STRAVINSKY AND ELIOT:
PERSONALITY, POETICS, AND CULTURAL POLITICS

By

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B.S., University of Alabama, 1950
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Adviser: Dr. Robert Detweiler

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Emory University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The Graduate Institute of the Liberal Arts

1976

XUM

STRAVINSKY AND ELIOT:
THE POETICS OF CULTURAL POLITICS

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May 14, 1976
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ABSTRACT

Epitomes of the modernist movement in music and letters and thus charged with extraordinary ambitions and responsibilities in the wake of their early celebrity, Stravinsky and Eliot used criticism increasingly as adjunct to their creativity and to their determined conceptions of what their respective arts should be doing at a particular historic moment. The frequently polemic nature of their criticism, colored by the marked tendency to elevate into law "impressions personelles," conditions its most notable cruxes. Moreover in its inclusive range, the derived poetic produced by such "workshop criticism" eventually sponsored the special affinity of "old comrades at arms" that later made for such congeniality when they became friends in old age. In so doing, it also validates the perspective in which this study places both men. Their extraordinary congruence of doctrine speaks strongly for the element of Zeitgeist which penetrates modernism in its conservative phase. The personal syndrome shared by Stravinsky and Eliot is a footnote to the study of essential continuities between biography and art, and offers a necessary corrective to exclusively intrinsic methods of analysis, if the work of discriminating modernisms is to be adequately reflective of the milieu it

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seeks to describe. As the most thoroughly on record among major representatives of what Stephen Spender calls "modernist traditionalism," Stravinsky and Eliot, considered together along the lines of their most explicit affinities--two closely similar poetic frameworks, offer a unique insight into the aims, tribulations, and distinguishing marks of what now becomes increasingly definable as a major phase of the post-1910 period.

The dissertation has five parts. Chapter I presents a history of the association and offers a justification of the comparison and analysis to follow, largely in terms of Stravinsky's own fragmentary speculations upon the same comparison.

Chapters II and III analyze and place the Stravinskyan poetic, tracing its evolution from early advertisements and polemic letters through the _Poetics of Music_ and his subsequent miscellaneous writings according to his most recurrent critical preoccupations: Order, Tradition, the Objective, and the renunciation of "expression" as a musician's primary goal.

In Chapter IV the critical writings of Eliot are reviewed in relation to the same four presiding and continuing concerns, following his effort to derive a satisfactory antidote for post-Romantic heresy and disintegration. At the same time, the chapter analyzes the detail of his argument in direct relation to the poetic Stravinsky had evolved contemporaneously.

Chapter V offers an overview of the two men's impact as exemplars and, to an extent, as theoretical models in the ongoing enactment of a cultural, artistic, and linguistic crisis for which both provided early and explicit descriptions, but have not, from this point of view, succeeded in pointing the way for a "shoring-up" available to the most productive among their successors. The study is, finally, elegaic, like the arts, poetics, and personal ambience of the men it seeks to convey.



IGOR STRAVINSKY AT 24 RUSSELL SQUARE, LONDON, 1958, WITH
EPSTEIN'S BUST OF T. S. ELIOT IN THE BACKGROUND

As always, a part of our conversation alighted on languages themselves.

--TE, p. 130.

[T]he account of the remembered experience is colored by the perspective and the need to enhance a point (to write about a man is to make him pose), which is that I revered Eliot not only as a great sorcerer of words but as the very key-keeper of the language.

--TE, p. 125.

[I]t is almost certain that the old vocabulary is exhausted, that the forms of classic culture cannot be rebuilt on any general scale.

--George Steiner,
In Bluebeard's Castle, p. 93.

PREFACE

Epitomes of the modernist movement in music and letters and thus charged with extraordinary ambitions and responsibilities in the wake of their early celebrity, Stravinsky and Eliot used criticism increasingly as adjunct to their creativity and to their determined conceptions of what their respective arts should be doing at a particular historic moment. The frequently polemic nature of their criticism, colored by the marked tendency to elevate into law "impressions personelles," conditions its most notable cruxes. Moreover, in its inclusive range, the derived poetic produced by such "workshop criticism" eventually sponsored the special affinity of "old comrades at arms" that later made for such congeniality when they became friends in old age. In so doing, it also validates the perspective in which this study places both men. Their extraordinary congruence of doctrine speaks strongly for the element of Zeitgeist which penetrates modernism in its conservative phase. The personal syndrome shared by Stravinsky and Eliot is a footnote to the study of essential continuities between biography and art, and offers a necessary corrective to exclusively intrinsic methods of analysis, if the work of discriminating modernisms is to be adequately reflective of the milieu it

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Abbreviations used in this study are the following:

ASG	Eliot, After Strange Gods;
CC	Eliot, To Criticize the Critic;
DD	Stravinsky and Craft, Dialogues and a Diary;
ED	Stravinsky and Craft, Expositions and Developments;
OPP	Eliot, On Poetry and Poets;
RC	Stravinsky and Craft, Retrospectives and Conclusions;
S	Eric Walter White, Stravinsky;
SE	Eliot, Selected Essays;
SW	Eliot, The Sacred Wood;
TE	Stravinsky and Craft, Themes and Episodes;
UPUC	Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism.

Among many patient people, several deserve mention for their special indulgence in seeing me through the various stages of the study, some more discouraging than others. Professor Robert Detweiler encouraged what at first must have seemed a nebulous proposal, then facilitated its development at every critical turn. Professors

Schuchard and Hoogerwerf, in addition to numerous useful stylistic suggestions, both on occasion provided essential opposing views to what might become too easy conclusions. Professors Arthur Evans and Lore Metzger were helpful beyond the call with bibliographical suggestions. Perhaps neither knows it, but at times when progress was slow, both Professor Gregor Sebba and Professor Hugh Kenner insisted I had a subject which must not be let go simply because it seemed slippery, and they thereby gave heart when it was needed.

To my friends who proofread and offered advice when they were certainly not obligated (Carla Schissel and Barbara DeConcini) and who forebore when that was most important (Rick Langhorst), I owe much and hereby acknowledge it with feeling. To John Leavey, who did not forebear, but scolded, bullied, ridiculed, and finally typed the thing, I must acknowledge that it has made, for me, the differAnce.

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CHAPTER I

AWARENESS, ASSOCIATION, AFFINITIES

Affinities between the careers and arts of Stravinsky and Eliot are indicated early and late, both in their own writings and through allusions and comparisons by their commentators. In his "London Letter" of September, 1921, Eliot wrote at a time when the experience and composition of The Waste Land were close upon him and voiced his admiration of the composer, calling him "Lucifer of the season, brightest in the firmament." In a paragraph strikingly similar to his celebration of James Joyce's appearance, Eliot observed: "To me the music seemed very remarkable--but at all events struck me as possessing a quality of modernity which I missed from the ballet which accompanied it. The effect was like Ulysses with illustrations by the best contemporary illustrator."[1] Elaborating his feeling that the music and the ballet did not match, he added: "The spirit of the music was modern, and the spirit of the ballet was primitive ceremony," going on to gloss what he called "the sense of the present." "Whether Stravinsky's music be permanent or ephemeral I do not know; but it did seem to transform the rhythm of the steppes into the scream of the motor horn, the rattle of machinery, the grind of wheels, the beating of iron and steel, the roar of the underground railway, and the other barbaric cries of modern life; and to transform these despairing noises into music."[2]

Among Eliot critics, Grover Smith, Herbert Howarth, Gertrude Patterson, and Anthony Burgess have all cited in recent years the impression of Le Sacre during formative stages of The Waste Land. Smith observes that, prompted by his perception of Le Sacre, Eliot "might almost have been sketching his own plans for a work applying a primitive idea to contemporary life."[3] Howarth believes Eliot "equally realized that if he could capture these effects he would create the contemporary literature which no writer in English had yet created: he would bring a literature which had not yet had a Stravinsky, and lagged behind, level with European music."[4] Patterson says flatly that "[i]n The Waste Land, he is making his own attempt at such a metamorphosis--only here it is voices that are metamorphosed," and adds that the texture of the poem is like Stravinsky's, as Jacques Rivière had described it, "entière et brute."[5]

W. B. Yeats, reviewing Ubu Roi in 1895, had asked: "after our own verse, after all our subtle colour and nervous rhythm, what more is possible? After us the Savage God." The explosive answer as seen by many was a musical one. Years later the English music historian Cecil Gray was to echo Yeats' question and pose an answer: "after the subtle color and nervous rhythms of Debussy, Ravel, and Delius, what more was possible but the Savage God of Stravinsky? The Sacre, in fact, was what Kant has called an historical postulate."[6] And so observers have thought it in surprising unanimity for sixty years. Eliot was one of the first literary men to perceive and make that postulate explicit. In turn, his own Waste Land was in significant respects an analogous poetic breakthrough and was so recognizable to percipient eyes and ears early on.

Anthony Burgess, recalling how he once organized a reading of The Waste Land during his student days at Manchester University while Eliot was still frequently seen as a literary Bolshevik, tells of his own struggle. "To accompany the opening, 'April is the cruellest month,' I wanted that marvelous chill bassoon solo at the beginning of Stravinsky's Le Sacre du Printemps, but I was howled down and we had to have a young music student playing Delius on the piano. Recently, I discovered that Eliot had had that very Stravinsky bassoon in his ears while composing his opening lines. I wish he'd announced the fact in 1937, the year of my production. I hate being right too late."[7]

Not only in their achievements did Eliot and Stravinsky invite comparison. As early as the thirties, the music critic Paul Rosenfeld, seeking an answer to the enigma of Stravinsky's unsettling and disappointing development after the years of the great ballets, found his lead in an analogy with the poet from St. Louis. Rosenfeld's comment is worth citing at length, centering as it does the widespread sense of bafflement and the sort of critical hypothesis offered at the time to explain what has remained a critical crux for near half a century.

> [W]hat has happened? . . . [A]n aversion to roots, dynamics: forces in and without himself. That, indeed, was what had happened: Stravinsky had turned against his own roots! The psychology of the émigré had developed in him: the spirit of the man not

> so much the physical exile as the exile from his early associations and the past alive in him; indeed from his own body.--This, curiously enough, came to me across the pages not of a Stravinsky score, but of a T. S. Eliot criticism: something about Chapman or Crashaw, Dryden or Marlowe; I've forgotten whom. In any case, in recognizing the analogy between Eliot's bookishness and Stravinsky's cerebralism and archaicism, I saw behind the scene; assisting at the birth of an hybrid style and defective classicism, neither Russian nor western nor Stravinsky. In flying from his early associations and the past alive in him, the émigré becomes mere head. For purposes of life, this head has to manufacture itself a body. It has to make the foreign its own; willfully identifying itself with that which makes the foreigner at home in his foreignness. Since this is early association and the living past, the émigré is unconsciously moved to identify himself with the forms assumed by them, sole contact possible to heads. He gradually becomes a fanatic of manners; called to defend his adopted country's culture and high tradition; more Catholic than the Pope, more royalist than the king; the intellectual knowledge, possession, appreciation of that past becoming subjectively potent symbols of identification. . . . [A] perfect instance . . . is to be found in T. S. Eliot's combination of head-rhythms with peevish bookishness and a puritanic cult for classic English expression divorced from a corresponding interest in the poetic personalities and the human adventure. [Another] alas! is the cerebralism and archaicism of the recent Stravinsky.
>
> A spiritual exile from Russia, forced to take root in western Europe, Stravinsky has perforce sought to assimilate principles of a tradition foreign to him.[8]

Rosenfeld's analysis voices a line of thinking common to numerous European (often French) estimates of the much heralded neo-classic phase of Stravinsky's music, generally held to have taken definitive shape in the Octet for Wind Instruments (1923) and marking most of his composition through his opera, The Rake's Progress (1951).[9] Music critics and historians from André Hodeir to Theodor Adorno have propounded their versions of this doctrine, and it is still in its present permutations a viable critique for those who do not believe Stravinsky ever returned to the prodigious attainment of Le Sacre.[10]

A similar line of censure/lament for Eliot is traceable also, but literary criticism has been, we ought to be reminded, predominantly an academic domain during this century, and the objections reflected in Rosenfeld's comparison remain, despite the overwhelming mass of Eliot commentary and explication, domesticated and restrained. Of that, more will follow, but here it suffices to make the point that adverse critiques of Stravinsky and Eliot from the twenties on rose from common objections and that the likening of their two arts was, to some critics, a natural and suggestive one.[11]

More positively, the rationale by which Stravinsky justified and sustained his creativity through the period of the twenties and thirties--made articulate both in his Autobiography (1934) and Poetics of Music (1939)--was clearly akin to, though certainly not directly derivative from, Eliot's critical thought. Eric Walter White, Stravinsky's most persistent biographer, notes in his first study of the composer under the heading "The Historical Sense" that, "[a]bout the same time as he abandoned his 'Russian style' and settled down in France, T. S. Eliot was entering on his public career as critic and poet in England."[12] Citing the publication of The Sacred Wood and quoting key passages from "Tradition and the Individual Talent," White goes on to maintain that the effort of the composer is like the poet's in the attempt "with full artistic integrity . . . to relate his work to the ever-flowing stream of tradition." Avoiding more critically speculative questions of motive and effect, such as Rosenfeld's, White merely relates the technique and intentions of the two in their "method of textual reminiscence and direct quotation" and in both artists' "ability to evoke emotion by successfully extracting the objective content of their material."[13] White further urges the pursuit of what he calls "the analogy between Eliot and Stravinsky," but despite the fact that White was writing in 1948, I know of no study in depth which has been prompted by his suggestion.

That Stravinsky himself did, in his later years, ponder this same comparison is a matter of record. And though the most explicit passage in which he does so is, once again, not developed at length, it is a highly provocative one and constitutes, in a way, the beginning and end of this dissertation:

> Were Eliot and myself merely trying to refit old ships while the other side--Joyce, Schoenberg--sought new forms of travel? I believe that this distinction, much traded on a generation ago, has disappeared. (An era is shaped only by hindsight, of course, and hindsight reduces to convenient unities, but all artists know that they are part of the same thing.) Of course, we seemed, Eliot and myself, to have exploited an apparent discontinuity, to have made art out of the *disjecta membra*, the quotations from other poets and composers, the references to earlier styles ("hints of earlier and other creation"), the detritus that betokened a wreck. But we used it, and anything that came to hand, to rebuild, and we did not pretend to have invented new conveyors or new means of travel. But the true business of the artist *is* to refit old ships. He can say again, in his way, only what has already been said. (*DD*, p. 30)

In his own Norton lectures Eliot had said: "Surely the great poet is, among other things, one who not merely restores a tradition which has been in abeyance, but one who in his poetry re-twines as many straying strands of tradition as possible" (*UPUC*, p. 85).

Music and literature are, of course, not the same thing and, in any ultimate sense, cannot be strictly comparable. They employ quite separate and, in important respects, distinct language systems.

Moreover, it is by no means certain that they derive from, pertain to, imitate, or express identical parts of human experience. Nevertheless, there is an overarching sense in which, as Stravinsky says, "all artists know that they are part of the same thing." A salient aspect of that "same thing" in the case of Stravinsky and Eliot is the strongly similar poetic evolved by each over the years to explain himself to himself and to the public. Similar, at least, in terminology, for the key words in their critical and analytic writing--_order_, _tradition_, _object_ (or its derivants), and _unity_, among others--are extremely close. It will be an important aim of the following analysis to explore the degree to which this near-identity of guiding conceptual tags indicates an actual aesthetic kinship, and to probe the nature and extent of that kinship.

For that inquiry, Stravinsky's _Poetics of Music_, the published form of his Norton Lectures at Harvard in 1939, will provide the central document, and it will be considered in reference to "Tradition and the Individual Talent," _The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism_, _After Strange Gods_, _To Criticize the Critic_, and other pertinent items in Eliot's criticism. The primary focus will be on Stravinsky's critical theory and practice, a matter far less thoroughly elaborated than that of Eliot, the nature and mass of musical commentary being a far different thing from the vast Alexandrian labyrinth of literary criticism in this century.

The _Poetics_ is an assertive, sometimes strident and querulous proclamation, a product of Stravinsky's middle years and a form of introduction in America; it is frankly polemic and of its time (as, in a less explicit way, The Sacred Wood might be said to be) rather than final and definitive. Surely it contained much that Stravinsky in later years felt impelled to modify or moderate in his conversations with Craft and others and in his published pensées, interviews, and articles. It continues to be regarded, nevertheless, as a central statement of the aesthetic to which he overtly related a vast part of his composition, and of the principles which he, at least, continued to insist ran constant throughout his vicissitudinous career as the most conspicuous, peripatetic, and controversial Western man of music for over fifty years.

From that placing of the Poetics, seen in the reflected light of Eliot's clearly influential synthesis of artistic problems of his time, I will hope to review in a little different way than has been done heretofore the relationship of theory and practice in the ongoing work of two of the era's prime shapers. To do this, I will look at both Eliot's and Stravinsky's output from different periods and examine the evident interaction of creative and critical impulse in them. To this discussion I believe some account of the men's actual, belated acquaintance and friendship is a necessary preface, especially since it conveys the setting and atmosphere in which the two masters finally came together near the close of their careers, some of the motives for their late blooming friendship, and something of the attitude in which they met, circled, wined, dined, joked, and savored a bit of late mutual congratulation. For this, Stravinsky's own recollections, cross-related with Craft's diary accounts of the several meetings, are a valuable reference, together with other strands of reminiscence from Spender, conversations with Huxley and Auden about Eliot, and so on.

The Friendship

Stravinsky's long-standing regard for the poet and, one may add, his special interest in Eliot for multiple reasons (strategy seems often to have abetted admiration) are made apparent from his initiation of a meeting between the two in England through the offices of their mutual friend, Stephen Spender. The association which followed and was maintained across the barriers of old age, declining health, an ocean and a continent, corroborated that regard. Stravinsky was 74, Eliot 68 at the time. "I met T. S. Eliot for the first time on a December afternoon in 1956. I was in London for a concert of my music in St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, and I invited him to tea. He arrived ahead of me and was waiting with Stephen Spender in the Savoy Grill Room when I appeared. . . . Conversation was not ready or easy, and at times I could almost hear the waiters silently polishing the silverware as though for a wake. The Savoyard sandwiches were a help, however, and so was the 'tea' (whiskey, in practice)" (TE, p. 124). Whatever importance may be attributed to Savoyard "tea," the unpromising beginnings which Stravinsky recalls led quickly to affable continuations. The visits, usually for dinner with their wives and, on occasion, Robert Craft along, were to become anticipated punctuation to Stravinsky's stops in London while he was on concert tour during the remaining years up to Eliot's death in 1965. One such meeting in New York is recorded also, made possible during Eliot's last visit to the United States.

From these meetings, aside from a manifestly warm friendship based on mutually shared tastes, assumptions, struggles, accomplishments (and, one suspects, on Stravinsky's part at least, a healthy relish for gossip), there resulted the anthem, The Dove Descending, based on the two stanzas comprising the fourth section of Eliot's Little Gidding and, by extension, the musical commemoration of the poet's death, In Memoriam: T. S. Eliot. No major (long) composition or collaboration was, so far as is recorded, ever proposed, though we cannot be sure Stravinsky did not entertain the idea, then drop it for reasons of his own. Eliot had long since ceased activity as a publishing poet, and despite a continuing high admiration for the man, even Stravinsky can scarcely have envisioned a musical setting of The Family Reunion or The Confidential Clerk.

Stravinsky's attraction to Eliot should be seen within the context of his lifelong experience of finding affinities and happy collaborations with men of letters. During a sixty year span as active composer, he worked closely and extensively with C. F. Ramuz (L'Histoire du Soldat), Cocteau (Oedipus Rex), Gide (Persephone), and Auden (The Rake's Progress) on major projects which were to become celebrated compositions. He had launched a scheme for an opera with libretto to be written by Dylan Thomas when he received word of the Welsh poet's death. All this is to say nothing of earlier collaborations with fellow Russians such as Stephen Mitusov (The Nightingale) and Boris Kochno (Mavra), the working out of his own texts for works such as Reynard and Les Noces, and numerous smaller pieces. In addition, his oeuvre includes shorter works involving texts from sources as various as Pushkin, Verlaine, Balmont, Hans Christian Andersen, folk songs, Japanese lyrics of anonymous origin, Thomas's Do Not Go Gently, Shakespeare, the Bible--all in all a diverse and extensive list.

Stravinsky's best and most constant friends during the Paris and Hollywood years included Paul Valéry, Aldous Huxley, and Christopher Isherwood--to cite some of the closest. More abbreviated, but noteworthy, acquaintances with Jacques Maritain, Gerald Heard, Evelyn Waugh, Spender, Graham Greene, Claudel, Franz Werfel, Isaiah Berlin, and myriad others were scattered through the years. Over decades his path crossed with that of Thomas Mann more than once, but despite his own persistent overtures he found the ironic German, on the whole, cool to him.

There is some evidence that, especially in later life, Stravinsky thought literary men more congenial than other musicians, at least on social and intellectual footing. Robert Craft has spoken of "I. S.'s musical isolation and . . . lack of communication with other composers" (RC, p. 198), and a tendency to ask "too strict a loyalty" (ibid., p. 197) of his friends, a demand, we might observe, less likely to be made upon other kinds of artists than on musicians. A great man, if he is so inclined, demands more specific adherences from those of his own calling than he ever thinks to elicit from others. Writers, painters,

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and sculptors share broad interests with, say, composers, but they do not in any direct way appear as competitors or pose threats. At any rate, the catalog of Stravinsky's contacts early and late, fleeting and permanent, includes so many literary figures as to become a distinguishing mark.[14] From his childhood recollection of awe at the sight of Henrik Ibsen strolling in Stockholm[15] and the indelible memory of having read Mark Twain in translation as a little boy in St. Petersburg (he tells us he never ceased to think of the Mississippi as "the strong, brown god"),[16] to recent conversations with Robert Graves, Henri Michaux, or Camus, and a late absorption with the wonders of Lévi-Strauss ("Lévi-Strauss's inquiries should be supported to the full. He is the first major philosopher to have understood that the true position of music is at the center of human culture"),[17] Stravinsky was clearly more than a little receptive to literary activity and fashion. The journals' listing of meetings, lunches, drinking bouts goes on and on: as a young man he recalls advice given him by Daudet, as an old man he swaps reflections with David Jones, calls on Ortega, finds Ionesco "uncommunicative." Stravinsky was long fascinated, not surprisingly, by Joyce, and once tried to draw out Eliot on his early recollections of the man and his work, but with small success: "all he could be made to say was that the account of their meeting in Wyndham Lewis's Blasting and Bombadiering is accurate" (TE, p. 127).

Stravinsky's reading was by many accounts--Craft's, Paul Horgan's, Vera Stravinsky's, Eric Walter White's, to name a few--omniverous. He had, he confided a little guiltily to Eliot, read at least sixty

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Simenons (Eliot's reply: "I can read about Maigret when I can read nothing else") (RC, p. 211). The Loved One inspired Stravinsky to stage a dinner with Evelyn Waugh, fellow connoisseur of Southern California bizarrerie. Waugh, however, proved difficult and irascible, and remained a problem throughout the evening for both wives, as well as for the irrepressible composer, who nevertheless concluded, "[i]n person I admired, even while suffering from, the agility with which he caused my remarks to boomerang. But whether Mr. Waugh was disagreeable or only preposterously arch, I cannot say" (DD, p. 37).

Gerald Heard was "the most brilliant talker I ever Heard" (ibid., p. 38), but Aldous Huxley proved a more reliable encyclopedia, and Isherwood a superior drinking crony. The author of Berlin Diaries often passed out and spent the night on the Stravinsky sofa during the Hollywood years, we are told. Graham Greene (all of whose novels both Stravinsky and Vera had read) turned out to be at once both shy and intimidating and, as a result, dinner with the author of The Power and the Glory proved a disappointing ordeal. Stravinsky did not share the novelist's interest in the emergent Wolfenden Report and records no response to Greene's remark that "T. S. Eliot and John Hayward should be induced to contribute a letter The Times on the respectableness of two men keeping house together" (RC, p. 201). Craft's account relates that Greene became "more interesting on the difficulties of unblocking royalties in the bamboo-curtain countries," discussion of money being a subject to which Stravinsky almost always warmed (ibid.).

As a matter of lifelong fact, reiterated again and again,

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Stravinsky loved words in and for themselves, the sounds and jointings of their parts. Frequently he refers to the artist as a maker, shaper, or preserver of language, whether verbal or tonal.[18] It was his habit to speak of melody, harmony, rhythm, and tone color as elements of the musician's language. To a degree, his reverence for Eliot, his implicit elevation of the poet above others, may well have derived from his sense of Eliot as "the very key-keeper of the language" (TE, p. 125), a role he plainly saw as parallel to his own in music. Eliot's own citation of Mallarmé's "donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu" was repeated, Father Torrens notes, in various contexts throughout Eliot's critical writing.[19] Stravinsky shared the preoccupation not only with the tools of his own craft, but with words themselves, whether or not they pertained directly to a problem at hand.

The Biographical Question

Whatever ultimate importance we attribute to biography in matters of interpretation and critical placement, it now appears that for some time to come the lives of two of our century's major creative forces are to be blurred or obscured in very different ways but perhaps for similar reasons. Public disclosures from both Eliot and Stravinsky have been piecemeal, fraught with strategies of secrecy and evasion. Both men remain in important ways yet to be revealed.

Undoubtedly Eliot's case poses the more dubious and immediate problems, the poet's penchant for impersonality, privacy, and indirection compounding the difficulty of access, even now, to his correspondence and private papers. Such impediments are the concomitant and aftermath of a considerable natural reticence and of formidable restrictions placed on all but a carefully managed publicity.

Despite the high degree of Stravinsky's arranged visibility (he published an Autobiography in France in 1934 when he had yet thirty-six years to live, and contributed or permitted a great deal of quasi-autobiographical material to appear in his six books co-authored with Robert Craft, plus authorizing and cooperating with Eric Walter White in his extensive and to-date most complete study, Stravinsky: The Composer and His Works, in the sense of making available a vast array of memorabilia, papers, manuscripts, etc., to the author), we still know comparatively little of the composer's private life, marital complications, the break with his children, the immediate situation surrounding his Catholic conversion in 1927, his political and social commitments, and inner empotional priorities and difficulties. The Stravinsky emergent is all too often a persona, his public mask being only a pastiche of the numerous possible and partial legitimate faces. Needless to say, the recently disputed status of his authorship in the collections of interviews, musical analyses, travelogs, epigrammatic pronouncements, aperçus, memoirs, and table talk which comprise his contribution to the Stravinsky-Craft collection is only the most noticeable impediment to any assured documentation of the essential man.[20] The composer was known to his commentators through a career spanning six decades as an eminently, almost overwhelmingly, public figure--to borrow Delmore Schwartz's designation of Eliot, an

International Hero, par excellence. Critics spoke of him as an artistic chameleon (much as they did Picasso), as mercurial and eclectic, as a tightrope-walker and mannerist, and as a careerist. But he was also singled out as "the most representative artist of the twentieth century."[21] Those who have followed his trajectory through the century following the early success of The Firebird and Petrouchka in Paris know that he has long eluded summary or definition, and are justifiably wary of the idea that any authoritative portrait can be assembled from the teasingly random, dubiously authored, though occasionally revealing writings he has left. Among other things, it appears to many we are faced with a hyper-conscious job of creating a quite stylized image to remember him by--"Stravinsky, by Stravinsky-Craft," executed much in the manner of his own music of the twenties and thirties which used to strike hearers as "Stravinsky-Handel, by Stravinsky," or "Stravinsky-Tchaikovsky, by Stravinsky."

On matters biographical, then, it is not only the hand of Craft, so often impugned, that may be suspect, but also Stravinsky's own habit of partial disclosure, postured ellipticisms, and misleading candor, as well as his legitimately changing point of view, which will for a long time to come confound the curious. We may well question if it is the noted privacy of Eliot or the determined publicness of Stravinsky which is in the end least informative, least revelatory and defining.

I have digressed here because it is obvious that in a study which aims finally at cultural estimate and placement of some sort, questions of biography, intentionality, sincerity, consistency, and integrity are important. The problem of authenticity in the authorship of the Stravinsky-Craft books, like the problem of aligning Eliot's theory of impersonality with his own highly personal (an ever larger chorus of critics seem to be saying almost romantically personal) poetry, is a real one, omnipresent and not to be ignored.

If, however, we are to await full clarification on all that puzzles us in the ways either artist handled his life in his art, considerably more urgent critical questions may not be addressed for a long time, if at all. That, or they will continue to be scanted, hushed in a near-conspiracy of critical "decorum" for which Eliot's own edict and example serve as principal model, even as Stravinsky's occasional outbursts against artist's biographies provide vehement support.

I will deal briefly with the authenticity problem, seeking to define the respects in which the presently questionable authorship status of the Stravinsky-Craft books limits (and does not limit) their use as a mine of information, not only on Stravinsky's life and career, but also as a personally focused and privileged cultural document of this century.

Here it is most important to be reminded that we are not approaching the books as biography or autobiography in any full sense, or as instance of any imputed literary aspirations on Stravinsky's part, but rather in terms of the preoccupations and habits of life which they display, the patterns of recurrent questions and problems faced, set of mind, and as a record of preferences voiced, choices made, companions, pathways. In these respects, the rigors of strictest attribution are obviously less decisive, and the books may be drawn upon with considerable confidence.

Much of the dubiety expressed concerning Craft's role as author-midwife of passages attributed to Stravinsky arose from the fact of the composer's frail health and advanced age during the writing of the later entries, particularly in the final volume, Retrospectives and Conclusions (1969).[22] Objections raised do not, as a result, cast the same doubt over the earlier volumes. Little or nothing in the use made of the books in this study is dependent in its assumptions upon an authentication of Stravinsky's authorship in the sense of actually penning or typing his own entries, or of his arranging and editing them for inclusion in book form. At the very least, he sanctioned their publication under his own name during years when he was still visibly hale and active, conspicuously keen of mind, and indefatiguably at work. To question the utterance in its main thrust and import is, it seems to me, to question the authenticity of the man himself, and that we are concerned to do only on a higher level, that of his stature as composer, his validity, originality, and impact as theoretician, and his integrity as artist in an era as important as it is difficult to assess. The former is in no way my intent or purpose to do; the latter is, of course, a prime concern and reason for this study.

The Stravinsky-Craft books provide several unique accounts of meetings between Stravinsky and Eliot. In some instances the point of view is double: we have both Stravinsky's and Craft's. Often, as mentioned, both Vera Stravinsky and Valerie Eliot were present, and the tone of the occasions is in each instance social. Typical is one on October 16, 1961, wherein Craft, also in the party, notes, "Tonight's dinner has been arranged to discuss a proposal that I. S. set to music 'two lyrical stanzas,' as Eliot calls them, from Little Gidding, though Eliot himself is 'doubtful they can be set.' Nothing further is said about this, however, and instead the poet and musician talk about favorite romans policiers, and plays of Voltaire neither of them has read" (DD, p. 176). How the arrangements were concluded, or when, we are never told, but the previously mentioned anthem, The Dove Descending, did result and was performed in 1962. It does not stretch belief to venture that there may have been no more specific discussion, that by this stage of a friendship dating concretely from 1956 (and, we may add, stretching back over thirty years in terms of mutual awareness and, at least on Eliot's part, a voiced admiration), the particulars of arrangement could safely rest on assumed consonance of feeling and purpose and posed no great problem in the mind of either man. Certainly, the accounts--both Craft's and Stravinsky's--reflect an atmosphere relaxed and jovial, its two principals more intent on conviviality than business.

Eliot discourses on Tagore ("I could make nothing of it"), Pound ("But he had great gifts, and I owe more to him than to anyone. Which reminds me that I should send him a letter; hm, hm, difficult to know what to say" [ibid., pp. 175-76]), and Eliot's occasional inability to recall his own poetry ("because it was rewritten so many times I forget which version was final").[23]

For his part, Stravinsky advised Eliot on tax matters (dinner at the poet's Kensington Garden flat should have been "deductible"), compared "r" sounds in Russian and Sanskrit with the poet, and records no response to Eliot's remark that he had not read any serious prose fiction since 1927: "I think the last novel was Middlemarch . . . no, I am forgetting The Heart of Midlothian . . ." (TE, p. 127). Stravinsky's own logoleptic proclivity and his reverence for Eliot emerge at the same time in his quizzical reflection that "I remember he used the word 'transpadane' in this discussion and . . . though it may have had to be dredged up and artificially resuscitated, like all of Eliot's words it became beautiful" (ibid., p. 128). That such an observation marks a genuine confluence of interest, belief, and taste needs little arguing.

Despite the failure in getting Eliot to talk of Joyce, a similar strategy worked better in regard to Joseph Conrad, who was

> especially interesting to me because of his Polish-Ruthenian background, which was partly the same as my own (he had lived for some years as a child in my father's birthplace, Chernigov), and because he was--dare I say "also"?--a man who in his mature years moved from a Slav culture with French inlay to an English one. Eliot described Conrad as "a Grand Seigneur, the grandest I have ever met, though it was a shock after reading him to hear him talk. He had a very guttural accent." I asked if it were like mine and Eliot replied that mine was easier to understand--which did not quite answer me. (Ibid., p. 129).

What Eliot thought of Stravinsky by this time, we do not, as we do not so many other things, know. That, along with other Eliot mysteries great and small, is conspicuously not a matter of public record. On Eliot's celebrated privacy, Stravinsky is as apt as anyone: "Eliot has drawn his portraits, however--Old Possum, Tiresias, the churchwarden,

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Sweeney--and the only composite picture will remain the one painted by himself. And why should we look for another, or ask what was he 'like'? The creations are the man, and the proof is a parody of Prufrock I have just produced. . . . He may also have been a great actor, of course, with a secret life behind his words, but I do not know. *His prepared faces, as he called them, are enough for me*" (*ibid*., p. 125; my italics). After a long conversation with Pierre Suvchinsky, "a man who was as close to I. S. at one time as I am now," Robert Craft writes:

> By extension I am able to recognize everything and confirm much in Suvchinsky's picture. But it is another I. S. So, too, the I. S. *I* know would seem greatly transformed to Suvchinsky, who would also be able to see by looking ahead, as I am able to see by looking back, the "continuity of personality." But the differences lead me to wonder whether anyone has ever known more than one or another aspect of I. S. Even V[era], who can collate these views, is held apart from his deepest feelings by at least the length of each new composition. (*RC*, p. 199)

Comparisons

In the section of *Dialogues and a Diary* (1963) devoted to short meditations on persistent aesthetic concerns quoted above (p. 6), Stravinsky permits himself a rare effort at justifying his artistic ways over the years to . . . himself? his audience? his muse? The passage is central to the focus in which I place Stravinsky in this dissertation and, at the same time, it fixes Eliot as an illuminating point of reference through the explicit comparison drawn by Stravinsky and the added weight of their eventual gravitation toward each other as friends. The passage urges a considerable elaboration and will provide much of the critical impetus and locus of my study. The sobriety of Stravinsky's tone speaks for itself.

Stravinsky's linking of himself with Eliot is obviously not casual, any more than his instance of Schoenberg and Joyce as antitheses. He was all too well aware of the habitual pairing of himself and Schoenberg as significant opposites in the dialectic of twentieth-century music, a practice to be found almost universally in historical and aesthetic discussion from the mid-twenties on, ranging from passing contrasts drawn by reviewers to the ponderous antinomy round which T. W. Adorno builds his *Philosophie der Neuen Musik* (1948), still the most prestigious study of its kind. Stravinsky himself indulged the game in response to a question from Craft in *Dialogues and a Diary*, offering a twenty-item set of "large and not very waterproof generalities" distinguishing himself from Schoenberg. Significantly, he follows immediately by adding, "[a] nice parlor game, no more, *but the parallelisms are more interesting*" (italics mine). Then he enumerates a set of nine similarities both intrinsic and extrinsic to musical composition, headed by a "number one" citing "The common belief in Divine Authority, the Hebrew God and Biblical mythology, Catholic culture" (pp. 56-58).

My own list of likenesses, drawn up almost at random in a preliminary stage of thinking toward a study of Stravinsky and Eliot in the same frame of reference, reflects a profusion of bases for considering the two together as prototypes of one sort of twentieth-century artist, many of which Stravinsky may have been taking into consideration. The list is offered for what it is worth, no more, but

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its readiness-to-mind, its recurrent articulation in chronologically parallel and occasionally intersecting criticisms of music and art, and the common mention of its subjects in ongoing discussion all argue that a significant part of the creative work of the first half of the century took place within a discernible syndrome wherein creators in different media faced and handled similar problems in closely analogous ways, guided by kindred precepts and rooted in similar experiential soil. This list could be longer; what does appear can argue its own relevance:

STRAVINSKY	ELIOT
1. Emigré--Russia Switzerland France United States	Emigré--United States Great Britain
2. Marital problems during twenties	Vivien Eliot
3. Aristocratic point of view	Royalist, Classicist, Anglo-Catholic
4. Earliest aesthetic pronouncements (1920-21)	The Sacred Wood (1920)
5. Religious conversion--1926	Religious conversion--1927
6. Poetics of Music	"Dante," "Blake," "Tradition and the Individual Talent"
7. "Music expresses nothing."	"It is never what a poem says that matters, but what it is."
8. Use of Pergolesi, Bach, Handel, Tchaikovsky, Hogarth	Wide use of quotation and allusion
9. Anti-Romanticism, centered in reaction against Wagner	Anti-Romanticism, centered in reaction against Rousseau
10. The musical object	The objective correlate

11. Zest for polemic	"Milton," "The Metaphysical Poets," debates with J. M. Murry, Laski, After Strange Gods
12. Myth--mostly Greek	Myth--many sources
13. Ritual, rhythmic bases of art	Ritual, rhythmic, and musical deep structures
14. Highest praise for "monuments of order"--Beethoven Quartets	Same--Dante, Beethoven Quartets
15. Not a systematist	Shifting precepts--Aesthetic to Moralistic criticism
16. Criticism as creative aid	Criticism as defense of own kind of poetry
17. Unconscious origin of Le Sacre	Fortuitous circumstances of The Waste Land
18. Eclecticism	"few so open to the influence of other men as was Eliot"--Margolis
19. Development, not change	Admired capacity for continued development
20. Never stood still stylistically	Movement from "poetry of images" toward "poetry of statement"
21. Decades as premier figure and spokesman	The Elder Statesman

To me the list suggests a solid reason for Eliot's being not only the likely figure for Stravinsky's comparison, but, among really eminent artists of the generation, perhaps the most plausible one, disparities of origin, temperament, and energies notwithstanding. At any rate, it is one he makes explicitly, and that is enough.

If it were not, Stravinsky has left another indication, implicit it is true, a matter only of gesture, but a gesture so strategically and centrally put as to foreclose doubt that he intended such a

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comparison to be drawn by whoever cares to consider that larger framework in which "all artists know they are part of the same thing." That gesture, symbolic surely, is to be seen in Stravinsky's decision to pose before Jacob Epstein's bust of Eliot for the portrait used as frontispiece to White's Stravinsky: The Composer and His Works, a work of strategic importance in establishing the "official" image Stravinsky wished to leave.[24]

Perhaps more than anything else, it was the composer's allegiance to what he defined as Tradition that determined his chosen alignment with Eliot in the summary years of his life. As Paul Des Marais puts it, "[f]or Stravinsky, like Eliot, history was the past and present together, something interesting to be used. He could take history into his hands: thump it, prod it, and squeeze it into the most fantastic shapes. It was still history, but it was also new."[25] Ezra Pound had insisted on "making it new," and the image of artist as indefatiguable maker by which Des Marais depicts Stravinsky, indicating his Eliot-like concept of tradition as dealt with by the individual talent, forges a picture of the master musician caught in a mutually familiar attitude as well, the same one Eliot paid elegant and celebrated tribute when he dedicated his own most memorable and timely poem to "il miglio fabbro."

"When I read Pushkin," Stravinsky had said, "I ask myself not (so much) 'What is it?' as 'How is it done?' Myself, I am a maker."[26]

Noting the aegis under which Eliot first made his mark, Borges recalls that the poet "was at first a lucid and orderly disciple of the extravagant Ezra Pound,"[27] and in dramatic fact it was the selfsame

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grand impressario of literary modernism who, against all odds, managed to make his symbolic presence felt once more (as he had previously done at Eliot's interment) when, in "the cruellest month" of 1971, the grand and solemnly symbolic extravanganza of Stravinsky's burial finally took place, of all places, in Venice, a few yards from the grave of Serge Diaghilev. "Among the mourners was a gray-haired ancient who, sitting with a woman companion, did not leave at the end (of the early-morning ceremony) but remained, almost motionless, in his seat throughout the morning as the church gradually filled to overflowing. Not everyone recognized him as Ezra Pound."[28] Francis Steegmuller tells how, in that morning's Il Gazzettino, the Italian composer Malipiero had crassly "wondered in print why Stravinsky had chosen to be buried in Venice: 'Was it to forget Hollywood? Or to be reconciled with Diaghilev?'"[29] But Malapiero's questions are not questions for Steegmuller nor, apparently, for others among those modernists who, knowing they were all, and had long been, "a part of the same thing," knew also to fear "death by water," yet stayed to "pray for those who were in ships." For refitters of old ships, what more appropriate place than Venice to post their most personal of all epitaphs to what they had long elegized as a sinking civilization? "On Diaghilev's gravestone," Steegmuller tells us, "there are incised a few words in Russian that seemed to provide sufficient retort to Malapiero's foolishness. They are Diaghilev's own words, quite simple, and might apply equally to the two famous men: 'Venice, ever our inspiration and fulfillment.'"[30]

The point of view of two such makers as Stravinsky and Eliot, for whom "Venice" (where "The rats are underneath the piles") could yet metaphorize "inspiration and fulfillment" beyond 1920, will be the real subject of the following chapters and the account they offer of a poetic "epiphenomenal of . . . taste," an attitude toward the fabrication of a "restorative" Art which was eventually to leave its advocates, as Peter Heyworth said in his obituary of Stravinsky, with "imitators in plenty, but no true successor."[31]

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NOTES

[1] T. S. Eliot, "London Letter," Dial, 71 (Sept. 1921), p. 452. The entire piece is worth reading alongside its predecessor, dated July 21, wherein Eliot writes of "the counter thrust of strict limitations of form and the expression of life" (pp. 214-15). It illustrates the close integration Eliot saw between the new ballet, the "method" of Joyce's Ulysses, and the prospect of an emergent drama. That Eliot did not get around to a full-fledged dramatic application of his insight for years is a matter of historic curiosity and, perhaps, regret.

[2] Ibid., p. 453.

[3] T. S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays (Chicago, 1950), p. 71.

[4] Notes on Some Figures Behind T. S. Eliot (Boston, 1964), p. 235.

[5] T. S. Eliot: The Poems in the Making (Manchester, 1971), pp. 155-56.

[6] Predicaments (London, 1936), p. 198.

[7] "The Waste Land Revisited," Horizon, 14 (Winter 1972), p. 104.

[8] Musical Impressions (New York, 1969), pp. 153-54 (rpt. from Discoveries of a Music Critic [New York, 1936]).

[9] Roman Vlad cites Pulcinella (1919) as the point de départ for Stravinsky's neo-classic phase: "Pulcinella was the first of a series of works in which Stravinsky, by more or less explicit references to the works of great composers of the past, reconstitutes in the mirror of his own personal idiom a picture of the last two hundred years of western musical culture" (Stravinsky [London, 1960], p. 76). Others mention L'Histoire du Soldat (1918) as a distinct precursor. Stravinsky himself makes the designation explicit through his own remarks on the "program" of the Octet (1923). There is no real dispute that The Rake's Progress marks a terminus ad quem.

[10] Robert Craft in RC, p. 197, takes issue with Pierre Suvchinsky on this score, remarking acidly: "As for the alleged perpendicular

decline of I. S.'s music after the Russian period, that is the official French postwar view of it; and Oedipus Rex and the Psalms will be released from French quarantine only when some extremely daring antiquarian of the Seventies discovers that whether or not these masterpieces are neo-classic is beside the point."

[11] Leonard Bernstein's Harvard lecture (part of the 1974-75 Norton series) deals explicitly with this problematical period in both artists' development and makes a comparison between representative works of each.

[12] Stravinsky: A Critical Survey (London, 1948), p. 126.

[13] Ibid.

[14] See Laurence Davies, "Stravinsky as Littérateur," Paths to Modern Music (New York, 1971), pp. 236-46.

[15] "Some things one sees never leave the eyes, never move into the back part of the mind. So Ibsen is in my eyes" (Stravinsky, in Conversations with Stravinsky [Garden City, 1959], p. 94).

[16] TE, p. 131: "though the god of the poem, as Eliot once corrected me, was actually 'the muddy "Mo."'"

[17] RC, p. 34. What Stravinsky thought of Schopenhauer may, or may not, be reflected in this remark. He always preferred clarté to "schwerbegreifbarer philosophischer Klarheit."

[18] "As always, a part of our conversation alighted on languages themselves," he says after one of his Eliot visits (TE, p. 130).

[19] See James Torrens, S.J., "T. S. Eliot and the Austere Poetics of Paul Valéry," Comparative Literature, 23, No. 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 7-8. Stravinsky was fond of the same phrase, appropriately a line from the sonnet, "Le Tombeau d'Edgar Poe." The symbolist tradition ran strong in both men, as did the feeling for the custodial role of the master artist, no matter how both might excoriate Matthew Arnold and the notion of the artist-priest.

[20] See Patrick J. Smith, "Who Really Wrote Stravinsky's Prose," High Fidelity, 22, No. 11 (Nov. 1972), pp. 50-56, for a resume of contending viewpoints. Paul Horgan's observations on the matter in Encounters with Stravinsky treat the question both sympathetically and with good judgment.

[21] The designation is Herbert Read's. The quote is from a catalogue of the exhibition at the Santa Fe Festival, 1962, cited by Horgan. Its praise is high and, since Sir Herbert was not a musician, it carries special weight: "It is given to some artists, whatever their

their craft, to be in virtue of their universality the representative artist of their age--a Dante, a Shakespeare, a Michelangelo, a Goethe. The most representative artist of our own twentieth century has been, not a poet or a painter, but a musician--Igor Stravinsky" (Horgan, Encounters, p. 209).

[22] Pierre Boulez, whose estimate as composer has sunk in the later Stravinsky-Craft books, is the most prestigious doubter. Others include Lillian Libman, a professional publicist and concert manager who was sometimes attached to the Stravinsky caravan and who quickly published her own book at his death, and Donal Henahan, a music reviewer for the New York Times.

[23] DD, p. 114. "His verses will not allow us to forget the laborious erasures that occurred in writing them, but at times they are splendid and charged with nostalgia and solitude" (Jorge Luis Borges, An Introduction to English Literature [Lexington, Kentucky, 1974], p. 72).

[24] White in fact wrote two books on Stravinsky, one in 1948 and the later biography cum catalog and bibliography referred to here. Though discreet and diplomatic, both enjoy the advantages of privileged access and careful scholarship. The latter was sanctioned and sponsored by Stravinsky himself.

[25] Paul Des Marais in "Stravinsky: A Composer's Memorial," Perspectives of New Music, 9, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1971), p. 87.

[26] Quoted in Francis Steegmuller, "Stravinsky at Work," Saturday Review, 29 May 1971, p. 45.

[27] Borges, An Introduction, p. 71.

[28] Francis Steegmuller, "Burial in Venice," New Yorker, 47, No. 11 (May 1, 1971), p. 100.

[29] Ibid., p. 103.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Peter Heyworth, "Igor Stravinsky: A Giant Who Will Survive," Observer, 11 April 1971, p. 22.

CHAPTER II

STRAVINSKY'S EARLY POLEMIC

> Any order which is self-proclaimed
> is nothing but a disguise for
> chaos.
>
> T. W. Adorno

Order and "Impressions Personnelles"

Stravinsky's announced intention and prolonged endeavor in mid-career, "to establish order and discipline in the purely sonorous scheme to which I always give precedence over elements of an emotional character," is a notable instance of a pattern of reaction against threatened general disintegration, one widely felt and voiced among leading artists.[1] Detailed description of such reaction lends more than casual support for Adorno's insight. A more familiar citation, the one most quoted in exemplifying the widespread impulse, is T. S. Eliot's invocation of classicism, royalism, and Anglo-Catholicism to provide a framework in his own agonizing quest for some stabilizing bulwark--poetic, political, personal. The calls on the part of these two figures, however, for a center which might conceivably hold, even if no more than individually and temporarily, are only the most conspicuous among many made by practicing creative artists of the era between the two great wars. For our purposes, they do have the virtues of being among the most extensively detailed and elaborated as to specific application for the sign-systems within which the composer and the poet worked and stood as leading spokesmen.

In a strict sense, there was nothing planned, cohesive, or programmatic about the overall outcry, little to indicate more than the most generalized kind of "influence" one on the other. Among proponents of the conservative credo being voiced, many were personally unacquainted, or knew each other only through work and reputation, as is true of Stravinsky and Eliot during the years in which they were undergoing artistic and personal crises and beginning to articulate their responses in remarkably parallel terms.[2] There were, of course, common influences of a traceable type, many of them French and literary or philosophical: Maritain, Maurras, Benda; and they often lead back in one way or another to Baudelaire and the symbolist line. But influence, however intriguing a subject, is not our concern. I am taking for granted a considerable core of shared lineage, the evidence for which is made explicit by Stravinsky and Eliot often enough in their own choice of references and quotations; this will become sufficiently plain in the exposition of their poetics which constitutes the next three chapters of my study, the first two dealing with Stravinsky, the next with Eliot.

"Eriger en lois ses impressions personnelles, c'est le grand effort d'un homme s'il est sincere." Eliot's citation from Rémy de Gourmont as epigraph to "The Perfect Critic" (first essay in his first collection of critical essays, The Sacred Wood) invites consideration as touchstone for his entire critical work and, to some degree, for that of certain other artist-critics of his generation, Igor Stravinsky for one. There may be no more productive single rubric for reading the diffuse and puzzling corpus of comment stretching from the publication of The Sacred Wood in 1920 through the Stravinsky entries in Retrospectives and Conclusions (1969), the last in the Stravinsky-Craft series, an ongoing record of nearly half a century's disclosures from the most eminent conservative poet and musician of their time. That in ways quite effective the "impressions personnelles" of these two men came to be elevated near the status of laws for so many and for so long argues much about the measure of effort and sincerity involved, though from another point of view it may say just as much about the strategies of cultural politics, the staying power of establishmentarian attitudes in hostile circumstances, and the subtler interrelations of rationalization and rhetoric. "Eriger en lois. . . ." Taking for granted the reach and impact of the sustained effort and saying as little as possible about the vexed subject of sincerity, I want to follow in detail some aspects of the translation of the personal into the magisterial as each man manages it in developing a poetic adequate, as Eliot put it, to "an account of the poet's experience of his own poetic activity, related in terms of his own mind" (UPUC, pp. 29-30).

Eliot was speaking of criticism as he viewed it "at its best," and he warns in the same paragraph that "when the critics are themselves poets, it may be suspected that they have formed their critical statements with a view to justifying their poetic practice" (ibid., p. 29). No reminder should be needed, especially in Stravinsky's case, that much of the criticism and poetic theory to be examined in this thesis did emerge after the fact of the creative work it gives "account of" and must be construed in one of its dimensions as apology, in another as advertisement. Both men, on occasion, are forthright on this. As a result, the continual need to mediate between the objectively experiential and the subjectively self-justifying becomes a first requisite to an ideal close reading and comparison of the two.[3]

From the time he emerges as spokesman for his own music (and, by sliding implication, for music generally) Stravinsky's is a call to Order. He is quite specific in voicing his feeling of being threatened by chaos and anarchy in the world at large, in the domain of art, and in his person. Since his writing deals mainly with music and is usually occasional in nature, the principal concern is naturally with the situation of Art faced with that threat as he conceives and articulates it, and the major theme of his most central and extended discussion, the lectures that comprise the Poetics of Music, is the imposition of aesthetic order and how to achieve it. This basic aesthetic problem is related, often quite specifically on either side, to the danger of encroaching world disorder and to the peril of personal "terror," though in the latter case the linking comes primarily through a shift in dictional intensity rather than through explicit logical connections.

Suggested, but not specifically acknowledged, is the apprehension that his own early work, notably Le Sacre du Printemps--no matter how misunderstood--may have played a significant part in the unleashing of a creative "freedom" frighteningly destructive in its potential of traditional musical order. "I was made a revolutionary in spite of myself."[4] In the proposed quest for Order, which he identifies with the preference for the One over the Many, instinct, emotion, and expression are to be subordinated to logic, objectivity, and the aim of an aesthetic integrity akin to Joyce's "poise and balance of the period" (PM, pp. 33-34). Discipline and restraint are repeatedly invoked, and the "monster of originality" will seek its own inner control and severely limited sanctions within the stronghold of Tradition. The tradition invoked, as with Eliot, is actually a revised and revaluated one tailored, as it turns out, according to a highly individual Stravinskyan precept. Conceived as a curb to excess and heresy, tradition offers conventions within which to work and develop, materials to "borrow," and the comforting securities of continuity, a refined scheme of reference, and a time-tested standard of taste. It makes for stability and is lauded in terms of cultural health. In the fullest measure, Stravinsky's invocation of Tradition is articulated in terms of the composer's custodianship of musical technique, its "language," and is analogous to Eliot's persistent sense of mission as reflected in his view that "literature must be judged by language, it is the duty of the poet to develop language"[5] and "to preserve, and even restore, the health of language."[6]

Healthy also is the distancing of art from the burden/curse of "expression." Stravinsky maintains that the use of art to "express" confuses the proper focus of the Ideal through false emphasis on the personal and the actual, thus blurring its true aspiration to the Universal. In his letter of October 13, 1919, to Blaise Cendrars, Stravinsky prefigured what was to become one of his most controversial pronouncements: "Music expresses nothing of a realistic character . . . something of the real world is caught as pretext or clothing for the inherent abstraction . . . descriptiveness has been removed . . . to a level of objectivity and pure art-play. . . ."[7] The extreme improbability of Stravinsky's acquaintance at this time with the article on Hamlet being published simultaneously in England by the young and relatively obscure Eliot should give pause to those who dismiss easily the concept of Zeitgeist as a factor in cultural connections that otherwise elude concrete explanation. Stravinsky's "pretext or clothing for the inherent abstractions" bears an uncanny likeness to Eliot's coinage of "objective correlative" to describe "the formula of that particular emotion."[8]

Foundations of a Poetic

Four considerations dominate as Stravinsky derives the framework of an aesthetic corresponding to his own poetic (musical) experience "related in terms of his own mind": the urgency of achieving order; recourse to tradition as a means or guide toward its attainment; severe restraint or limitation of the personal and emotive; and the

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corollary, a working-out of the material onto "a level of objectivity and pure art-play" in the autonomous musical (artistic) form-to-be. A close reading of three documents will disclose the process of that derivation as it took place in the years following what Robert Craft calls "Stravinsky's Great Divide . . . the index point of this epochal change in musical philosophy . . . the beginning not only of his neoclassic aesthetic but of his preoccupation with aesthetics."[9] These are: "The Sleeping Beauty," subtitled "Open Letter to Serge Diaghilev" (1921);[10] "Some Ideas about my Octuor" (1924);[11] and Poetics of Music (1938-39), Stravinsky's six lectures delivered in French as Charles Eliot Norton Professor at Harvard.

Stravinsky's lucubrations are a matter of voluminous public record. A tracing of his aesthetic evolution post-1920 could also draw heavily on his ghost-written but closely supervised Autobiography (1934) and, in order to complete the story, would have to take into account the expansion, revision, and elaboration contained in the Craft-Stravinsky collections. I have chosen to concentrate on the aforementioned texts, however, because they provide respectively a concentrated view of the "impressions personnelles" from which Stravinsky works again and again as a kind of matrix of taste and instinctual alignment; because they are the first and most absolute of his manifestoes; and, in the case of the Poetics, they offer the most explicit, consequent, and fully stated exposition of artistic credo. The first is not the beginning, but a beginning. The last is certainly not an ending, but may be understood as a central statement toward which the experience of almost three decades as an active composer (and over a quarter century as a world-renowned figure of hotly controversial eminence) had brought him at a time when the catalyst of the Harvard invitation acted upon a condition of personal, artistic, and professional crisis to evoke a fully characteristic (though not fixed or final) revelation. Within these recommendations and limitations the writings cited serve as index to Stravinsky's essential, ongoing inquiry into and justification of his own "poetic practice."

Craft notes that "[w]ith Mavra (1923) and the Octuor (1924), each new Stravinsky opus was introduced by a newspaper article, interview, radio talk, or public lecture. Not all of these apologia were written by Stravinsky, but all were initiated by him and kept on one of his short leashes."[12] Both the substance and the tone of these are prefigured in the "Open Letter to Serge Diaghilev." Stravinsky's contribution, apart from the letter, amounted to no more than the orchestration of two Tchaikovsky piano pieces for the forthcoming ballet, The Sleeping Beauty. But the accompanying letter illustrates in its subject, sharpness, and oddly gratuitous attacks on pet aversions of the time, the essential dynamic underlying the composer's emergent neoclassic doctrine which was soon to follow.

The introduction and praise of Tchaikovsky is, to be sure, purposeful. It serves an immediate and practical end--advertisement, but Stravinsky's tributes to his fellow Russian are also an abiding motif in his writing throughout, and one must regard the admiration as genuine, though the degree of preference for Tchaikovsky (and Glinka)

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over all other Russian composers may be questioned in light of subsequent findings.[13] Stravinsky's affinity is explicable in light of his feeling that his own gift was in salient respects similar to Tchaikovsky's, and his conviction of their mutual excellence and focus as ballet composers. Moreover, ballet was, at the time, regarded as the distinctive Russian cultural contribution,[14] hence the admiration of Tchaikovsky's "Europeanness." Stravinsky's own personal brand of nostalgia makes itself felt here, as in numerous instances, in the vein of reminiscence coloring his advocacy. "[T]his work appears to me as the most authentic expression of that period in our Russian life which we call the 'Petersburg Period', and which is stamped upon my memory with the morning vision of the imperial sleighs of Alexander III, the giant Emperor, and his giant coachman, and the immense joy that awaited me in the evening, the performance of The Sleeping Beauty" ("OL," in S, p. 527). In his Autobiography (1936) Stravinsky stresses repeatedly the importance of "those incidents which make a deep impression" and recalls a childhood hearing of Glinka's Russlan and Ludmilla in a gala performance which was "a memorable evening for me. Besides the excitement I felt at hearing this music that I already loved to distraction, it was my good fortune to catch a glimpse in the foyer of Peter Tchaikovsky, the idol of the Russian public, whom I had never seen before and was never to see again."[15] Glinka's A Life for the Tsar had been the work performed when "I heard an orchestra for the first time. . . . The impression was indelible. . . ."[16] Elsewhere Stravinsky alludes to recollections of his first exposure to Pushkin and, in

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a different context, states matter-of-factly that "I still consider Dostoievsky to be the greatest Russian after Pushkin."[17] A full collation of Stravinsky's memorabilia with later artistic stances taken would bear out the difficulty of overemphasizing the degree to which his earliest recollections form the essential substructure for tastes and aversions later argued with fierce show of logic and authority.

Of equal importance in the elevation of Tchaikovsky is the contrast drawn by Stravinsky between that composer's aesthetic, musical, and historical direction to the deliberate and conscious nationalism of "the Russian Five," whose music "has long been awarded the facile label of Muscovite picturesqueness" ("OL," *ibid.*).

Tchaikovsky, he says, possessed three musical gifts "to the fullest extent: simplicity, 'poverty', and spontaneity." He is extoled, along with Glinka, for his "power of melody, centre of gravity in every symphony, opera or ballet composed by him . . . an extremely rare and precious gift . . ." (*ibid.*).

Then abruptly and, it would seem, entirely gratuitously, comes the assertion in sharp, paragraphed relief: "And that is something which is not German."[18] The pattern of praise followed by the revelation that the attitude toward the thing(s) praised is born of animus for an opposite thing loathed and to be excoriated is conspicuous here, as it is present in so much of Stravinsky's writing. Wagner, *bête noir* of his most violent and extended tirades, is not mentioned specifically at this point, but is forcefully implied in the blow which follows as Stravinsky polishes off "*Leitmotive* which they substituted for

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melodies," melody being, in this period, the most insistently extolled in Stravinsky's hierarchy of musical components.

The correctness of Tchaikovsky's intuitions is praised, once again at the expense of the naive "nationalists" because while "not specifically cultivating in his art the 'soul of the Russian peasant', Chaikovsky drew unconsciously from the true, popular sources of our race." There is "no doubt of the quality of his taste."[19] "Every time that a Russian musician has come under the influence of this Latino-Slav culture and seen clearly the frontier between the Austro-Catholic Mozart turned towards Beaumarchais, and the German-Protestant Beethoven inclined towards Goethe, the result has been striking. . . ."[20]

In the bravura of these two opposed configurations, Stravinsky goes far toward defining the nature and style of the strange debate of taste and artistic direction during the era in which he will play such a decisive and controversial role over the next twenty years. His breathtakingly unelaborated collocation of Mozart, Couperin, Glinka, Bizet, Latin-Slav culture, and Austro-Catholicism "turned toward Beaumarchais" finds its instant dialectical opposite (for Stravinsky) in the identification of Beethoven (emblematic of the dominant, established line of musical descendency) with Germanness, Protestantism, and a highly suspect inclination "toward Goethe."

Just how to construe this pan-cultural sweep is, given the speaker, the time, the aesthetic questions put, an open field for conjecture. In light of Stravinsky's subsequent ruminations, as well as his development as a composer, we know that he is, at the least, saying something vital about himself, his own outlook and prospects as an operative musician faced with choices suddenly become crucial and increasingly self-conscious, and that the something vital has importantly to do with divergent pulls of lightness and heaviness, national identity and "Westernness," authority and romantic impulse. The implications for his own future and those who would emulate him are unmistakable: "Every time a Russian musician [read non-European?] has . . . seen clearly the frontier . . . the result has been striking." Stravinsky concludes by designating himself (by now four years exiled) pointedly as "Russian musician." With half a century's hindsight we can now perceive that the chosen parameters of his course are here being set for some time to come: preferring "involuntary but living anachronisms" to "archaeological research" or "laboured pasticcio" (and apparently drawing some clear distinction of his own between them),[21] and describing the preference modestly as a "virtue that appertains only to great creative minds," he will venture to compose and legislate to the tastes of the twenties and thirties under the aegis of a newly enunciated aesthetic, one frequently to be designated in critical parlance, and sometimes by Stravinsky himself, as a _new classicism_.

The "Open Letter" was initiated as an advertisement for Diaghilev's forthcoming production of _The Sleeping Beauty_ in 1921, and Stravinsky's contribution interrupted briefly his work on a projected opera based on Pushkin's _The Little House in Koloma_, to be known by time of its premiere in 1922 as _Mavra_. But the letter could serve as a preliminary position paper as well. In _The Arts_ of January, 1924, there appeared the full-length article titled "Some Ideas about my Octuor" (described, as mentioned above, by White as the first the composer had written directly for publication). It is Stravinsky's most cubistic aesthetic statement, the objectivist extreme toward which his crisis (of whatever nature) of the intervening two or three years had brought his thinking, and from which absolutist stance his frequent public declarations were to proceed over the years, explaining, arguing, refining, and ultimately modifying the basic ideas of an initially uncompromising formalism. The tone of "Some Ideas" is authoritarian, almost belligerent, its form that of a manifesto. Appended to an initial one-sentence announcement, unindented, are twenty-nine blunt, declarative statements (mostly adhering to a one-sentence paragraph structure) concerning the work and elaborating its primary proposition: "My Octuor is a musical object" ("SI," in S, p. 528). Insisting on the piece as a thing made (Jacques Maritain's neo-Thomist Art and Scholasticism had recently been published), Stravinsky specifies several times the totally integral nature of melos and medium, matter and form. He declares "a certain rigidity of form I had in mind," and rules out the use of stringed instruments for the ensuing score, since they are "less cold and more vague" (ibid.). "My Octuor is not an 'emotive' work but a musical composition based on objective elements which are sufficient in themselves." What he calls "musical architecture" is proclaimed to be "the most important question in all my recent compositions." Having "excluded from this work all sorts of nuances," the composer designates "the play of [these] volumes" and "the movements in their reciprocal connection" as the "two active elements on which I have based the action of my musical text (which is the passive element of the composition)." Sharply demarcated *forte* and *piano* are "only the dynamic limit which determines the function of the volumes in play" (*ibid*.).

Thus elucidated, the finished piece, "the object for musical execution," is offered up, along with a stern and lengthy warning to ensure that "the executant(s) follows strictly the musical text" (*ibid*.). Throughout, Stravinsky's syntax, arrangement, and tone suggest that such recurrent terms as "execution" are employed with full cognizance of their extra-contextual sense and that in composing such an unusual form for such an unusual combination he is not only expanding the repertory in a forceful, "constructive" way, but also may well be taking an almost malicious pleasure in making the performers an offer they can't refuse. Renato Poggioli has reminded us of the military origin of the term *avant-garde* and points out the legacy of warlike language and tactics evident in the movement of modern art from the early, attention-getting antics of the Dadaists through the manifestoes of Futurists, the blasts of Hulme, Lewis, Pound and Company.[22] Stravinsky, despite the strenuous effort to disengage himself in the 1920's from the reputation he had earned in the decade previous, actually inherits much of his method and habit as publicist and tactician from his early days with Diaghilev and the Ballet Russe, his long-term connections with French literati--notably Cocteau, whom he had known intimately since 1914.[23] At this particular stage of an imperiled career, he employs the mode and attitude of polemic ostentatiously. The appropriation of impressive, quasi-mechanistic jargon is another family characteristic: his *Octuor* has "specific weight" and "occupies a place in space" and "like all other objects it will necessarily lose part of its weight and space in time and through time" ("SI," in *S*, p. 529).

More significantly for the development of music to follow everywhere in the West, Stravinsky insists, near the end, that in his music Form (ultimate consideration for the musical object) "derives from counterpoint," a remarkable assertion considering his *oeuvre* to date. Further, "I consider counterpoint as the only means through which the attention of the composer is concentrated on purely musical questions" (*ibid*., p. 530). Stravinsky was, of course, not the first or only composer to tender this bromide of the time, but it is doubtful if any of the various declarations to this effect (Schoenberg's and Hindemith's come to mind) proved more immediately influential, and certainly none can have been voiced more unequivocally. For better or worse, Stravinsky's call to counterpoint signals a return to what Eliot often referred to analagously as "first principles" in his own theory and praxis. It was a tribute to Stravinsky's own achievement and stature that its influence had much to do with establishing and fueling a tendency in the serious music of the day known, in its most popular and fatuous description, as "back to Bach." Judicious musical historians are still trying to assess the impact and value of this postulate both for the music of Stravinsky and for the generation of composers who heard and heeded his example.[24]

In "Some Ideas" and other writings, Stravinsky's strictures against performers and critics, against "interpretation," may often strike readers as interruptions to discussion of more intrinsic import. However that may be, they are usually present and are, in fact, entirely characteristic. And while in a strict sense such considerations do tend to violate the purely ontological discourse on the nature of music and its constituents--to belong somewhere else in the discussion, in other words, it is not so for Stravinsky. For him, performance and hearing (if not interpretation) complete the "realisation" of the music and "what I demand is the realisation of the piece itself and not of its portrait" ("SI," in S, p. 529). White notes that the constant preoccupation with errant or faulty rendition of his music, a lifelong concern near obsession, became accentuated in the early twenties, especially following a particularly unfortunate performance of his Symphonies of Wind Instruments at its premiere in London under Koussevitsky on June 10, 1921 (S, p. 254). Part of an all-Russian program of established and, for the most part, popular works by Rachmaninov, Rimsky-Korsakov, Glazunov, and Scriabin (three of which later came to be regarded or spoken of with contempt by Stravinsky, though he always maintained a proper, if measured, respect for his master, Rimsky), the dry and acerbic Symphonies were, in Stravinsky's estimate, inadequately performed. They were, in any event, hissed by the audience, and (perhaps charitably) ignored by the reviewers (whom Stravinsky always chose to regard as synonymous with critics, though he knew as well as anyone how in the newspaper world they are all too often chosen by chance and cannot be described as critics in any real sense of the word). The débacle was one of Stravinsky's first critical reverses and came at a time when it was particularly urgent, after the war, to reaffirm his immense pre-war prestige and extend it beyond the continent to England and a beckoning America.[25] The occurrence also closely anticipates his emergent decision to launch an "additional" career as conductor and, later, as pianist. Coincident with strong musical and professional motivations were, as Robert Craft now acknowledges, the developing urgency of personal and financial pressures stemming from the necessities of maintaining two ménages, quite separate, after his alliance with Vera de Bosset.[26]

In any event, it is not altogether surprising to find, set down emphatically amid considerations of "form considered as the only emotive subject of the composition" the news that "I admit the commercial exploitation of a musical composition, but I do not admit its emotive exploitation. To the author belongs the emotive exploitation of his ideas, the result of which is the composition; to the executant belongs the presentation of that composition in the way designated to him by its own form" ("SI," in S, p. 530). Despite the proprietary nature of the claim, the foregoing speaks for itself as influence on theories of performance over the last half-century, as any conservatory graduate can attest. Here the oft-stated reaction against a whole tradition of romantic performance style (and excess) works hand in hand with a fundamental instinct to declare incontrovertible territorial claims and to reassert the proper contours of hierarchy. And, though other items of musical dogma find much more moderate phrasing in Stravinsky's later thought, the rigid doctrine of performance and interpretation remains much the same. If anything it tends to become more authoritarian and sharply imperious as time goes on.

Finally, a close approach to a thoroughgoing aestheticism is made in a concluding paragraph which begins: "This sort of music has no other aim than to be sufficient in itself . . . nothing else, neither the literary nor the picturesque, can be in music of any real interest. The play of the musical elements is the thing" (ibid., p. 531).

So much having been said, one peculiarly modest and puzzling afterthought concludes the article. "I must say that I follow in my art an instinctive logic and that I do not formulate its theory in any other way than ex post facto" (ibid.). To the skeptical, this admission may seem to undermine or contradict the ostensible rigor and theoretical integrity of what Stravinsky has claimed up to this point. What, one is inclined to ask, is the "objective" validity of a superstructure, be it ever so rigorously derived, which is then admitted to be based on a foundation of "instinctual logic"? It is not, after all, the rigor or system which we question, any more than the momentarily acknowledged subjective basis manifested by "instinctive logic." It is rather the claim to the notion of the "objectively valid" with its pretense to successful suppression, compartmentalization, or transcendence of those very elements which, when we get down to it, must in candor always be recognized, even if only in a postscript or

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afterthought. Unable to void completely the importance of the emotive and the instinctual, Stravinsky de-emphasizes it by relegating it, as it were, to footnote status, though he preserves an avenue of retreat from the most extreme and indefensible stance by mentioning it at all, however perfunctorily. In this respect his tactic is typical.

Crisis, Poetics, Politics

In any retrospective of Stravinsky's fifty years as influential commentator and arbiter of musical taste, one would naturally expect considerable shifts in aesthetic emphasis, an evolution of viewpoint, and, in a man of Stravinsky's indisputably volatile nature and circumstances, occasional turnabouts; problems of reconciliation, apparent *and* real, naturally arise. So they do. But the interesting and perhaps surprising thing is that, considering his reputation as eclectic, as musical chameleon,[27] and the incontrovertible factuality of his having composed in three or more distinct idioms at different stages of his life,[28] it is possible to discern a fundamentally continuous--and thereby, in that sense, consistent--substratum of aesthetic thinking underlying the shifts. In that evolution, the "Open Letter," read as his first published specification of aesthetic preferences, serves as a useful showcase for the premises of taste, belief, and loyalties contributing to an increasingly articulate aesthetic of composition to be elaborated for years to come. In the same perspective, it is useful for the present study to regard "Some Ideas" as a *terminus a quo* for the increasingly cerebrated, worked-out, articulated, and publicly-directed expression of views. "Some Ideas" is, as I have said before, an extreme statement, querulously put, of attitudes the years were later to modify, but eventually, not quickly.

Further, although it heralds what Rosenfeld and Lang, plus a host of French critics on the scene of his major activity deplored as a long period of sterility and blight, that estimate is no longer a critical universal if it ever was and, at any rate, the manifesto does reveal a stance applicable to the music he was composing for almost two decades of hotly contested but undeniable influence in the development of twentieth-century music. Insofar as we can regard it as an accurate and successful explanation of what Stravinsky was doing at the time (a sort of justification of the ways of Lucifer to man), it can also be regarded as adding a dimension to an otherwise baffling volte-face in the musical output of one of the two most influential musicians of his era.

Stravinsky's antipodal placement vis-à-vis the Viennese "school" is a commonplace of the musical cartography of the period 1900-50.[29] In addition, his public utterance begins relatively early in a trend musicians were adapting from other art forms: that of explaining and commenting on their own efforts in a public way.[30] Before this century, analytical writing about their own music was for composers a rarity, and seldom highly articulated or widely circulated when it did exist. Wagner (ponderously) and Schumann come to mind as forerunners. But this century has brought an increasing flow of articles and books by composers anxious to air the aesthetic and theoretical bases of

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their own music, and of the acoustical, environmental, social, and historical determinants and desiderata thereof.

Stravinsky's manifestoes and announcements, media interviews, open letters, leading up to his Autobiography (1936), Poetics of Music (1939), and the six Craft-Stravinsky collections (1959-69), comprise a striking and prominent instance, but Hindemith, Schoenberg, Webern, Copland, Piston, Chavez and others on up to Boulez, Stockhausen, and Babbitt have contributed to shape the composer's praxis-derived and -oriented inquiry as one of the dominant developing modes of critique and aesthetic definition. Viewed historically, it is part of a trend which in itself argues the unique crisis of sensibility and direction which has overtaken music, alongside a parallel sense of dilemma in other expressive forms of our time. Stravinsky's place as prototypic modern served, of course, to call the musical world to attention when he chose to speak: when the maker of fashion sounds a new note, the world observes, especially when the call comes from Paris--or so it was in 1920. Sir Herbert Read once called Stravinsky "the most representative modern artist," and Osbert Sitwell can still refer to him in Great Morning (1948) as "the master of the epoch."[31] Seen in that light, the combination of Stravinsky's turn toward introspection and his expanding analysis of the musical situation becomes a more-than-modestly symptomatic analog in the musical world for the already pervasive literary self-scrutiny which has prompted the description of our time as "the age of criticism" and made that designation a form of contemporary truism.

The Poetics of Music is usually regarded as Stravinsky's central critical and theoretical statement. The six lectures which comprise it do offer a unique reflection of his public personality and attitudes on the eve of World War II, and they adumbrate his own transfer of activity from Europe to America, though they also present problems if the attempt is made to view them as enunciating a system or a fixed, operative aesthetic. The pattern is too elliptic, the temper marred by factionalism and the topical, but they do represent an effort at integrating and putting persuasively a full exposition of "where Stravinsky was at" at a crucial stage of his career. They have moreover the virtue of providing, perhaps more than any of his earlier and subsequent pronouncements, a focus of his thinking about his art and a fair verbal-ideational center from which to view and assess his evolution as composer-critic-theoretician. In addition, they enjoy the added advantage of being presented under formal auspices and, as a result, are the result of a careful, sustained incubation and preparation.

Harvard's invitation was opportune and flattering. Stravinsky was the first musician to occupy the chair in a succession of celebrated artists previously chosen from men of letters. The series had produced distinctive contributions: The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, Eliot's lectures from the 1932-33 series, is a case in point. Stravinsky, with his own career in France at a problematical stage and Europe increasingly imperiled, his own personal world only partially stabilized after his heralded embrace of the Church in 1926, faced the added distress of family trouble and ill-health himself.

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Between November 30, 1938, and June 7, 1939, his oldest daughter Ludmila, his wife Catherine, and his mother all died. He himself moved to Sancellmoz and spent five months in a tuberculosis sanatorium, where he wrote the second movement of the Symphony in C and worked on the Norton lectures. The death of his wife freed him to live openly with, possibly to marry, Vera de Bosset, but for a man as scrupulous in the maintenance of the forms of propriety as was Stravinsky, the decisions and transitions toward this end cannot have come easily or been taken lightly. His recently assumed position as a conspicuously public Catholic naturally contributed to the complexity of his personal situation. New commissions came from the United States rather than from Europe.[32] France, his adopted home and the scene of his greatest early triumphs and celebrity, proved critically hostile to what was considered his artifically adopted neo-classicism and seemed about to consign his reputation to oblivion. Performances were rarer, premieres less festive, notices bad. No doubt the "land of opportunity" appeared, at times and from afar, just that to the composer. Certainly, his present situation was not ideal. Like many of us, Stravinsky was quick to generalize from his immediate condition. In an interview with Serge Moreaux on Radio Paris in December, 1938, after dismissing critics as "mauvais bergers," he had this to say about the scene about him:

> It is not surprising that critics are disoriented; the crisis is indeed more general than we see it. In fact, the human condition itself is profoundly affected: we are in the process of losing our awareness of values and the feeling of relations. This is extremely serious, for that fact leads us to the transgression of the fundamental laws of human equilibrium. Applied to musical

> art, we obtain: one side wishes to lower the spirit of what I would call the higher musical mathematics to some servile applications and vulgarize it by an elementary utilitarianism. The other side, since the spirit of our age is sick itself, music which is believed pure bears in itself the germs of a pathology something like a new original sin.[33]

Though Stravinsky's attitudes toward and associations with Fascism have never been thoroughly aired or documented, enough is known to say that by this time he no longer harbored the early illusions about its promise which had for several years prompted some identification between himself and the movement, particularly with Mussolini. But Italy was the nation which most notably sponsored and welcomed his music in the mid-thirties, and Stravinsky continued to perform and record music in both Italy and Nazi Germany as late as 1939 when, Pierre Suvchinsky charges, "all of his colleagues with a scrap of political, if not moral, sense (and not least among them I. S.) were protesting Nazism."[34] Notably he "was a frequent and welcome visitor to Blackshirt Italy during the Ethiopian and Spanish wars, after all, conducting at the Maggio Fiorentino as late as 1939, by which date that festival had become a loudly pro-Axis celebration" (RC, p. 195). Since Stravinsky himself recounts an ugly episode involving himself, Vera de Bosset, and a Jewish friend, the photographer Eric Schall, in Munich in 1932 and relates how the incident had opened his eyes on the subject, the inference is that no matter how clearly he discerned, along with others, the incipient danger and repugnance of the totalitarian wave, he did not regard the question as being of sufficient import to cut across the primary matters of promulgating his art, supporting his various *ménages*, and forwarding his career. The fact remains that among prominent artists of world rank who have been tarred with the brush of collaboration, Stravinsky may well have been among the earlier ones to draw back from totalitarian ideology and practices, but he was also indisputably one of the later ones to withhold his art, prestige, and participation from their cultural festivals. Suvchinsky speculated to Robert Craft that "[i]f Stravinsky had not gone to America in 1939, he might have compromised himself politically. . . . He even inscribed a copy of his Chroniques de ma Vie for Mussolini. Was this out of pro-Fascist sentiments or because Mussolini's trains ran on time?" (ibid.). Whatever the answers to Suvchinsky's questions, intriguing though they be, I think the answers are, without much fuller amplification than is here possible, imponderable.

What is clearer, taking Stravinsky at his own word, is that he always saw himself first and foremost as a musician, and it would have been inconsistent with his belief to let a moral demand cut across or take precedence over an artistic imperative. And there is no reason to believe his own brand of Catholicism, with its ingredients of intellectual fashion, aestheticism, and nostalgia for an orderly scheme, should have proven more a determinant of risky or self-sacrifical action for Stravinsky than it did for millions of others faced with similar dilemmas throughout a troubled Europe in which, as he said, the situation was indeed "extrêmement grave" and the "transgression des lois fondamentales" was everywhere to be seen. Viewed from Paris, with the rhetoric of L'Action Francaise ringing in the air, Italy's Fascists and Germany's Nazis would scarcely be seen to have any monopoly on "péché original."

Stravinsky, in any event, came to America, the lectures largely written before he sailed. "He discussed their substance with his friend Pierre Suvchinsky, who helped him draft them in Russian; and later he revised them with Roland-Manuel, who helped him to rewrite them in French" (S, p. 90). Moreover, we know from a letter of Paul Valéry's written to Gide in September, 1939, of at least one airing they received before reaching Massachusetts. "Nadia [Boulanger] lives three hundred yards from here and until Thursday had put up Stravinsky, who is bound for America (if that is possible). We saw a lot of each other. S. read us the course he'll be giving on the Poetics (he, too) of Music, which have analogies with mine (a rather curious thing)."[35] Valéry says no more of the lectures, or what he thought of them, and we are left to speculate as to exactly what the poet of La Jeune Parque may have thought "a rather curious thing" about the analogies between his own poetic and that of the composer who insists so strongly on the autonomy of art and its essential removal from the realm of emotion and external responsibility. What Edmund Wilson calls Valéry's "characteristic interest in method apart from matter which leads him to publish two versions of the same sonnet,"[36] wherein Valéry himself speaks of "the rather monstrous copulation of my system, my methods and my musical exigencies with the classical conventions,"[37] finds a precise echo in Stravinsky's frequent reworkings and republications of the same works, his obsessive concern with process, and his own copulative and dependent relationship with his own selection of classical conventions which had been by 1938 a growing preoccupation for almost two decades. Such concerns were, by the late thirties, a hallmark of artistic practice all over the West; they merely found an epitome of expression in France and in the spelt-out aesthetics of Valéry and Stravinsky. The composer's already conspicuous habit of searching out compatible and self-confirming models in eclectic manner was soon to transfer its *locus operandi* to a new theatre. The promise of a new land was enhanced by rejection, disillusion, and the threat of disorder in France. Perhaps tradition was portable after all and would be available in America which might hopefully be anticipated, with a little mental juggling, as an extension of "the mind of Europe."

NOTES

[1] Igor Stravinsky, An Autobiography (New York, 1936), p. 109.

[2] Richard Ellmann's Eminent Domain, in narrating the personal-poetic relations of modern British poets, conveys well the strong, though essentially random, cross-influences of major literary figures, one on another, without their being part of a "school" or conscious movement. The ambience in which Stravinsky moved, nowhere studied as such, is evident in many accounts of his career, memorabilia, etc.

[3] Both men were superb tacticians and, in personal affairs, defiantly private, though Stravinsky's "privacy" wore a public mask.

[4] PM, p. 11. But in 1915, Stravinsky told Artur Rubenstein: "The Sacre was essentially my revolution against the existing musical tradition . . . " (quoted in Rubenstein, My Young Years [New York, 1973], p. 428).

[5] T. S. Eliot, The Egoist, 5 (April 1918), p. 55.

[6] "The Social Function of Poetry," in OPP, p. 144.

[7] Quoted in Robert Craft, "Stravinsky in America," New York Review of Books, 21, No. 13, 8 August, 1974.

[8] Hugh Kenner comments that the formulation "makes perhaps a more general claim than Eliot intended; he could hardly have foreseen its misapplication to the job of the lyric poet" (The Invisible Poet, 1959, p. 102). Stravinsky's remark about music "expressing" nothing certainly got him into hot water.

[9] Craft, "Stravinsky in the Twenties," New York Review of Books, 2 May, 1974, p. 31.

[10] This letter was carried in The Times of 18 October, 1921. It is reprinted in S, pp. 527-28, as Appendix A 1. Hereafter it will be abbreviated as "Open Letter" and often cited as "OP" in references.

[11] This article, designated by White as "the first article Stravinsky had ever written for publication (S, p. 528), was printed in

The Arts, January, 1924. It also is reprinted in *S*, pp. 528-31, as Appendix A 2. Hereafter it will be abbreviated as "Some Ideas" and often cited as "SI" in references.

[12] Craft, "Stravinsky in the Twenties," p. 31.

[13] Stravinsky's letters demonstrate, for instance, high regard for Moussorgsky, the "greatest" of the *Group of Five*. This esteem, a most natural one, was little emphasized in print, as Craft says, "partly because of his public partisanship on behalf of Tchaikovsky, whom the French abominated in about the same measure as they venerated Moussorgsky." Negative reaction to prevalent French attitude seems often to have been sufficient determinant to establish Stravinsky's position. See Robert Craft, "Stravinsky's Russian Letters," *New York Review of Books*, 21 February, 1974, p. 20.

[14] Ibid., p. 17. In a letter dated July 21, 1911, written to his friend Vladimir Rimsky-Korsakov, Stravinsky says: ". . . I am interested in and love the ballet more than anything else . . . for the only form of theater-art that makes its cornerstone *the problem of beauty and nothing more, is* the ballet. . . ."

[15] Stravinsky, *Autobiography*, p. 7. He adds a few sentences later: "I think that the beginning of my conscious life as artist and musician dates from this time."

[16] *Ibid*., p. 6.

[17] Stravinsky and Craft, *Conversations with Stravinsky*, p. 93.

[18] Clive Bell recalls in *Old Friends* (London, 1956), p. 180, a strained conversation in Paris in 1922 between Marcel Proust and Stravinsky. To Proust's overture, "Doubtless you admire Beethoven," the composer answered shortly, "I detest Beethoven."

But, mon cher maître, surely those late sonatas and quartets . . .?"

"Pire que les autres."

The bias had abated by the time Stravinsky wrote in 1968: "These quartets are my highest articles of musical belief . . ." (*RC*, p. 142).

[19] Stravinsky's italics seem significant in view of his more frequent insistence on "controlled" processes.

[20] "OP," in *S*, p. 528. When Mozart was 18 in Salzburg, he saw Beaumarchais' *Il Barbier de Seville* and Shakespeare's *Hamlet* within two nights. His later setting of *Le Nozze di Figaro* is, of course, quintessential Mozart, with its dramatic base in *commedia del arte*; he never set Shakespeare, Lessing or the other "Germanic" playwrights he knew and considered at times. See Alfred Einstein, *Mozart* (London, 1946), p. 99.

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Taste in Stravinsky's vocabulary corresponds closely to *sensibility* in Eliot's.

[21] A thorough gloss on the distinction Stravinsky draws would deal with the differences he saw between *his* neo-classicism and that of his "imitators," Francois Poulenc's for one.

[22] Renato Poggioli, *The Theory of the Avant-Garde* (1968), pp. 73-74. Poggioli also makes clear in other respects how, like Eliot and Pound, Joyce and Bely, Picasso, Klee, Henry Moore, and many others, Stravinsky "prove[s] that the modern genius is essentially avant-gardistic" (p. 224). Such artists, despite "their anxious search for a new and modern classicism," actually continue the experimental exploration which "is a kind of aesthetic Faustianism" (p. 135). From this perspective, the type of the "revolutionary traditionalist" remains essentially avant-gardistic in exactly those moments and gestures he considers most conservative. He is indeed "made a revolutionary in spite of [him]self." The "classic" gesture becomes, in many cases, another instance of defiance, this time against his own initial instincts and the dominant tendency of his time.

[23] Cocteau, with whom Stravinsky had a not-entirely-satisfactory collaboration on *Oedipus Rex* (1927--the year after Stravinsky's rejoining the Russian Orthodox Church), maintained that "*Le Sacre* . . . remains a Fauvist work."

[24] Ernest Krênek, "Tradition in Perspective," *Perspectives of New Music*, 1, no. 1 (Fall, 1962), pp. 27-38, has an excellent general discussion of this.

[25] Stravinsky's accounts of the fiasco in his *Autobiography* and in *TE*, p. 152, are very different. By the time of the latter writing, Koussevitzsky, whose power in America and whose good will toward Russian composers Stravinsky respected, but whose musicianship he found appalling, had died.

[26] Stravinsky's death seems to have opened several doors. In all the hundreds of pages published previously, Craft had not been free to air fully the important reasons for Stravinsky's restiveness. In a recent article, three years after Stravinsky's death (but not Vera's; she is very much alive, but apparently does not object) Craft writes: "After Stravinsky moved from Switzerland to France, in June, 1920, his music was influenced to an unprecedented extent by the circumstances of his life. On February 19, 1921, he met the woman who was to be his companion for fifty years, and for whom he sacrificed his family. Then in 1923 he embarked on a career as conductor and pianist, with a radical effect on his work. For the first time, too, his new music met with resistance (partly because of the increasing popularity of the old), one result of which was that he began to formulate a philosophy of his art, something he had not needed before" ("Stravinsky in the

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Twenties," p. 29).

[27] Cecil Gray provides a good example in his Predicaments (1936). For him, Stravinsky's restless reappearances in new stylistic garb suggest old men of ancient times who, "prematurely aged through excesses of every kind, believed that they could recapture their lost vitality by means of contact with robust adolescents" (pp. 210-11).

André Hodeir, Since Debussy (1961), p. 21: "The stylist in him has devoured the artist."

Robert Siohen, in Stravinsky (1966), p. 112, speaks diplomatically of "the extreme mobility of spirit" that has characterized the composer, along with Cocteau and Picasso.

[28] Craft, Collaer, Vlad, and others present this aspect in terms of Stravinsky's attainment as neo-classicist and later as serial composer and place both very highly.

[29] Indeed, it determines the structure of several histories and analyses: Donald Mitchell's; Joan Peyser's; and, in the main, that of the major source and text to date, William Austin's Music in the Twentieth Century, to say nothing of T. W. Adorno's theoretical cyclops, Philosophie der Neuen Musik. Stravinsky himself acknowledges the inevitability of the opposition in DD, pp. 56-58, by affording his set of comparisons, as alluded to in Chapter I above.

[30] In music the bibliography, although not so overwhelming as in literature, is already beyond reach. The writings of Debussy, Busoni, Schoenberg, Hindemith, and Webern make a good start. On artists' self-examination as a manifestation of dissociation, alienation, and heightened self-consciousness, three modernist paradigms, see Monroe K. Spears, Dionysus and the City; Irving Howe, The Idea of the Modern; and Erich Heller, "The Hazard of Modern Poetry," in The Disinherited Mind. These are arbitrarily chosen: the list is long, the formulations various.

[31] The Read reference is quoted in Paul Horgan, Encounters With Stravinsky (Boston, 1972), p. 209. Sitwell's quotation occurs on p. 269 in his Great Morning (Boston, 1947).

[32] S, p. 89. Craft, in "Stravinsky in America," pp. 26 ff., amplifies the situation.

[33] "Il n'est pas étonnant que les critiques soient désorientés; la crise est bien plus générale que vous ne la voyez. En effet, la condition humaine elle-même est profondement affecté: on est en train de perdre la connaissance des valeurs et la sensation des rapports. C'est extrêmement grave, car cela nous mène à la transgression des lois fondamentales de l'équilibre humain. Appliqué à l'art musical, cela donne ceci: d'un côte on veut rabaisser l'esprit de ce que j'appelerai les hautes mathématiques musicales jusqu'à des applications serviles,

et à le vulgariser par un utilitarisme élémentaire. De l'autre côte, comme lui-même l'esprit de notre époque est malade, la musique qui se croit pure porte en elle les germes d'une pathologie quelquechose comme un nouveau péché original." This interview is reprinted in _S_, p. 540, as an appendix.

[34] Quoted by Robert Craft in his Diaries, 1956, entry in _RC_, p. 195. Stravinsky seems to have been more or less impervious to these speculations. Anyhow, he allowed them to be included in the collection.

[35] _Self-Portraits: The Gide-Valéry Letters, 1890-1942_, ed. Robert Mallet, tr. June Guichernaud (1966), p. 319.

[36] Edmund Wilson, _Axel's Castle_ (1950), p. 64. Stravinsky was continually reworking, re-orchestrating, and republishing. He called the revisions his "comments" on earlier works.

[37] _Ibid._, p. 70.

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CHAPTER III

STRAVINSKY'S POETICS

Pierre Suvchinsky has maintained that Stravinsky was a very confused man during the period of his life in which the Poetics was written.[1] What we know of the composer's work, alliances, and movements of the time supports this view, as does the turbulent statement of the Poetics itself, proclaiming, more insistently than any other theme, the urgent "quest for order." What is offered is an updating in a considerably more developed, personalized (for some readers, idiosyncratic) idiom, of the tastes and predilections of earlier, more fragmentary publications such as the "Open Letter" and "Some Ideas." The Poetics resounds with quasi-cubist rigors and aesthetic mandate. Tensions born of a fierce impulse to impose order amidst countervailing tendencies toward chaos or disintegration (biographical, aesthetic, professional, political) are everywhere apparent in the text: throughout occur virulent attacks on romanticism, Wagner, and such "liberal" forms as the idea of progress and originality. Strident admonitions in praise of rigor, will, conscious construct, and the dogmatic advance an eccentric reassessment of "good tradition," and betray numerous other earmarks of complex and powerful inner stress. "I shall talk about making in the field of music. . . . [W]e shall not use music as a pretext for pleasant fancies," Stravinsky warns as he invokes techné and Aristotelian ideas "regarding personal work, arrangement of materials, and structure" (PM, pp. 4-5).[2] Eliot's Harvard mentor, Babbitt, would have rejoiced at the introductory promise (a gratuitous one, it would seem) that the forthcoming lectures on musical poetics "will not be confessions of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau sort, and even less of the psychoanalytic sort which, under a pseudo-scientific guise, merely effect a sad profanation of man's real values and of his psychological and creative faculties" (5). Instead Stravinsky proffers something between an academic course and "what one might call an apology for my own general ideas," apology, he adds, "in the sense of a justification and defense of my ideas and personal views" (5). The premise is like Eliot's, voiced in the same forum seven years previous, that the "critical mind operating in poetry [read music], the critical effort which goes to the writing of it, may always be in advance of the critical mind operating upon poetry, whether it be one's own or some one else's. I only affirm that there is a significant relation between the best poetry and the best criticism of the same period. The age of criticism is also the age of critical poetry" (UPUC, p. 30). And the overall ex cathedra tone of the Poetics makes it clear that Stravinsky shares also Eliot's conviction that "when the poet finds himself in an age in which there is no intellectual aristocracy, when power is in the hands of a class so democratised that whilst still a class it

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represents itself to be the whole nation; when the only alternatives seem to be to talk to a coterie or to soliloquise, the difficulties of the poet and the necessity of criticism become greater" (ibid., p. 22). At any rate, at no time after his coming to America did Stravinsky shirk his duties regarding "the necessity of criticism" any more than he relinquished the aristocratic tone in his address to a class which he frequently made plain he felt to be as lamentably "democratised" as it was unfortunately necessary to a composer who demanded an audience considerably beyond the dimensions of coterie. As for the alternative of soliloquising, the *Poetics* goes unconsciously far in asserting the prerogative of the composer to do so, while at the same time it seeks to make clear the obligation of that selfsame "debased, democratised" public to recognize and heed the vatic voice if it is to return to a state of grace.

Stravinsky's language is severe and authoritarian from the outset. He urges dogma and the dogmatic "insofar as they designate an element essential to safeguarding the integrity of art *and mind*" (6-7; my italics). In addition to *dogma*, under whose aegis he is incited "to place our own creative activity" (7), the recurrent words and phrases on which he puts high or positive value are such terms as order, formal process, principle, discipline, impersonal exposition, object and the objective, the concrete, system, speculative will, polemic, judgment, construction, "hierarchy of phenomena," and so on. Correspondingly, negative value and assertions are attached to chaos, "the indecision of vague thoughts," "absurd cacophony," "vanguard élite," "uncoordinated music," and disorder ("the two disorders of the two Russias--the conservative and the revolutionary disorders" [20]).

Predictably, it is from the specifically Russian frame of reference that Stravinsky draws his own special set of connotations for the word revolution and its derivatives: "this stertorous term, which designates in its most usual acceptation a state of turmoil and violence" (12). By definition the very concept is inimical to art. "Art is by essence constructive. Revolution implies a disruption of equilibrium. To speak of revolution is to speak of a temporary chaos. Now art is the contrary of chaos. It never gives itself up to chaos without immediately finding its living works, its very existence, threatened" (12-13). Vehemently he defends himself, even as composer of The Rite, from the designation: "I hold that it was wrong to have considered me a revolutionary. . . . I was made a revolutionary in spite of myself" (11). "The tone of a work like The Rite may have appeared arrogant, the language that it spoke may have seemed harsh in its newness, but that in no way implies that it is revolutionary in the most subversive sense of the word" (12). The distinction is between "revolution," for which Stravinsky fails to adduce any but "subversive" senses, and "innovations," illustration for which he introduces, in an extended discussion which must have astounded even his audience of Harvard aesthetes and proper Bostonian dowagers, the matter of Charles Gounod and the initially rude critical reception of Faust.[3]

Stravinsky's biographers make common note of his initially ambivalent attitude toward the 1917 Revolution in Russia and the early phases of Leninist government, all of which brought momentous consequences for himself, as for all Russian artists. He first heard of the February coup while he was already living part of each year in Switzerland. White cites C. F. Ramuz, the Swiss novelist, friend, and collaborator in L'Histoire du Soldat, on the musician's reaction at receiving the news: "Stravinsky talked about Russia--the new Russia--and Ramuz in his enthusiasm shared his friend's hopes (and illusions). The exile had decided that his place was 'back there'--in the true Russia, the Russia that had woken from her winter sleep and would at long last assert her proper native genius. He even started to make travelling plans" (S, p. 42). The stages of change in Stravinsky's attitude toward the mother country and the possibility of returning there in ensuing years have never been spelled out, but the fact remains that, despite his almost constant protestations of strong national attachment throughout his life, he remained effectually cut off from the time of the successful revolution and, in fact, did not set foot on native soil until the occasion of his triumphant visit at the invitation of the Soviet Goverment nearly half a century later in 1962.[4] Many factors contributed to determine and perpetuate his expatriation, a situation long lamented by himself and his commentators alike (though for far different reasons, the latter most often deploring the "falling off" that left Stravinsky producing work after work but no more Le Sacres, with the blame attached in some way to his deracination and detachment from roots, as in the case of Paul Rosenfeld). Of these reasons, some are known, though it is not possible to assess their

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relative weight in a turn of events difficult to describe as a decision, if only because the early estrangement and ultimate irrevocability of his exile became apparent bit by bit over the years and stretched far beyond 1917 and that initial enthusiasm and hope which he had expressed to Ramuz. The deaths of Bertha, his childhood nurse, and of Gury, his brother (from typhus, on the Roumanian front) in 1917, "two of the few persons connected with his youth for whom he really cared" (S, p. 46), meant that "his links with Russia were dissolving fast. True, his mother was still there, together with Yury his remaining brother. But these were only nominal ties" (ibid.).

What White does not mention in his factual, though minimal, account is that Stravinsky's distant, though correct, relationship with his mother may have caused him anguish at times but certainly flared into hostility and bitterness on occasions when they were too close together, as when she would taunt him with his own limited status, in her view, as a "Russian" composer. Undoubtedly an additional catalyzing element was the uncertainty of his status--from both sides--with the Soviets. "I was now also in a position of the utmost pecuniary difficulty. The Communist Revolution, which had just triumphed in Russia, deprived me of the last resources which had still from time to time been reaching me from my country. . . ."[5] In spite of the fact that in the early years of the revolutionary government Russia tendered, through its cultural agents, various inducements to Stravinsky, as one of its most celebrated and prestigious native sons, to cast his lot at home, he never did so and, it would seem, was seldom strongly tempted under the new circumstances.

Not only were opportunities richer and more varied on the continent, but the strength of aristocratic upbringing and affinities, visible in the configuration of childhood dreams, memories, and tastes and becoming doctrinally emergent in postwar years, proved always sufficiently assertive to prevent and make even less likely as years wore on any more than fleeting and nostalgic reconciliation with his homeland. This condition held, in spite of the fact that Stravinsky remains for many observers quintessentially Russian in his artistic intuition, most effective expression, and lifelong adherence to native modes of habit, gesture, and personal style.[6] If nothing else, the hardening of party doctrine in prescribing artistic direction and limits within its ranks, paired with Stravinsky's adamant artistic independence, would have served to make the two forces incompatible in the long run. Stravinsky was no Prokofiev, and never deluded himself that he was. Recently published letters from his Petersburg years are surprising in their revelation that early on he shared the liberal, even radical, attitudes of the intellectual group of which he was part in those years, a persuasion of which his middle years retained little trace.[7] Nevertheless, to whatever extent these views had ever pertained, they certainly did not in the end prevail, and that revelation is perhaps most significant in its underscoring of the biographical basis for what is already apparent in the shrill rhetoric pervading such documents as the Poetics: that is to say, the absolutism and dogmatic surety of assertion, bolstered by doctrines of religious

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orthodoxy, the proclaimed necessity for aristocratic hierarchies of various sorts, and the culminating, unarguably elitist conception of artistic autonomy have not evolved without extreme inner stress and struggle between contending attitudes and loyalties. Robert Craft notes that when Stravinsky had been a student of Rimsky-Korsakov after taking his law degree in St. Petersburg, around 1905 and thereafter, his group "was a nucleus of liberalism, and the newcomer became an ardent disciple in this as in everything else--a fact worth mentioning only because later in life he recalled his political inclinations of the time somewhat differently."[8] Craft mentions Stravinsky's participation in an anti-government demonstration which was quelled by the police in 1905, and he quotes from a letter Stravinsky wrote his mother in 1906 explaining that he and his new wife changed their plans to go to Crimea because it would have been impossible to "live quietly" too near the "revolutionary ferment" "unless one is indifferent to the life around one and unless one looks upon the great Russian Revolution with hatred. And, as you know, we are of the opposite persuasion."[9] The road leading from that "opposite persuasion" to the better publicized, unremitting hostility to the consummated Revolution and all it stood for, which marked Stravinsky's position in the twenties, has not been charted. On that point he kept a sustained and careful silence.

In response to his interlocutor's question, "What do you recall of your infancy . . . ?" in Expositions and Developments, Stravinsky speaks of a ray of light which entered his childhood bedroom "from a closet or adjoining chamber" (ED, p. 13) and how the reassurance it provided and which he took for granted became a lifelong necessity for one who, during those years, "was close to no one in my family except my brother Goury," and whose "feelings were all fixed upon Bertha, my nurse," since for "my mother I felt only 'duties.'"[10] He relates of Goury that "we found in each other the love and understanding denied us by our parents, who specially favored neither of us,"[11] and remembers that "[w]hatever [the ray of light] was, however, and whatever bogies it kept at bay, this umbilical cord of illumination still enables me at seventy-eight, to re-enter the world of safety and enclosure I knew at seven or eight" (ED, p. 13). Such memories preface several pages devoted to enumerating childhood images of "safety" around which his early life was built.

For such a man, it is perhaps unnecessary to emphasize the extreme lesion of any estrangement from the encompassing matrix to which, in his autobiographical allusions, he makes constant (though mostly unconnected) reference throughout his life. Just as the image of the night light is recalled in his old age, so is the sustaining reservoir of impressions, memories, materials, ties provided by the mother country looked back upon as a recurring source, even after it has been externally cut off. Given Stravinsky's temperament, powerful resentment is a natural response to any effective agent of severance so avowedly traumatic as his own from Russia. Stravinsky, always a stickler for etymology, describes himself at the outset of the Poetics as a "reagent," and it is true that numerous anecdotes from various stages of his life serve to underscore his pattern of sharp and, in crucial instances, almost reflexive and often protective reaction (10).[12]

It is, in any event, the "revolutionary" which most surely triggers his wrath and indignation throughout his writing, and at no time does this hold more true than in Poetics of Music. In whatever connection the term is mentioned, a diatribe is likely to follow: "Wagner the typical revolutionary" (65) draws his heaviest fire. "The tyranny of the Wagnerian system" (60), which "found sublimity in the cult of disorder" (65) and produced a music "more improvised than constructed" (64), "unleashed" a "decadence which his work actually consecrated and that has developed apace ever since his time. How powerful this man must have been," Stravinsky continues, "to have destroyed an essentially musical form with such energy that fifty years after his death we are still staggering under the rubbish and racket of the music drama!" (46). Fearful that, in the wake of Wagner and the widespread condition he so powerfully still represents, "[m]odern man is progressively losing his understanding of values and his sense of proportions" (47), Stravinsky counterpoises the healthy influence of Verdi (alongside a strange retinue including Gounod, Chabrier, Delibes, Tchaikovsky, etc., who constitute an approved "line" at least as novel as the world of letters a decade before had found Eliot's and Leavis' revaluation of the English poetic tradition elevating Donne, Massinger, minor metaphysicals and obscure symbolists at the expense of Shakespeare, Milton, Blake, and Shelley). Stravinsky's implied purge and reconstitution is advanced, as I have said, in the name of cultural health, as was Eliot's and, like the latter's fulmination against Arnold, it depicted a central heresy in "the murky inanities of the Art-Religion, with its heroic hardware, its arsenal of warrior-mysticism, and its vocabulary seasoned with an adulterated religiosity" (62). Denouncing Wagnerianism further for its "miasmic vapors" and "inflated arrogance" (61), Stravinsky deplores the "heresy" that regards art as the "realm of freedom" rather than the "realm of necessity" (67). Wagner's conception of "the notorious Synthesis of the Arts . . . has inflicted a terrible blow upon music itself" (61). That, however, was to have been expected since in its "lack of tradition" and heretical emphasis on freedom and inspiration the Wagnerian idea results in the obvious, regrettable consequence: "In every period of spiritual anarchy wherein man, having lost his feeling and taste for ontology, takes fright at himself and at his destiny, there always appears one of these gnosticisms which serve as a religion for those who no longer have a religion . . ." (61).

More properly, "the phenomenon of music" is to be regarded as "a form of speculation in terms of sound and time" (144). In its "pursuit of the One out of the Many" (144),[13] it is more modestly and more correctly to be thought of as craft, not Art-Religion. Stravinsky cites Maritain approvingly in reminding us that "in the mighty structure of medieval civilization, the artist held only the rank of artisan" and quotes the noted Catholic philosopher to the effect that "his individualism was forbidden any sort of anarchic development, because a natural social discipline imposed certain limitative conditions upon

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him from without" (53). The personal application is pointed. In line with this, "my freedom will be so much the greater and more meaningful the more narrowly I limit my field of action and the more I surround myself with obstacles" (68).

Stravinsky goes neo-humanists a step better by pushing the blame for contemporary decadence back beyond Rousseau and the heresy of Enlightenment when he adds: "It was the Renaissance that invented the artist, distinguished him from the artisan and began to exalt the former at the expense of the latter" (53). Inspiration, that vaunted Romantic value, is correspondingly devalued. It is "in no way a prescribed condition of the creative act, but rather a chronologically secondary manifestation . . . in a field where everything is balance and calculation through which the breath of the speculative spirit blows. It is afterwards, and only afterwards, that the emotive disturbance which is at the root of inspiration may arise . . ." (51).

In his reflections on what art and the musical imagination are not, Stravinsky comes to a remarkable elucidation of what, at least in his case, the creative act is: "All creation presupposes at its origin a sort of appetite that is brought on by the foretaste of discovery. This foretaste of the creative act accompanies the intuitive grasp of an unknown entity already possessed but not yet intelligible, an entity that will not take definite shape except by the action of a constantly vigilant technique" (52). This appetite, "as habitual and periodic, if not as constant, as a natural need" (52), enables him "[s]tep by step, link by link . . . to discover the work," and it will be "this chain of discoveries, as well as each individual discovery, that gives rise to the emotion--an almost physiological reflex, like that of the appetite causing a flow of saliva . . ." (51). Citing Pascal in furthering this somewhat strange accommodation with Pavlovian determinism on the part of a recently self-styled Thomist, he reminds that "'we are automatons just as much as we are minds. . .'" (57). Then, after quoting Pascal, Stravinsky makes, by way of a peculiarly animalistic image, one of his most explicit connections between the creative process in the "individual talent" and its cradling tradition:

> So we grub about in expectation of our pleasure, guided by our scent, and suddenly we stumble against an unknown obstacle. It gives us a jolt, a shock, and this shock fecundates our creative power.
>
> The faculty of observation and of making something out of what is observed belongs only to the person who at least possesses, in his particular field of endeavor, an acquired culture and an innate taste.
>
> . . . .
>
> The artist imposes a culture upon himself and ends by imposing it upon others. That is how tradition becomes established. (57-58)

The really remarkable thing about this account of the creative process in Stravinsky's middle, "ordered," neo-classic years is the degree to which it contradicts his own, frequently rendered account of the dream-inspiration of other, earlier works, notably of Le Sacre. In Expositions and Developments he tells how the "idea of Le Sacre du Printemps came to me while I was still composing The Firebird. I had dreamed a scene of pagan ritual in which a chosen sacrificial virgin danced herself to death. This vision was not accompanied by concrete musical ideas, however . . ." (p. 140).[14] While the "grubbing" aspects of the composing process are in no way contradicted here, Stravinsky

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does reveal that at least one of his "children" originated in a highly romantic fashion, and one of the most successful ones at that. Not only is the "inspiration" here described not a "chronologically secondary manifestation," but his frequent abrogation of all "literary" connections with music is refuted in the specific instance of the work for which he remains most celebrated. And it is a curious fact that, in all Stravinsky's vast writing, though he has much to say about such musical "infelicities" of his youth as The Firebird, he nowhere renounces Petrouchka or Le Sacre. This is true despite the patently folkish, emotionally expressive and populist sentiment of the one and the uncalculated origins, dionysian excitement, and programmatic primitivism of the other. Whatever part Apollo's "demands" had played in their genesis is left, for the most part, unelaborated.

Music should be, however, according to Stravinsky at Harvard in 1938, "modest and aristocratic," as was that of "the colossus," Verdi, whose "invention" as "master of the traditional opera" "blossoms forth on every page" (64). Even in the case of Verdi though, "how can we help regretting . . . Falstaff, which, if it is not Wagner's best work, is not Verdi's best opera either?" (63). "Universality," which had been the earlier Verdi's strength, "necessarily stipulates submission to an established order" (77), and order in itself guards the artist against becoming a "monster of originality, inventor of his own language, of his own vocabulary," the victim, in short, of "intellectual caprice and intellectual anarchy" (75). The Verdi of Rigoletto, Il Trovatore, Aida, and La Traviata, before succumbing to "the poison of

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the music drama" (63), "did not hesitate to make use of a formula which many a composer had employed before him" (81). He "applies his own inventiveness to it and, without going outside of the tradition, makes out of a commonplace a perfectly original page that bears his unmistakable mark" (81). Thus, in the designated time and place, Stravinsky on the relations of one individual talent and the scheme within which he worked most fruitfully. At this stage, Lucifer's cry, it would seem, is a strikingly unrebellious one.

Stravinsky regards the question of Romanticism and Classicism as an "endless argument . . . over words" (82), but to clarify his own attitude plunges in nevertheless. He cites André Gide to the effect that "classical works are beautiful only by virtue of their subjugated romanticism," and adds significantly that "[w]hat is salient in this aphorism is the necessity for subjugation" (81). For admirable examples, he refers to Tchaikovsky, whose themes and "driving impulse" are "for the most part romantic. . . . What is not at all romantic is his attitude before the problem of incorporating them into the musical work" (82-83). In Germany, Carl Maria von Weber's sonatas, "which are of an instrumental bearing so formal that the few rubati which they permit themselves on occasion do not manage to conceal the constant and alert control of the subjugator," provide contrast to the "laxness" of Wagner (83). Summing up, Stravinsky reiterates in a paradigm of the creative process, implying priorities both chronological and hierarchical: "What is important for the lucid ordering of the work--for its crystallization--is that all the Dionysian elements which set the imagination of the artist in motion and make the life-sap rise must be properly subjugated before they intoxicate us, and must finally be made to submit to the law; Apollo demands it" (83).

The foregoing statement of artistic position, however, while sufficiently unequivocal in the abstract, is not adequately expressive of Stravinsky's own actual situation in the grip of actual composition. His habitual recourse to another language level--a hyperbole of elaboration--to illustrate his exact state is marked: "I experience a sort of terror . . . before the infinitude of possibilities. . . . If everything is permissible to me . . . [w]ill I then have to lose myself in this abyss of freedom? To what shall I cling in order to escape the dizziness . . . ?" (66-67). He alludes to his "terror" and expands at length on "the anguish into which an unrestricted freedom plunges me" (67). Maintaining that "the more constraints one imposes, the more one frees one's self of the chains that shackle the spirit," he cites Baudelaire's advocacy of rhetorics and prosodies as "a collection of rules demanded by the very organization of the spiritual being" and attributes to them, in his own words, "the secret of salvation" (68-69). Thus in his crisis of language, craft, and spirit, Stravinsky turns to the rock of Tradition, in its largest and, at once, most articulated forms. Brought low by the feeling of disintegration and imminent chaos, contrite for his original sin of inventiveness and originality, he will now seek salvation in those forms which redeem disorder, wherein in the words of the poet:

Out of the sea of sound the life of music,

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> Out of the slimy mud of words, out of the sleet and
> hail of verbal imprecisions,
> Approximate thoughts and feelings, words that have
> taken the place of thoughts and feelings,
> There spring the perfect order of speech, and the
> beauty of incantation.[15]

For better or worse, a significant part of Stravinsky's music written after his coming to America has been, in its essential nature, incantation.

§

One of the most interesting, sustained discourses in *Poetics of Music* occurs in the lecture (fourth in the series) called "Musical Typology." In its course, Stravinsky does not achieve, except by extension, anything seriously approaching a typology, but the rubric does provide him a launching point for revealing excursions into questions of tradition and its workings *vis-à-vis* the individual talent; divagations on the impact of genius (an "erratic block" for which Berlioz provides a prime example, alongside Wagner); observations on expressive and imitative theories of art (they are rejected); and a discursus on the spurious nature of both the "modern" and the "academic." The peripatetic course of his reflections on these main matters is rendered, it turns out, principally in terms of his animadversions to the "little bastard myth . . . that has been named Progress with a capital P . . . " (73), to that musical aberration the tone poem and toward recent instances of "anarchic individualism," "the arbitrariness of whim," and the *Leitmotiv* ("the Cook Agency of Beyreuth"). Once again, he ridicules his favorite whipping boys, critics who are misled by such ephemeral notions. He concludes with a defense of the bourgeois and a tribute to the advantages of patronage as it prevailed in the *ancien régime*, in contrast to the dubious contributions of the present-day state, which, if it supports the arts at all, tends to become "an anonymous and senselessly leveling patron" (94).

The purported typology must be almost altogether inferred. In the "search for the *One* out of the *Many*," Stravinsky reiterates the principle that "all art presupposes a work of selection" and that "to know how to discard . . . is the great technique of selection" (70). Anomalous because of the constant insistence on control and calculation, but also revealing, is his reference to "the *subconscious* activity that makes us incline toward unity; for we instinctively prefer coherence and its quiet strength to the restless powers of dispersion" (71; italics mine).

In line with this disclosure, a comparison between the circumstances of Stravinsky's life and the nature of the major work on which he was engaged at the time of this writing (i.e., the *Symphony in C*) provides a particularly good gloss on his remarks in terms of 1) the interplay between biography, creativity, and what is acknowledged of that creativity, and 2) the ongoing and insistent strategy of critical activity on the part of the artist. The inclusive dates of the *Symphony*'s composition (1938-40) coincide with repeated public assertions that "music is, by its very nature, essentially powerless to *express* anything at all . . ." (*S*, p. 365).

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Here it suffices to say that, proceeding under the aegis of typology, Stravinsky in fact continues his contribution to the syndrome of the uprooted artist ill-at-ease (in this case powerfully, even oppressively, so) in the camp where he finds himself placed by virtue of his early works, reputation, and it would be fair to add, hard and decreasingly satisfactory choices. He makes no secret he is at pains to disengage. Famed as a shaper of new musical language for a necessarily "new mode of perception," Stravinsky was known by admirers and detractors as the most distinctive of stylists.[16] "Style," however, he insists, where it is legitimate, "is the particular way a composer organizes his conceptions and speaks the language of his craft" (71). Approvingly citing Haydn and Mozart, he notes that although "they benefited from the same culture, drew on the same sources, and borrowed each other's discoveries [, e]ach of them, however, works a miracle all his own" (72-73).

The extension of this thought, while promising considerable observance of the individual impact of "genius," tends instead to elaborate in terms of a theory of tradition that has much more in common with Eliot's early de-emphasis of individuality and elevation of tradition. The movement, in obedience to some deep-seated pattern of visceral reflex and habit, is toward an attack on "that evolution which has been revered as a goddess--a goddess who turned out to be somewhat of a tramp" (73). It is this selfsame Tramp-Goddess (Evolution) who has spawned the aforementioned "little bastard myth," Progress.

Tradition then, at its best, works as an effective brake or restraint to the pell-mell acceleration and disorder of "a new age that seeks to reduce everything to uniformity in the realm of matter while it tends to shatter all universality in the realm of the spirit in deference to an anarchic individualism" (76). The musical particular of this crisis is "the example of a musical culture that is day by day losing the sense of continuity and the taste for a common language" (75). He again avoids mention of the enormous contribution that "brilliant feat of emancipation,"[17] Le Sacre, had played in shattering precisely that sense of continuity and commonness of language which, in music, stemmed from the pervasive ascendancy of German romanticism and the chromatic tonal wash in its wake which so profoundly disturbed Debussy, Schoenberg, and Stravinsky himself in the first, momentous decade of this century. But surely he is aware of and, for the moment at least, unhappy about the inescapable conjoining of his own most prestigious early work with the idea of the "revolutionary" and its part in the rapid crack-up of the exhausted tradition it arose from.

§§

The question of primary determinants in Stravinsky's selection-repression pattern and their effect upon his diagnosis as to what might prove a viable tradition and its constituents, like Eliot's less vehement one, remains unsettled and will continue to do so until much more nearly adequate biographical information becomes accessible. That is to say, what is readily discernible to astute observers of several

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persuasions can nevertheless only remain in the realm of critical inquiry and cannot be "validated" in even the quasi-scientific sense that usually sanctions academically received opinion. This circumstance serves, at the same time, either to stifle or artificially dichotomize biography and interpretation, with the inevitable result that criticism so often emerges stunted, deformed, or both.

Nevertheless, and in spite of a certain evasiveness on Stravinsky's part, a syndrome is evident and is variously described by commentators as neo-Marxist-Freudian as Adorno, as essentially conservative and orthodox as Paul Henry Lang, as admiring and musicologically-oriented as Roman Vlad or Paul Collaer, to say nothing of the omnipresent Craft, from his own uniquely privileged position. The common denominator among these and others too numerous to name is that, whether or not much can be said about it, there is a crucial connection between Stravinsky's psychology, his condition of cultural estrangement, and the restless turn of his aesthetic direction in mid-career.[18] Rosenfeld's insight is hard to discredit.

Among these descriptions, an impressive and provocative account (if not always an intelligible one) has been made by T. W. Adorno, the least timid and, at the same time, most thoroughly equipped of the critics named. In Adorno's dialectical scheme of developments shaping modern music, a tacit model for other art-forms as well, Stravinsky, along with Schoenberg, one of the two major, polarized and magnetic forces operating in the twentieth-century situation, represents the restorative (ultimately reactionary) impulse in "imagining that the responsible

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essence of music could be restored through stylistic procedures," the procedures to be tradition-derived and -sanctioned, and chosen from the great heap, as Adorno puts it, in a historical "moment of arbitrariness."[19]

In his severe devaluation of expression and of what Adorno calls "individuation" (what Eliot designates as "personality"), Stravinsky "belongs to a type of Western art the highest summit of which lies in the work of Baudelaire, in which the individual . . . enjoys his own annihilation."[20]

> [T]here are for Stravinsky no communicative symbols for that abyss between the regressive impulse and its musical materialization; for this reason he is no less dependent upon psychology than is Wagner--indeed, his dependence is perhaps even greater. The outspoken sado-masochistic pleasure in self-annihilation--an element so clearly perceptible in his anti-psychologism--is determined by the dynamics of the basic drives and not by the demands of musical objectivity. . . . [H]e is to tolerate no introspection or self-contemplation. The obstinate health . . . is the product of defense mechanisms in the Freudian sense. Convulsive stubbornness, along with the exclusion of any inspiration from music, betrays the unconscious presentiment of something incurable which otherwise would manifest itself disastrously.[21]

The result, according to Adorno, is that "musical form is eventually crippled by all of this,"[22] its resulting structure being, in the last analysis, externally superimposed by the composer's conscious will. Ironically, this very externality and superimposition of structure are rooted in the very fear (Stravinsky's "terror" before the "abyss of freedom," Eliot's "escape from personality") of the "something incurable" (Stravinsky's "inflated arrogance," Eliot's "original sin") which, in Adorno's scheme, does indeed end by manifesting itself "disastrously." The artist's "will," seeking to submit itself, indulges

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instead in an un-willing, paradoxically arbitrary exercise of tradition-licensed personal reaction and regression.

While it is easy to cavil at the sweep of Adorno's categorical transformations, it is also noteworthy that, though his assessment was published in 1948, there is yet little or no effective, sustained refutation of his argument. One can certainly quarrel with his use of "sado-masochistic pleasure" to describe the process of composing, but Stravinsky's own description of his daily compositional rite as a satisfying of the "appetite" to create according to some self-imposed limits ("I surround myself with obstacles") lends support to the term. On a different level, it is impossible to ignore the world-renouncing aspects of such works as Stravinsky's Oedipus Rex, the Symphony of Psalms, or Apollo. And though one may deny with considerable validity the just application of Adorno's diagnosis to the question of artistic integrity or intrinsic interest in the work, he cannot reasonably argue against it as being irrelevant to the obviously important ways in which the art work may be viewed as a significant cultural object manifesting a significant cultural--and personal--pattern.

The repetitiousness and ultimate lack of point of much existing Stravinskyan commentary attests to the futility of ignoring obvious psychological and cultural factors in the interest of vague pretenses to critical purity or objective technical analysis. Stravinsky simply provides a sharply outlined case wherein cutting off the contextual vitals amounts to emasculating the criticism. It is, in the last analysis, as foolish and ignorant to do this as it would be to argue the total satisfactoriness as aesthetic diagnosis of the profile Adorno offers.

One element in Stravinsky's aesthetic scheme to which Adorno might have paid more nearly sufficient attention is the matter of what it is exactly that the artist "submits" to. Eschewing expression, denying message, ridiculing imitation, Stravinsky maintains: "Poussin said quite correctly that 'the goal of art is delectation.' He did not say that this delectation should be the goal of the artist who must always submit solely to the demands of the work to be done" (78). Here and elsewhere Stravinsky stands as staunch spokesman for the musical work as "aesthetic monad," though he is more persuasive in detailing how the "demands of the work" assert themselves within the composer than he is in making clear from what they arise. Adorno's discreditation of the intrinsic, self-determining nature of Stravinsky's artistic material as, in this case, a delusion, though forcefully put, does not obviate a strong feeling that, to some immeasurable degree, the nature of the aesthetic subject, problem, and materials must, as Stravinsky maintains, always remain vital, onleading factors in the creative process once the work is under way. To what degree the "matter" is a donnée of tradition or a property of the individual must, as I see it, remain problematical far beyond any foreseeable calculus of creative quantification and analysis. No doubt Stravinsky, in asserting his own version of the triad of tradition-individual-material, does protest too much, or too shrilly. He leans far toward locating the material and its sources in a too arbitrarily defined tradition while at the same time placing great emphasis on the autonomous "working out" of that material according to its own "inexorable" laws, so that the inevitable result is a corresponding de-emphasis upon the individual contribution. But that in itself is not to deny the very sound precept of Freud, whom Adorno is fond of citing--that neurosis and art are in many cases quite close to one another; in fact, the letter of Stravinsky's description as well as the dynamics of his phrasing of it lend weight and support to that very psychological concept of the conditions of his own particular creative process. Indeed, as his own phraseology makes clear all too frequently, that process involves an ever-present element of what Adorno calls "self-annihilation." It is too easy to forget that, for the most part, Stravinsky, in the *Poetics*, is talking about his own experience of composing, the musical counterpart of Eliot's "criticizing poetry in order to create poetry."

Despite his claims and tendencies to an *art pour l'art*, Stravinsky, even at his most hostile toward interpreters, is too intelligent (and/or is retrieved by sound instincts, one cannot say for sure) to corner himself completely in that familiar *cul-de-sac*. Whatever saves him, his sporadic reversion to a larger scheme of values and references is apparent in striking ways. One excellent instance is his address to the sore subject of "that abortive neologism the word *modern*" (84). Neither Maritain, Maurras, nor Hulme could have been more pleased with the initial construction he puts on the word: "In its most clearly defined meaning it designates a form of theological liberalism which is a fallacy condemned by the Church of Rome. Applied to the arts, would

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modernism be open to an analogous condemnation? I strongly think so . . ." (84). For him, the corollary is ready to hand: "Might it not rather be a sign of a decadence in morality and taste? Here I strongly believe we must answer in the affirmative" (85).

Beyond a denigration of the concept, Stravinsky offers little by way of analysis as to precisely what works exemplify the heretically modern, what liberalisms make for the lamented decadence, and, most significant of all, what exactly constitutes his own dissociation from the stigma of such a label. All he will say, after a reference to the allegation of his own curiously derived academicism as a vestige of modernism is, "I am no more academic than I am modern, no more modern than I am conservative. _Pulcinella_ would prove this" (88). The fact is, of course, that _Pulcinella_ "proves" quite different things, and has always done so since the initial consternation it engendered and the pinning of unwanted labels that ensued. In decrying the inadequate historicism and consequent uselessness of the term _modern_, Stravinsky conveniently ignores the comparatively recent origin of some of his own more favored labels such as _classic_, a term which, as René Wellek has documented, can claim only an embarrassingly short, ill-defined career itself.[23] Failing to meet the challenge of the word analytically, Stravinsky, apparently stung by its frequent application to himself, seeks absolution by Papal proscription. Here again his response is more symptomatic than logically revealing.[24]

Academicism, another brush with which he is sometimes tarred, but apparently a less threatening one in his vocabulary, is lightly dismissed. "A work is called academic when it is composed strictly according to the precepts of the conservatory," and further, "should find no place outside the conservatory" (86). Tagged with this label since the Octuor and 1923, he acknowledges, "I myself have so often borrowed academic attitudes with no thought of concealing the pleasure I found in them" (87). Apparently the ironic distance implicit in the fact that he makes conscious appropriations is sufficient justification, if any be needed, for his adoption of formulae and borrowing of others' "inspirations." "My greatest enemies have always paid me the honor of recognizing that I am fully aware of what I am doing. . . . Now, I do not have a temperament suited to academicism; so I always use academic formulas knowingly and voluntarily. I use them quite as knowingly as I would use folklore. They are raw materials of my work" (88). I wish later to return to the matter of Stravinsky's use and adaptation of formulas which, by his own admission, his temperament is not attuned to. It occupies a central place in any adequate critique of his neo-classic advocacy and serves to underscore the artifical and arbitrary aspects of the movement.

Leaving aside the academic question of whether or no Stravinsky in much of his middle period is properly described as an academic composer, we might more instructively note the relative dispassion with which he brushes aside the "charge," compared to the rancor evident in his rejection of the terms revolutionary and modern. What is obvious from this discrepancy is that, at the very least, according to his own current values ("I am fully aware of what I am doing"), the one is either

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a much more damaging charge than the other or a far less applicable one, or both. I incline to the first, for reasons that become apparent as Stravinsky turns to his fifth lecture, "The Avatars of Russian Music," a historical specification in terms of the preceding phenomenological and typological theories tendered. "[T]h music of Russia, particularly in its latest developments, illustrates in a characteristic and very significant way the principal thesis that I desire to present to you. I shall thus devote less time to a historical view of Russian music than to what I have called its avatars--its transformations during the very brief period that comprises its whole existence" (96).

Noting that "its beginnings as an art conscious of itself do not go back for more than one hundred years or so," Stravinsky pays tribute to Glinka as a great founder in whose opera "the melos of the people is quite naturally incorporated into art music" (96). His phrasing here is crucial, as becomes clear when he goes on to contrast Glinka's approach favorably with that of "The Five," "Slavophiles of the populist variety" who, through "a kind of devotion to the people's cause," seized upon popular melodies and liturgical chants and "sought to graft the popular strain upon art music" (97-98). The operant contrarieties are, of course, "naturally incorporated"--"grafted" and "popular strain"--"art music." Stravinsky's preference, and the patrician emotion that subtends it, becomes even more explicit when he tells us, "Glinka does not hobnob with the common people, as certain of his successors did, to reinforce his vigor through contact with the plain truth" (97).

The failure of "The Five," he maintains, is essentially one of naiveté: "At the outset, the freshness of their ideas made up for the inadequacy of their technique. But freshness is not easily reproduced" (98). The pattern of Stravinsky's career from 1911 through the early 1920's considered, it is difficult to avoid a suspicion that it is precisely the misfortune of his own experience which lends such wisdom and epigrammatic snap to this and similar insights. In Russia, he says, the need to consolidate accomplishments led to methodic study, conservatories, and eventually "the alarming symptoms of a new academicism" (99), as in the case of Rimsky and his school. Again, we have the echo of the writer's own history, with the conspicuous exception that even among his most fervent detractors no one has attributed Stravinsky's "downfall" to the absence of technique. The compaint has been rather the opposite. It has long been a commonplace to deplore Stravinsky's virtuosic immersion in technique, style, and manner.

The development in Russia of "an active center of genuinely professional composers," urged by the need to "consolidate achievements and, to that end, perfect technique," saw nationalistic elements, led by Rimsky, evolve into the Belyaev circle, including Glazunov and Liadov, and witnessed a turn toward an "ever-increasing enthusiasm for German technique" (99). But Tchaikovsky, keeping his bearings like Glinka and Pushkin before him, had avoided the Scylla and Charybdis of unsophisticated folkishness and the new Germanic academicism. His continued significance for Stravinsky is underscored in the observation that he generally "showed himself to be, if not nationalist and populist like The Five, at least profoundly national in the character of his themes, the cut of his phrases, and the rhythmic physiognomy of his work" (100). It is distinctly to Tchaikovsky's credit that his music managed a successful amalgamation of the best elements from the Italian, German, and French legacies of his time. Somewhat surprisingly, Stravinsky comments that "simply by virtue of the brilliance of his powerful talent, the personality of Tchaikovsky shone forth all alone" (99). At any event, the crowning achievement of this model for the fusion of individuality and European tradition is to be seen in the way he "found his true expression by turning with open arms to occidental culture" (100). The importance of this conception, specified on both the general and individual planes, cannot I think be overemphasized in comprehending the Stravinsky of 1939 and the decades leading up to its articulation. Here, twenty years after the "Open Letter," it is still the cosmopolitan, synthesizing Tchaikovsky who, despite his unmentioned but obviously un-Stravinskyan emotional proclivities, is still held up as the true "avatar," along with the founding father Glinka, of Russian music. It is not less significant that the guiding image of "a" or even "the" Russian "way" still subtends and shapes Stravinsky's generalized and theoretical position (to the degree that that position may be seen as identical with his polemical one). Further, within the lifelong evolution and myriad shifts of an articulated poetic, admiration and praise of Tchaikovsky remains one of the most continuous threads, a highly significant, consistent, and positive factor among the many powerful aversions which, far more often, serve to trigger and illustrate Stravinsky's contentiously argued aesthetic criteria.[25]

Before addressing the historical sequel to the elements thus far traced, present-day Soviet Russian music (which is predictably ridiculed), Stravinsky has brief moment for the mention and dismissal of "a new disorder" which had "wormed its way into Russian thought," "an ideological, psychological and sociological disorder that took possession of music with impudent unconcern" (100-01). He refers to the "success of theosophy" and its spectacular and brief-lived exponent, Scriabin. He treats this "aberration" with utmost contempt in a series of unanswered (and, for Stravinsky, apparently unanswerable) questions: "frankly, is it possible to connect a musician like Scriabin with any tradition whatsoever? Where does he come from? And who are his forebears?" (101).[26]

The history of Stravinsky's distaste for Scriabin and Russian late-romanticism generally is a more vexed matter than is commonly known. Recent publication of early Stravinsky letters and papers in Russia reveals an almost complete volte-face somewhere between 1914 and 1920 on the subject. Pre-war, pre-revolution letters indicate a surprisingly high regard for Scriabin's music.[27] On the other hand, the American composer George Antheil recounts how, in Berlin in 1922, a bitter argument between Stravinsky and his mother, who was an admirer of Scriabin--"at this period . . . practically the official Russian Soviet composer," almost brought Stravinsky to tears.

> [H]e, Stravinsky, no longer able to stand his mother's inordinate admiration for Scriabine (when, after all, she had a son destined

> to become more famous than Scriabine would ever become!), admonished her, criticizing her taste, and finally admitting to hating Scriabine. Wereupon she had answered:
>
> "Now, now, Igor! You have not changed one bit all these years. You were always like that--always contemptuous of _your_ _betters_!"
>
> Stravinsky shrugged his shoulders and again looked absolutely forlorn, hopeless.[28]

The changed attitude toward Scriabin is a touchstone to understand the dynamics of Stravinsky's ostentatiously rationalized aesthetic announced in "Some Ideas" in 1924. The psychologically complex shift it evidences had undoubtedly been playing a formative role in the music he had been composing for several years previous (the _Octuor_ was premiered, we recall, in 1921).

Because the connection is so characteristic of Stravinsky's general procedure of formulating intellectual programs from the base of frankly avowed, strongly felt tastes and because it is so clearly sponsored, in its dynamic extremes, by emotionally rooted aversions, his short dismissal of so conspicuous and important a part of the grand configuration he purports to be offering as Scriabin is extremely symptomatic. But so is his capacity for curbing impolitic opinions. The belief is bolstered by his failure even to mention such another problematical but unavoidably prominent contemporary and compatriot-in-exile, Rachmaninov. Rachmaninov, at the time of Stravinsky's Harvard lectures, was both immensely popular in America and well-connected in Boston, especially through the two composers' mutual and powerful advocate in this country, Serge Koussevitsky. Stravinsky's nose for the politic forbade the mention of Rachmaninov, whose music he had as little use for as, by now, he had for Scriabin's. However, he

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maintained a diplomatic silence on Rachmaninov throughout his writings, even in the sometimes gossipy Craft dialogs. The proximity and dignity of the other composer, and quite likely the fact that he did not personify any pretentions or dangerous "heresy" but only represented for Stravinsky a postscript to the already defunct post-romantic impulse, earned him an immunity from the barbs his music would almost certainly have elicited. His reticence on Prokofiev is likewise significant.

The treatise on Soviet music begins moderately, but as Stravinsky turns his attention to the Revolution which necessarily conditions it, his hackles rise. He refers to anarchistic progenitors of the great upheaval as forming a "grotesque movement," heaps scorn on their "suspect mysticism," and ridicules committed writers like Andreyev and Artzybasheff as being "novelists in the worst possible taste." A "perfidious wave that defiled the true foundations of culture and the state welled up from the milieu of false intellectuals, morally disinherited and socially uprooted, and from the centers of atheistic seminarists and flunked-out students . . ." (103).[29]

Lamenting the failure of a once-promising pre-revolutionary renaissance to "find a commensurate expression in the sphere of governmental reforms or in the domain of economic initiative and social problems," Stravinsky acknowledges briefly that the faulty Russian system, comprised of feudal remnants, "occidental capitalism, and a primitive communism (in the form of rural communities)," "could not withstand external and internal pressure" (104). The revolution thus resulted from "a tragic collision of two disorders. To revolutionary disorder the weak and lax government could only oppose another disorder, a reactionary one" (104). This surprisingly balanced analysis is immediately followed by an implicitly approved version of what might, under better circumstances, and more desirably, have occurred: "Neither the authorities nor social conscience were equal to the task of realizing or even of formulating a live and constructive system of *counteraction* capable of *curbing* and *disarming* the pressure of the revolutionary forces . . ." (104; italics mine). Notably Stravinsky says nothing more of the conditions which engendered the revolutionary "disorder," nor of the reasons the existing state found itself so debilitated as to be powerless either to resist or to devise effective reforms. "In the truth, it seems impossible to explain such an atrophying of the Russian state when, drawing on an age-old tradition, it was fundamentally tending to realize the idea of a Third Rome" (105). Stravinsky does not seem to have been struck whatsoever by the idea that, just possibly, a "Third Rome" might be inapplicable to a twentieth-century condition.

Stravinsky's "powerlessness" to explain suggests more an unwillingness than an intellectual inadequacy. Recently available pre-war letters indicate, as mentioned before, that there were times when Stravinsky had regarded himself as pro-revolutionary and of the opposite camp from that in which he now firmly places himself.[30] He was not ignorant of Marx and revolutionary thought, nor had been since his student days, though it does appear that the reading of his middle years did not altogether balance his absorption in St. Thomas and

Maritain by attention to other, less medieval-minded thinkers. But one cannot reasonably attribute solely to external influences the utter indisposition in a man so penetrating and otherwise informed as Stravinsky to recognize fault and decay in Russia's version of *ancien régime* as a major factor in its own fall. Merely to be acquainted with the phrase "seeds of its own destruction" has provided adequate clues to men far less perceptive and intellectually privileged than Stravinsky.

Moving on, Stravinsky considers the present state of affairs in Russia in an alternating current of savage invective and dignified regret. An "almost childlike rationalism" and its "pseudo-critical spirit have poisoned and continue to poison the whole field of art in Russia" (105-06). Offenders include Gogol and others who, under the dubious auspices of party line, "denied art any right to be an end in itself" (106). Tolstoy is conspicuous in "his aesthetic vagaries," having "wandered off into the impasse of morals and its categorical imperative" (106). Something of the intolerance of Stravinsky's thinking when he is touched off by considerations of revolution, populism, and morality as they bear upon art reveals itself through his hyper-emotional charge that Tolstoy's ethically-based aesthetic "is to be connected with his total incomprehension of the genesis of any kind of creation" (106). Apart from the intemperate nature of this comment upon the author of *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, its very hubris recalls how incisive Eliot's early, chance characterization of Stravinsky as "Lucifer of the hour" really was, and prompts the question of whether the composer's mother--quite apart from the merits of the argument over Scriabin--was not recalling something basic and primary in the essential nature of her son when she accused him of being "always contemptuous of your betters!" To whatever extent he realized that aspect in himself, such recognition goes far in explaining the stringency of his resolve to orthodoxy and constraint in later life at the same time it augurs the peril and difficulty of the tightwire act he is attempting.[31] The imposition of a severe classical manner and catechism upon a tempestuous, rebellious nature is risky play at the very least.

In the _Poetics_, visceral outbursts like the one savaging Tolstoy are, however, interspersed with a perceptive and wittily detailed account of the decline of music in post-Revolutionary Russia, an account which, despite the ideological bias, manages yet to be a keen and often judicious one. The "Revolution found Russian music disoriented within its own country" and was able to capitalize on that condition throughout subsequent years in establishing a spurious "Social Realism" as the effective musical order of the day (107). Assigned a role and meaning "totally foreign to its true mission," Soviet music has floundered ever since, caught between tendencies to "simplification" and an occasional "rather specialized adaptation of classical works" (118) (the latter apparently differing in unspecified ways from Stravinsky's own adaptations which comprised his primary creative effort during the same years).

"Music is not a 'dancing kholkoz' any more than it is a 'Symphony of Socialism,'" he ventures in a remark few would dispute (122). And

"Art," defined once more as "an ontological reality," "is not and cannot be 'a superstructure based on conditions of production' in accordance with the wishes of the Marxists" (124). To this point Stravinsky is admirably clear.

Where Stravinsky fails to do justice to the issues he has raised both here and throughout his writing is that he will not face squarely the need to distinguish why and in what details Art is not superstructure, why and in what details "means of production" is not an adequate expression of The World's Body or The Mind of God. Of these matters, which should be the crux of his rejection, nothing is said. Rather, the case is rested on the reiteration that Russia "has never been capable of stabilizing her culture or of consolidating her traditions," the result being that she "has ever been untrue to herself" (123). The heart of the tragedy lies for Stravinsky in the fact that "now . . . that she is once more taking up her traditions, she is content with their mere simulacra without understanding their intrinsic value" (123). "A renewal is fruitful only when it goes hand in hand with tradition. Living dialectic wills that renewal and tradition shall develop and abet each other in a simultaneous process. Now Russia has seen only conservatism without renewal, or revolution without tradition, whence arises the terrifying reeling over the void that has always made my head swim" (123-24).

It is difficult to quarrel with Stravinsky's formulation of the dilemma at the stated level of theoretical generality. That formulation remains, in the context of his discussion, a brilliant one, as

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well put as an Eliot, a Tate, or a Hoffmansthal could want it. So far as it goes. But it is in his music (quite properly, considering that a man has only one life to live), rather than in his poetic, that one must search for the ground on which conservatism can come successfully to grips with renewal, revolution reconcile itself with tradition. The riddle of Stravinsky's middle period centers around his own response to the problem he so well poses. Why, during the same years when he dwells most insistently on his Russianness, on the nostalgia for a stable base and the need for deep roots from which to draw for continued creative nurture, he must nevertheless remain, as he puts it several times, *déraciné*, essentially nomadic and facing the frustrating demands of establishing a new base of operations at this decisive, mid-stage of a troubled career, he will never say in so many words. Why, as a French citizen situated at the heart of his much-coveted European tradition, having "seen clearly" the frontier between "Latino-Slav culture" and German protestantism, safely cradled in Rome and securely "facing toward Beaumarchais," he must nevertheless move on, rather than back, is also a matter not squarely met. The answer is, however, made almost appallingly clear in the final paragraph of the lecture.

Faced with the abyss and confronted by internal as well as external crisis, failing to have established permanent moorings in either his native land or his various adopted homes (several each in both Switzerland and France),[32] Stravinsky postulates these salient requisites, as he sees it: "For art presupposes a culture, an upbringing, an integral stability of the intellect, and Russia of today has never been more completely devoid of these" (124). The "integral stability of the intellect," for Stravinsky, translates into the securities of doctrine, dogmatic stance, and aesthetically preceptual fiat, a stern assertion of the demands of Apollo over the variously renounced instincts, dreams, and impulses of Dionysus. These are invoked simultaneously with the closing of the door on Russia and the emergent renunciation of Europe for America. When the head swims, it would seem, one swallows the pill of dogma, travels, and averts one's gaze from the dizzying confusion of social and political actuality. We find Stravinsky soon (and for the remaining twenty years of his life) living in Hollywood, where the values, if not the trappings, of _ancien régime_ may be said to have reached long since their parodic apotheosis, suitably far from diverting obligations to anything resembling "social realism," no matter how crude its current forms. Stravinsky had learned that the Southern California climate might prove favorable to his health. It was also where the money was.[33]

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It may or may not be surprising that, in a series devoted to outlining a musical poetic, one of six lectures should be devoted to concert performance. Stravinsky greets the opportunity as in other contexts, however, and discourses at considerable length as to proper and permissible standards for the rendition and hearing of music once it is written. Here he is as authoritarian and dogmatic as he ever becomes.

Music, as one of the forms of Art, may be, as he has previously asserted, "an autonomous reality," existing beyond its matrix, the composer, and apart from the social complex from which it emerges; but Stravinsky makes plain that, as with many so-called political and territorial "autonomies," the domain of the composer's wishes extends, in fact, into and over the living conditions of that autonomy. Distinguishing sharply between the roles of "two kinds of musicians: the creator and the performer," and demarcating sharply the idea of execution and the idea of interpretation, he opts for the former, since the condition of music "implies the strict putting into effect of an explicit will [the composer's] that contains nothing beyond what it specifically commands" (127). The good performer is the faithful executant whose "secret of perfection lies above all in his consciousness of the law imposed upon him by the work he is performing" (132). The error of "interpretation" lies in the fact that the "sin against the spirit of the work always begins with a sin against its letter" (129).

But the absolute nature of the music's autonomy comes into question, and the degree of its independence of the will of what must be read as a suspiciously jealous and domineering composer is more than suggested in Stravinsky's remark that "the composer [not, we note, the now supposedly dis-umbilicized, objectively-derived "autonomous" progeny, music] runs a perilous risk every time his music is played" (128). It appears then that there continue to exist rights both proprietary and territorial. The precaution one may take for avoiding this "perilous risk" is to develop and encourage performers who are inured to "the great principle of submission" (132-33). Ideal submission requires, along with technical mastery, a sense of tradition and, commanding the whole, an aristocratic culture that is not merely a question of acquired learning" (133).

Considering the ostensible breadth and magnanimity of Stravinsky's views in some contexts, it might be tempting to dismiss his odd use of the word aristocratic here as an innocent one, accidental or merely figurative, but that would be to misread him when he is in his present frame of mind. He goes on to confirm both the intentionality and the literalness of his diction by adding: "Such an education cannot be acquired in the schools of music and the conservatories, for the teaching of fine manners is not their object: very rarely does a violin teacher even point out to his pupils that it is ill-becoming, when playing, to spread one's legs too far apart. It is nonetheless strange that such an educational program is nowhere put into effect" (134).

Of course, the primary reference is to what he calls "musical civility . . . musical good breeding" as illustrated, more justifiably, in the proscription of such prevalent excess as renditions of the St. Matthew Passion "in complete disregard of the composer's wishes, with hundreds of performers," an "arrogant pride in numbers, this concupiscence of the many" (135). What is interesting here is that, although Stravinsky is making a valid aesthetic and acoustical point which can be successfully argued against a variety of what M. H. Abrams would call "pragmatic" values involving the performers as well as the audiences in such a performance, he does so by asserting eminent domain, the rights of the few or the One (whether Composer or Aesthetic Monad) over those of the Many.

Stravinsky is seldom without surprises, however, and, having postulated and argued the primacy of purely aesthetic considerations over less aristocratically-oriented, mundane, and humanly "unbuttoned" ones, essentially a case which overrides utilitarian values, he suddenly inserts a paragraph reminding (who? the audience? himself?) that a "work of art cannot contain itself. Once the creator has completed his work, he necessarily feels the need to share his joy" (137). Yet even this afterthought and concession remains self-centered in its expression: "He quite naturally seeks to establish contact with his fellow man, who in this case becomes his listener. The listener reacts and becomes a partner in the game initiated by the creator. Nothing less, nothing more. The fact that the partner is free to accept or to refuse participation in the game does not automatically invest him with the authority of a judge" (137). We see then that the audience "share" in the musical offering comes off as a mainly passive one. The listener, once he has failed to exercise his option of refusing to hear, has evidently renounced his title to judge what he hears. Lacking the authority of the composer and becoming a listening "partner" in compliance with decorum and "the great principle of submission," he is freed from the presumptuous license of judging for himself.

Stravinsky's attitude toward performance and audience thus complements the continuous fulminations against critics which constitute frequent digressions everywhere in his writing and interviews, early and late. The result is that his complaint that listeners generally "enjoy music only in a passive way" (140) and that "in music, as in anything else, inactivity leads gradually to the paralysis, to the atrophying of faculties" (142), has a hollow ring. All too commonly authority deplores the vices which its own practices do so much to inculcate. "Understood in this way, music becomes a sort of drug which, far from stimulating the mind, paralyzes and stultifies it" (142). But surely it is axiomatic that "participation" (which Stravinsky solicits) limited to mere uncritical reception ("Nothing less, nothing more") and denied the full right and encouragement of judgment is bound to reduce, in the end, to a matter of passivity rather than actual participation. And beauty, as Cassirer insists, "does not consist of passive percepts."[34]

The imperialist aesthetic which yields only a token concession to social "uses" of art and which denies interpretive independence to the performer, all the while denigrating the function and responsibilities of critics,[35] can do little in the end but foster passive attitudes, "atrophy of faculties," and that widespread stultification Stravinsky is so quick to deplore in Western audiences. Audiences who "submit" to such precepts do indeed reach the point of taking music as "a sort of drug," just as he says.

No one is more precise than Stravinsky at delineating the often

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benumbing ignorance and apathy of Western audiences and the corresponding signs of disorientation, disorder, and debility in the contemporary scene. His disquisitions from the Autobiography on critics and concert-goers; his interviews collected in the Craft books dealing with such phenomena as hippies, John Cage, and Miami; and his dissections of the contemporary medical world: all these attest to his everlasting acuity and wit, and occasionally to outrageous bias. And there is no serious doubt that at times the composer-audience alienation continued to be of utmost concern to him, even if primarily for financial reasons. It was usually much more than that. Yet though he does address the problem in terms of reverting to a modified, more accessible musical language (his whole neo-classic phase has been construed by some as a concession to popularity), seldom if ever will he train his sights on the underlying attitudes which make true accessibility considerably more than a matter of technique, style, and manner. The pleading (in Stravinsky's case, the proclaiming) of special privilege, of composer's status, and the denial of audience claims to exercise its "authority of a judge" (no matter how vulgar its tastes)--all these are aspects of the phenomenon of artist-audience alienation defined as early as Ortega's Dehumanization of Art and detailed beyond reasonable doubt in Edmund Wilson's Axel's Castle; they have since been elaborated somewhere along the line in almost everyone's diagnosis of what ails Western Art for nearly half a century. The myopia which leads Stravinsky to discern sharply a widespread debasement of audiences, but to ignore the possible contributions of the artist to exacerbating that situation, argues an insecurity which too often finds its voice in high-handed rhetoric about "universal" qualities to be sought by the artist in lieu of "special," decadent, and romantically individualistic ones. It is an ill-concealed snobbishness that belittles the intuitive (and therefore democratic) base of artistic perception and moves glibly on to the high-handed denial of that fullest dimension of audience participation, the satisfaction of making up its own mind. In the ascendancy of such a point of view and its creative practice, there can be no wonder that art, somewhat like religion, finds itself in danger of becoming an "opiate of the people," seeing that it induces and encourages more and more the very ignorance, passivity, and estrangement it pretends to deplore.

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The hallmarks of Stravinsky's poetic are: the necessity for shoring up the bases of Order in the presence of the "abyss" and cultural fragmentation; recourse to a select tradition as repository of previously established, stabilizing, enduring and universal forms, as a reservoir of materials and inspiration (if that term is permissible), and as a salutary inbuilt restraint on the original sin of anarchic individualism (which nevertheless may assert itself in certain limited and approved, though mostly unspecified, ways); the autonomous basis of musical ontology, which nevertheless admits (somehow) of a

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token tolerance for social purpose and recognizes "a form of communion with our fellow man--and with the Supreme Being"; and the transposition of the idea of expression into terms of creative "play" or of work as fulfillment of the appetite or "need" to create. The strategic role of criticism as a function of the creative artist is acknowledged and defended, along with the assumption that the creator is the one uniquely qualified to criticize.

Most of Stravinsky's tenets relate to these generative ideas, which are seen to be a working out, in dialogue with the ongoing musical-cultural events, fashions, demands, controversies, and crises of the 1920's and 1930's, of a pattern of taste prefigured in statements concerning his compositions of the period, of which the "Open Letter" and "Some Ideas" furnish convenient examples. Such manifestoes were originally issued, and continued to be so, in the event of what the musical world took to signal an extraordinary and surprising aesthetic position coming from the man it still chose to recall as the composer of The Firebird, Petrouchka, and The Rite of Spring, a kind of divine primitive, a revolutionary force in music, the shaper of a new tonal, rhythmic language. Stravinsky, indignant at so clumsy an effort to freeze him in a position he now claims he never held, devotes a good deal of public statement to setting the record straight and to declaring the ideas that now animate his music.

The evolution of his expressed attitude, extending through ensuing decades up to the time of his death in 1971, thirty years later, is a steadily continuing one, chronicled in the controversial but intriguing publications which he issued from time to time in collaboration with Robert Craft. What Stravinsky has to add in these frequent, if usually abbreviated and topical, disclosures does considerable to moderate the extremity and dogmatism (if not the pungency) of his views, but it does not radically alter the foundation of his aesthetic stance. We may be a long while before attaining a satisfactory and validated attribution of total responsibility for the letter of those beliefs because of the controversy over Robert Craft's actual role in conveying them to the public view. Authorities can be adduced to maximize, or to minimize, their authenticity in the letter, and there is, at this juncture, little to be gained in pressing for an absolute disentanglement of authorial responsibility in proportion to the loss incurred in delaying their recognition as an absorbing and revealing extension in the thought of one of our century's monumental, though problematic, creative masters. Stravinsky, like Yeats and Picasso, lived a long life and remained an active spirit during almost all of it, with all the intellectually and emotionally developmental facets and modulations the expression implies. It should not be expected that he, of all people, could have remained static in his thinking about his art. That he did not do so has already become apparent to those who have cultivated his acquaintance through the Stravinsky-Craft books, which offer a more episodic, confidential, and personalized access than the "official" documents I am treating. They are better written and, when all is said and done, are scarcely more dubiously authored.[36] Altogether they constitute a repository of continuing aesthetic introspection, anecdote, aperçus, gossip, and wit for which we should first be grateful, then inquisitive. At any rate, their continuance and elaboration of Stravinsky's persisting thematics can only be done justice elsewhere. It suffices here to reiterate that they provide with some consistency a mirroring critical continuum for Stravinsky's own late resume of his creative experience: "Speaking from my own education as composer, I know that I learned more through my mistakes and pursuits of false assumptions than from my exposures to founts of wisdom and knowledge. In the matter of acquisition of artistic skills, furthermore, I was, and am still, a pious Aristotelian: imitation is the beginning of art."[37]

In the later books we see him become more often charitable, if not exactly mellower in expression; he is less guarded, more latitudinous on items of dogma, and more tolerant of heresies--at least, when they emanate from great heretics. His wit pierces more as it becomes less vitriolic. Much of the polemic battle of the earlier years is long since fought, the issues have faded and are coming to seem almost quaint alongside the furor surrounding Op, Pop, and anti-Art; the old battle lines are eroded. For Stravinsky in the sixties the spectre of the Aleatoric dwarfs the previous menace to Art of tired old Social Realism and its tattered army of Variants or even of Romanticism Renascent.[38]

In his survey of "the scene," Stravinsky's feel for contemporaneity remains impressive (and that, for doubters, is part of the problem). He is no less fearfully lucid and lethal in depicting the most au courant in intellectual fads, and retains a sharp eye for whatever might prove less absurd and more staying. His late tribute to Charles Ives, his rapprochement with figures as disparate as Beethoven and Messiaen, and the announced suspicion that Lévi-Strauss may well have something but will have to be watched--all testify to his continued intellectual ubiquity, keenness and, even more important, late-blooming flexibilities. It is possible that in retrospect we may see that in his age only a scattered few--again Yeats and Picasso come to mind--stayed so young so long. But even if so, it can scarcely seem so remarkable in other cases as in Stravinsky's, considering the determined will to premature rigor mortis which characterized the more outlandish postures of his middle age, the ones these chapters have been describing at length.

As the polemicizing abates and Stravinsky relaxes into a partisanship less bitter, his wit becomes more detached, his tone increasingly Olympian. The changes in tone, as I have said, tend mostly to modulate rather than renounce or contradict the Apollonics of earlier vintage. And it is in the almost gravitational pull toward old positions capable of being phrased anew and more gently that Stravinsky suggests most strongly his friend of late age, Eliot, another homo faber who spent much of his own career "defending his position" in the sincere effort to merit, and then sustain, clear title to the admired status reflected in his early designation of Ezra Pound as il miglior fabbro. A broad base of harmony in taste and recognition of shared, long-term purpose is discernible, for both Stravinsky and Eliot, in the telescoped retrospective of the poet's poetic that follows.

NOTES

[1] RC, p. 194. Suvchinsky may well be, of all Stravinsky's long-term associates, the best equipped to have undertaken a full critical biography--by virtue of length and closeness of association and his own perspective as polymath. It is a great pity he has not done so.

[2] Hereafter in this chapter any quotation from PM will be indicated by a page number in parenthesis, e.g., (4-5).

[3] PM, pp. 15-17. The implied analogy between Faust and Le Sacre as "innovative" rather than "revolutionary" works speaks for itself.

[4] This momentous event in the late years of Stravinsky's life is chronicled by both Stravinsky and Craft in DD. The account is both touching and, since even back in Petersburg Stravinsky remained himself, pungent.

[5] Stravinsky, Autobiography, p. 70.

[6] There are numerous accounts, short and long, of Stravinsky's daily life. One of the best is contained in Vera Stravinsky's letters to a young cousin in Moscow in 1962, describing daily activities chez Stravinsky in Hollywood. These are included in TE, pp. 64-82.

[7] See Robert Craft, "Stravinsky's Russian Letters," New York Review of Books, 21 February, 1974, p. 16.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Stravinsky and Craft, Memories and Conversations (1960), p. 19.

[11] Ibid., p. 21.

[12] He adds: "The contact of this reagent with the musical reality around me, with human environments and the world of ideas, has provoked various reactions in which violence has been equaled only by arbitrariness."

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[13] Citing "Parmenides on one side" and "Heraclitus on the other," Stravinsky adds, p. 34, that "[m]ere common sense, as well as supreme wisdom, invites us to confirm both the one and the other. All the same, the best attitude for a composer in this case will be the attitude of a man who is conscious of the hierarchy of values and who must make a choice."

[14] After all his aesthetic discussion, Stravinsky recalls in RC, p. 75, how Debussy once referred to him in a letter as a "primitive" and as an "instinctual" rather than a "schooled" composer. "And he was right."

[15] T. S. Eliot, "Choruses from 'The Rock', 1934," *Complete Poems and Plays* (London, 1969), p. 164.

[16] Edward T. Cone, "The Uses of Convention: Stravinsky and His Models," in *Stravinsky: A New Appraisal of His Work*, ed. P. H. Lang (1963), p. 33. "Stravinsky's style is too strong and too individual to permit long disguise. To watch it preserve its identity through all its adventures is endlessly fascinating."

[17] The phrase is Paul Rosenfeld's.

[18] As P. H. Lang puts it, "[t]o be thus never quite at home is to be always on the watch for the different" (*Stravinsky: A New Appraisal*, p. 13).

[19] T. W. Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, tr. Anne Mitchell and Wesley Blomster (New York, 1973), p. 135.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 166. Cf. Eliot's belief that the "marvel of Lucretius is the passionate act by which he annihilates himself in a system and unites himself with it, gaining something greater than himself" (T. S. Eliot, "A Brief Introduction to the Method of Paul Valéry," *Le Serpent par Paul Valéry*, tr. Paul Wardle [London, 1924], p. 14).

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] René Wellek, "The Term and Concept of Classicism in Literary History," in *Discriminations* (1970), pp. 56-89.

[24] It hardly suffices to say, as Stravinsky does (85): "My fondest hope, to finish up, is that you may be as embarrassed by the expression as I myself am" and then to cover his withdrawal by an *ad hominem* attack on critics who employ the word.

[25] Laurence Morton, "Stravinsky and Tchaikovsky: Le Baiser de la

Fée," in Stravinsky: A New Appraisal, p. 60, says: "But at a certain moment . . . of his career he needed the figure of Tchaikovsky as a symbol of Russian music from which he himself stemmed, to which he has always remained umbilical. He has recreated Tchaikovsky not in his own image but in the image of the distinguished figure that the twelve-year-old Igor once glimpsed in the foyer of the Maryinsky Theater."

[26] Eliot had spoken of Blake as subject to "the dangers to which the naked man is exposed. His philosophy, like his visions, like his insight, like his technique, was his own. And accordingly he was inclined to attach more importance to it than an artist should; this is what makes him eccentric, and makes him inclined to formlessness." The passage is from Eliot's 1920 essay on Blake, SE, p. 320. It may be superfluous to add that Scriabin is often accused of eccentricity and formlessness.

[27] See Craft, "Stravinsky's Russian Letters," p. 18. Less relevant here, though equally volatile, is Stravinsky's change of heart concerning Richard Strauss' music. Electra was "a marvelous thing" in 1913, but later Stravinsky could say of Strauss, "I do not like the major works, and I do not like the minor works" (RC, p. 225).

[28] George Antheil, Bad Boy of Music (1945), pp. 38-39.

[29] But in RC, p. 35, Stravinsky has kinder words for the hippies and counter-culture types on Sunset Boulevard, a few blocks from his California home: "The long-haired ephebes attract me, but I am too square to belong to their Big Daddy elect myself."

[30] Craft, "Stravinsky's Russian Letters," p. 16. There is little evidence though of extensive, active participation.

[31] Giorgio Melchiori, in The Tightrope Walker, seeking "the common characteristics of the style of an age," uses the term "funambulism" to convey the distinctive mode of the artist "who, like the successful acrobat, succeeds in keeping step by step, moment by moment, his balance, while being aware of the void or the turmoil round him" (p. 8).

[32] White itemizes an almost constant shifting of residences for the Stravinsky family during the years 1914-39.

[33] White puts it quite diplomatically: "As soon as he found that in the United States he could work in peace and earn a respectable income, he became relaxed; and his wife [Stravinsky married Vera de Bosset in Bedford, Massachusetts, March 9, 1940] saw to it that in L.A. he had a comfortable and happy home to live in" (S, p. 93). The continuing narrative of Stravinsky's financial negotiations with Walt Disney, Billy Rose, Ringling Brothers Cricus, and others in show business is a fascinating, but separate, story. Though it reveals

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Stravinsky--as do nearly all his intimates--as somewhat avaricious and a tough bargainer, it is on the whole not unfavorable to his artistic integrity. He always drew the line somewhere.

[34] Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven, 1944), p. 151.

[35] René Wellek has noted how in the main Eliot "rejects both interpretative and judicial criticism" while continuing to practice it himself. Eliot's relegation of roles is somewhat different from Stravinsky's, but alike in its hierarchical assumptions: "interpretation is necessary perhaps only in so far as one is passive, not creative oneself." See Wellek, "The Criticism of T. S. Eliot," Sewanee Review, 64 (1956), pp. 402-03.

[36] See Patrick Smith, "Who Really Wrote Stravinsky's Prose?" High Fidelity, 22, No. 11 (November 1972), pp. 50-56, for a recent opinion on the validity of Stravinsky's inclusions to the books.

[37] Igor Stravinsky, Themes and Conclusions (London, 1972), p. 22.

[38] See TE, p. 4, on "Current Enemies of Art."

CHAPTER IV

THE POETIC OF ELIOT

That the Stravinskyan poetic as summarized in the preceding two chapters recalls in its principal points of emphasis several of the most persistent Eliot concerns can scarcely come as news to familiars of Eliot criticism. Order, tradition, personality, objectivity are, in Eliot's phrasing, concepts which focus a preponderance of his early contribution to poetic theory. Whatever role they may or may not play in knitting together a somewhat deceptively loose critical discussion, the following are central to most efforts to discern the infrastructure of his poetic system: his ongoing preoccupations with the urgency of stemming chaos in a fragmented, debased language and age; the problem of mediating between tradition, poetic material, and the individual talent; the hazardous ambivalence of personality and emotional expression; and the problematically derived, technical challenge of locating suitable objective correlatives.

Style and Stratagem

Difficulties do present themselves, however. Eliot himself was diffident about elaborating systems. His prose style, as M. C. Bradbrook says, "works by reserves and implications," and has its own "tentacular roots." Its characteristic method is at once strong and dangerous, she adds, in that it "allows play to assumptions and veils prejudices."[1] As A. D. Nuttall remarks: "Urbane deprecation is not argument."[2]

In this regard, Eliot's manner can be seen to complement his early purpose if we recall Hugh Kenner's assertion that Eliot's adopted role in the literary raid conceived by Ezra Pound was to "go in at the back door and take out the swag,"[3] and that the scheme became formative and enduring in its influence on Eliot's mode of thought as well as his public stance. Pound's own recollected version was "that he'd better try a more oceanic and fluid method of sapping the foundations."[4] Some measure of Eliot's success in adopting the strategy, and of the ambiguous nature of his success, can be seen in Pound's later remark that he "is now respected by the _Times Literary Supplement_, but his criticisms no longer arouse my interest."[5]

Kenner's account of early Pound-Eliot stratagems is supported in important details in Donald Gallup's monograph, _Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot: Collaborators in Letters_,[6] and is lent authority in a larger perspective by René Wellek's ascription of much in Eliot's lifelong critical endeavor to "cultural politics."[7] George Watson describes the early results in terms of a coup, stating flatly that the venture scored a triumph "total and instantaneous within the terms it had set itself: the capture of young intellectuals of creative energy in

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England and the United States in the 1920's."[8] The 'swag,' he says, "involved, in a very few years, the capture of the seats of literary power, of the London literary journals and of influential younger teachers of literature in the universities."[9] In facilitating the take-over which admits of such a description, Eliot's early criticism lent a provocative thrust which can no more be forgotten than literary history can ignore the persuasive purr of his continuing polemic for which Lady Rothermere's Criterion provided the main forum over the next two decades in consolidating the ground gained.

Pound, it will be remembered, reserved the throwing of bricks for himself. Eliot's most telling effects are those in which, as John Chalker says, he "works by insinuation."[10]

That Eliot was a more complete and consequent thinker than Pound and, to return to our own comparison, a more thorough one along discursive lines than Stravinsky, should be unnecessary to argue. To be able to say, "[t]here is no method except to be very intelligent" (SW, p. 11), is not only to brush off a coterie anxious to attribute something like omniscient system to almost casual utterances (a fate to which Eliot was soon subject). It is also to draw in a phrase quite proper lines between aesthetics and creative criticism, prophecy and idea, and, by no undue extension, God and man.

It may have been, as Mario Praz objects, "speciously modest" for the author of "Tradition and the Individual Talent," the essays on Donne and Hamlet (later of "The Music of Poetry" and "The Three Voices of Poetry"), and the most technically polished new poetry to be written in perhaps a century to comment, "I have no general theory of my own" (UPUC, p. 143). More likely, however, what Praz reads as a posture is to a degree vindicated in that, as Praz comes to see, "he is an empirical critic . . . has not scrupled to contradict himself . . . his real guide is not logic but intuition."[11] Eliot himself, often more discerning than his advocates, corroborates this: "I am sure that my own theorizing has been epiphenomenal of my tastes" (CC, p. 20). Again: "Alas, philosophy is not science, nor is literary criticism; and it is an elementary error to think that we have discovered as objective laws what we have merely imposed by private legislation" (UPUC, p. 60).

Plus Anglais que les Anglais, Eliot in so saying confirms himself in a very British pragmatic tradition of criticism, even as his remark about method and intelligence establishes the same point. He is asserting strongly under cover of measure and deference. The adoption of well-born modesty does not obscure an unavoidable implication that he himself is, to say the least, "very intelligent," and thus to confer a sly authority upon his own words. In style and tactic, then, Eliot is quite different from Stravinsky, whose pronouncements emerge in an alternating current of logical rigor and invective, punctuated by his flair for the pungent and epigrammatic, all *ex cathedra*.

Eliot's disinclination to systematize, however, does not obviate a degree of continuity and cohesion in his criticism, as Bradbrook, Austin Warren, and numerous others have pointed out. Though the resonant coinages which were to become the critical catch phrases for two literary generations were never advanced in the definitive and hypostatized senses attributed them by a host of sedulous explicators less intelligent than Eliot himself, they were nonetheless thoughtfully put and, Kenner notwithstanding, usually seriously intended in the contexts where they occurred. It is hard to share, for instance, Kenner's view that the whole idea of Tradition and the Individual Talent is in essence a parody of British literary establishmentarian cant.[12] Many reviews which came to comprise The Sacred Wood may have issued from the point of view of "a whimsical but purposeful Poltergeist,"[13] but Eliot's sustained attention throughout the years to the idea of tradition verifies a dimension of seriousness, if that were needed. The criteria offered in "What is a Classic," for example, indicate some of the maturing ramifications of the idea considered twenty years later. Certainly Eliot's early comments on, say Blake, are tinged with strategy and irony, but the effect of such a realization should perhaps be more to remind us, quite properly, of the several levels on which his critical pieces moved rather than to discredit them for a fundamental lack of authenticity. Stravinsky, whose affection and admiration for Eliot is often voiced in the terms of old comrades-at-arms, remains nevertheless able to reconcile the campaigner and tactician, the gentleman poltergeist and the serious critic when he says, upon his first meeting with Eliot: "He is not the most exuberant man I have ever known, but I feel I have been with someone very pure" (DD, p. 114).

To recognize a complex ground for Eliot's criticism, then, is not to discredit it, but rather to realize anew what we all need to recall from time to time: that any criticism Eliot himself was to respect, no matter how far it strays into the dark wood of abstraction, must remain applicable in actual creative contexts, touch upon problems, and bear on immediate endeavors. It pertains to situations and derives from the plights and designs of the creative artist.[14] That, at least, remained Eliot's explicitly eloquent opinion when he came to the Norton Chair of Poetry with the lectures later published as The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism. Here, like Stravinsky a few years later, he ponders aesthetic questions in terms of creative problems rooted in specific situations, characteristically, though not exclusively, his own. The critical tradition is treated almost exclusively as a history of eminent poet-critics.[15]

Nor does Eliot insist on the discontinuity of life and art, as has often been supposed. Though he held firm to the precept that a poem is a poem, "and not another thing,"[16] and continued to avoid frankly confessional disclosure in his poetry, he acknowledges in many places the interplay between poet and poem, biography and the created work. Of Shakespeare he says, "We need a great many facts in his biography."[17] To those who would have us 'look into our hearts and write,' he replies, that is not deep enough. "One must look into the cerebral cortext, the nervous system, and the digestive tracts."[18] Poet-critics do not, according to Eliot, always comment solely as craftsmen. "Arnold . . . may have been stirred to a defense of his own poetry, conceived and composed in the soul of a mid-century Oxford graduate" (SE, p. 309). It is also clear that Eliot was not averse on occasion to perpetrating what the New Criticism, in uncommonly prim proscription (often invoking

Eliot as authority), has almost succeeded in making the primary interpretive crime of the first half-century, the so-called 'biographical fallacy.'[19] Often invoked to shield artists' privacy from critics' poking about, this 'doctrine' has much to answer for in inhibiting the reading of so-called difficult poets, Eliot not least among them.

So it is within the understanding of Eliot's criticism as being launched, refined, and argued from a complex ground of poetic conviction conditioned by "cultural politics," the advocacy of never quite static or systematized beliefs, and an inner ambivalence manifested by the posing of several never quite settled cruxes (some of them personal) that we must construe it. Astute Eliot commentary today is coming more and more to recognize this fact. Mowbray Allan believes there "is reason to doubt that Eliot himself achieved a definite and final state of mind."[20]

> One has only learnt to get the better of words
> For the thing one no longer has to say.[21]

Allan's study of the evolution of Eliot's belief on such a fundamental matter as "impersonality" leads him to say, for example, that by "1930 Eliot would seem to have come around, in part and reluctantly, to Hegel's view that the Romantic is the art of the modern world."[22] As Eliot recognized in his essay on Baudelaire, "a poet in a romantic age cannot be a 'classical' poet except in tendency" (SE, p. 424). The implications for Eliot's own situation are considerable. "In part and reluctantly" would seem to be key words in describing many of Eliot's shifts in attitude.

Stravinsky is, of course, not alone in remarking Eliot's several

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faces. Auden and Kenner are only two among those who knew him well and who played the game of characterizing the man and his work as a composite of shifting masks.[23] It is moreover true that to recall his various personae helps in glimpsing sporadically the elusive critic behind the invisible poet: Old Possum, strategist and tactician, with Pound a "collaborator in letters" engaged in a raid on the literary establishment as well as on the inarticulate; Sweeney of the digestive tract who "shifts from ham to ham" "stirring the water" in much more than his bath while allowing, perhaps a bit disingenuously, that "The masters of the subtle schools / Are controversial, polymath"; Tiresias who sees a whole waste land on London Bridge, after whose "knowledge" there can be little "forgiveness"; the melancholy churchwarden, whose post-Tiresian other-worldliness bespeaks the bleak realization that "Human kind cannot bear very much reality," and who posits _The Idea of a Christian Society_ knowing full well how remote is its potential for fulfilment. "[I]n poetry as in life our business is to make the best of a bad job" (_UPUC_, p. 45).

Order

The "reality" which Tiresian Eliot was to treat from _Gerontion_ forward and which he apparently found so difficult to "bear" was, in generalized terms, an increasingly prevalent disorder to which both his poetry and his commentary refer as the years progress. His citation from Haecker at the beginning of _After Strange Gods_ (1934) reflects his view of the consequences for literature:

> Chaos in "literature." Literature, which, though its borders be vague, is even more clearly a province unto itself, which in healthy times is a relatively pure and pleasant mirror of all prevailing things and absurdities, but which in sick, chaotic times is itself more turbid than all gloomy things and ideas, has become a *cloaca maxima*. Every disorder in the human, in man himself--I mentioned the three-fold perspective from which disorder can be viewed, from the primacy of pleasure, the primacy of sentimentality, the primacy of technical intelligence--in place of the only true hierarchical order, that of the primacy of the mind and of the spiritual--every disorder finds its relatively clear, or rather, recently even further distorted image in the literature of these times.[24]

Eliot had, at the outset of his career as critic, phrased the problem of order in cooler, more strictly literary terms. In "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919), the emphasis, a persistent one, is adjunctive to the idea of tradition and its working within literature. Eliot makes no reference at this point to any crisis of world disorder. What he does indicate unmistakably is the disposition on his own part to expect and demand sequence, continuity, and hierarchy, and to arrange or impose them where they are not readily present or where their arrangement has been disturbed: "The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the *whole* existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered . . ." (*SW*, p. 50). After modification and renewal, order is seen as a condition, like unity, toward which we naturally aspire, and the failure to regain that condition--though that is not here mentioned--will by implication constitute an aberrant state of affairs.

Now whatever Eliot's original intention in writing The Waste Land may have been, it can hardly be argued that the resulting poem acted as a force for the reconstitution of order or, for that matter, would soon permit the regrouping Eliot seemed to desire and find natural. Inasmuch as his own conception of the poem as an "ordered unity" prior to its publication has now been shown to have been at best a tenuous matter itself, Eliot can scarcely have preconceived its enormous and shattering effect upon what F. R. Leavis was pleased to call "the situation upon which [he] impinged."[25] Suffice to say that in a relatively short time the poem (like The Sacred Wood) was, in fact taken and understood much more in terms of "sapping the foundations" than as "the supervention of novelty." And its impact on English poetry had to be viewed as altering rather more than "ever so slightly" the "whole existing order." For a man of Eliot's disposition and developing values, we can only surmise what, if any, inner ambivalences were triggered by his own succés de scandale.

Eliot, like Stravinsky, unleashed more than he knew he had within him, or would have countenanced, had he realized initially his own potential for disrupting "the existing order." The evidence is that the revolutionary impact of The Waste Land and The Sacred Wood, of his early "impingement" generally, conjoined with a deeply ingrained personal disposition to order, served to heighten the tensions observable in his equilibristic performance over the next two decades as leading poet and arbiter of literary affairs. The nature of Eliot's religious quest for an ordering matrix complicates, if it does not compromise, the individualistic urge to experiment and provides a sustained gloss to Eliot's early remark that the "progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality." Noting that Eliot's "fundamental critical concepts originate in idealist epistemology," Allan sees Eliot as informed by, yet also in "reaction against Romanticism."[26] "For him, the poet's or the critic's expression of his personality in his work may be a sin, but it is original sin. We may say, then, that if Eliot's critical theory is in the Romantic tradition, his critical practice is *an effort to escape from that theory*."[27]

Certain it is that contrition and penitence (and their obverse manifestation, high-handed pontificality) determine the tone in the neo-classical professions which were to follow. We have seen how the iconoclastic success of Stravinsky's early iconoclastic ballet scores intensified his own ambivalence and sharpened his ensuing condemnation of "the revolutionary." The similarity between Eliot and Stravinsky on this count reveals a parallel so close as to indicate considerably more than mere coincidence. Characterizing Eliot as "imperialistic . . . poet of the *urbs aeterna*" and citing his "veneration not only for Baudelaire but for Virgil," Kermode notes how, for the poet, the "other side of the city is the Babylon of *Apocalypse*, and when the *imperium* is threadbare and the end approaches of that which Virgil called endless, this is the city we see. It is the *Blick ins Chaos*."[28] Self-defined as imperialist, attracted by Baudelaire and invoking Apollo and Mozart, Stravinsky too felt panic at the thought of waiting for the end if the imperium was to become increasingly threadbare. He experienced his own

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confrontation with Chaos, and even more sharply than Eliot he seems to have felt his own contribution to Babelizing the "dialect of the tribe." What Kermode says of the one can equally be said of the other. Each "has the marks of a modern kind of greatness, those beneficial intuitions of irregularity and chaos, the truth of the foul rag-and-bone shop. Yet we remember him as celebrating order."[29]

The urgency of achieving (retrieving) order, along with Eliot's matured conception of the vocation of the artist and his sense of worldly limitation (and, of course, the limits of art) is conveyed in "Poetry and Drama" (1951). "For it is ultimately the function of art, in imposing a credible order upon ordinary reality, and thereby eliciting some perception of an order in reality, to bring us to a condition of serenity, stillness, and reconciliation; and then leave us, as Virgil left Dante, to proceed toward a region where that guide can avail us no farther" (OPP, p. 94). For Stravinsky, "the One precedes the Many," though "the coexistence of the two is constantly necessary," and

> all the problems of art, like all possible problems for that matter, including the problem of knowledge and Being, revolve about this question, with Parmenides on one side denying the possibility of the Many, and Heraclitus on the other denying the existence of the One. . . . The best attitude for a composer in this case will be the attitude of a man who is conscious of the hierarchy of values and who must make a choice. . . . Contrast is everywhere. One has only to take note of it. Similarity is hidden; it must be sought out. (PM, pp. 33-34)

Later, all "music is nothing more than a succession of impulses that converge toward a definite point of repose" (ibid., pp. 37-38).

Carol H. Smith's excellent book on Eliot's final period as

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dramatist delineates persuasively the main strands in his development as a whole. It confirms (in much the same terms) the major ideological-personal determinants in his course:

> Eliot is first and last a religious poet, but he is also an experimenter. The evolution of his personal philosophy can be traced from despair at the disorder of the natural world to his acceptance of a supernatural order which gives meaning and unity to the world's apparent chaos. This movement is clearly evident in his critical writings and his non-dramatic poetry. Moreover, there is a clear connection between Eliot's religious perspective and his views on art and drama. His endorsement of classicism, for example, was an effort to require of art a form which would order experience, just as a religious interpretation could order the world of nature. In fact, art's function became for Eliot the microcosmic reflection of divine order.[30]

In short, Eliot is once more trying to have it both ways. The extent to which he is able to attain "serenity, stillness, and reconciliation" (Stravinsky's word is "repose") comes at the cost of an unspecified "extinction of personality." Our measure of that cost (or gain) is then to a large degree governed by the way we compare The Waste Land and the Four Quartets, or, say, Prufrock and The Cocktail Party.

Smith's delineation of the main curve and direction of Eliot's career closely duplicates the principal points already chronicled in the composer's odyssey. The queasy state of being ultimately religious and at the same time congenitally experimental contributes to a "movement from despair at the disorder of the natural world" toward acceptance of a supernatural order which promises meaning and unity within the world's apparent chaos (recent memoirs and attempts at biographies of Eliot--Sencourt's, Matthews', Simpson's, Bergonzi's--though "not very satisfactory," tend to corroborate the suspicion that Eliot's spiritual crise had as much to do with personal and marital distress as with intellectual assessment of the world's condition, and in this he also presents a rough parallel to Stravinsky). Interestingly indicative of the two men's difference as physiological-psychological types are the divergent recourses taken by the two, though they were faced with similar domestic problems and shared similar moral-religious beliefs: Eliot, as John Fuller puts it, is caught at the "infectious nadir of despair," where "his primary theme is the vision of death related to a failure of communication in an erotic situation." His poetry, from Prufrock to The Hollow Men, thus becomes a "poetry of emotional breakdown. And therefore, despite the sometimes heavy intellectual apparatus, a poetry of emotion."[31] To this one may only add that Eliot, for all the "heavy intellectual apparatus," dissembles less. Everyone who reads him realizes his thematic center, according to one phrasing or another. Few listeners of Stravinsky's Symphony in C will apprehend in any distinct way the family disaster, personal catastrophe, and intellectual despair which form its temporal and emotional background. For a vast stretch of his career, Stravinsky was one of the most "successful" of all artists in divorcing his art from the communication of emotion, and that, apparently, was how he wished it.

Otherwise, the two men worked in mid-career from quite similar frameworks. In each self-awareness becomes at some undesignated point painful, is accompanied by talk of péché originel, leads toward a poetry (music) of resignation and supplication, and works hand in hand with critical accommodations and newly prescriptive dicta. It

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culminates (for the time) in the advocacy of a newly articulated "classic" attitude "to require of art a form which could order experience" and function as "the microcosmic reflection of divine order."

We do not know when Stravinsky first read Eliot, only that when they met in later years he quoted freely from the poems. Whenever it may have been, his own analysis (1923) of the situation as "extrêmement grave" must surely have found confirmation in the particular shadings of fashionable despair he found there. The ennui and ineffectuality of Prufrock, Gerontion's "dry season," portents of disintegration and decline in _The Waste Land_'s image of "the mind of Europe," the continuing thematic duality of personal and cultural sterility echoing through the lamentation and threnody of _The Hollow Men_--these Stravinsky apparently seized upon with characteristic zest. _Oedipus Rex_ (1926-27) marks the introduction of a truly sombre voice in Stravinsky's work, following a decade of essays in manner, the common note of which seems to be avoidance of emotional substance and a resulting effect of sterility on listeners.[32] Stravinsky was possessed of such stamina, energy, and professional ambition that his period of distress never stemmed the flow of music from his pen: divertissement followed ballet score, "music about music" constituted the product of commission after commission. But the new tone sounded in _Oedipus_ is later echoed in occasionally more "serious" compositions soon to punctuate the outpouring of a music seemingly determined to "express nothing whatsoever," the music, not of conflict, but of escape or distraction. The dates are interesting: _Symphony of Psalms_ (1930), _Persephone_ (1934), _Symphony in_

C (1939-40), Babel (1944), Orpheus (1948), Mass (1948)--Stravinsky told Evelyn Waugh, "The Credo is the longest movement. There is much to believe."[33] White reports him on another occasion as saying of the same work that he wanted to write "very cold music, absolutely cold, that will appeal directly to the spirit" (quoted in S, p. 408). The catalog of his last twenty years lists an increasing number of works whose titles imply rather more interest in the next world than this one: In Memoriam Dylan Thomas; Canticum Sacrum; Threni; Epitaphium; A Sermon, a Narrative, and a Prayer; Anthem: "The Dove Descending"; The Flood; Elegy for J. F. K.; Introitus; and so on. These were, however, to the end interspersed by works of determined gaiety and detached elegance, though the latter occurred in decreasing frequency and tended to be worked out mainly as technical problems, fulfilments of commissions, or both.[34] In the later stages of his oeuvre, perhaps only Agon (1953-57) suggests engagement in anything like existential terms, and, as White notes, that ballet is totally abstract, "without any semblance of plot" (S, p. 451). It was described by Balanchine as the "IBM ballet, more tight and precise than usual, as if it were controlled by an electronic brain" (ibid., p. 456). White observes, without editorial comment, that Agon had an atypically disturbed gestation, requiring four years for completion, a lying-in rare for Stravinsky (ibid., p. 451).

Ash Wednesday was published in 1930, as was Symphony of Psalms, following religious conversions in 1927 and 1926 respectively. Eliot's "Suffer me not to be separated / And let my cry come unto Thee"[35] is perhaps more intense and urgently supplicatory than the Allegro passage in the _Symphony_, inspired, as Stravinsky recalls, "by a vision of Elijah's chariot climbing the Heaven,"[36] but the two sequences of alienation, desolation, and supplication for refuge in another world correspond.

In _For Lancelot Andrewes_ (1928), Eliot had made his most explicit indication of a comprehensive "position," a move he later had cause to deplore. The celebrated "classicist . . . royalist . . . Anglo-Catholic" declaration undoubtedly oversimplified its sponsoring feeling and is in itself an index of the kind of rhetoric and self-caricature in which Eliot occasionally indulged when his purpose was polemic, possibly without meaning to do so, though one can never tell. He was later to comment that "the quotable sentence _turned up_ in the preface to the book of essays I had in preparation, _swung into orbit_ and has been circling _my little world_ ever since" (_CC_, p. 15; italics mine).

Whatever else, the announcement certainly exposed him to a degree of caricature not fully authorized by the considerably lengthier, subtler truth that would have been required to represent adequately his full position. Conrad Aiken's response in _Dial_, July, 1929, indicates the reception: "Cautiously, jejunely, with an air of puritan acerbity [he] seeks a refuge from humanity in Grace, from personality in dogma, and from the present in the past."[37] This from a poet-friend who was himself absorbed in human complexity, familiar with personal dilemma, and most surely no stranger to the past, including that particularly chosen past which Eliot was increasingly often to

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romanticize and invoke. Throwing bricks was never really Eliot's style, as Pound had noted, and he usually did not fare well when he ignored the diagnosis. In this case, the commitment was not altogether worth the candle. Despite the incontestable seriousness of his religious alignment (however incredible it may have seemed to contemporaries), Eliot never made much of his "royalism," and there remains dispute as to what claims, if any, he could ever lay to an actual, operant classicism. In _To Criticize the Critic_ (1941), he says, "as for Classicism and Romanticism, I find that the terms have no longer the importance to me that they once had" (p. 15).

On this last there is a whole critical literature, from J. M. Murry to Kermode (two recent studies are Allen Austin's _T. S. Eliot: The Literary and Social Criticism_ and Mowbray Allan's excellent _T. S. Eliot's Impersonal Theory of Poetry_). On the whole, perhaps little is settled, except that respectable backing is lent the long-suspected opinion that neo-classicism, as it occurred in France and England in the twenties and early thirties, had always been more a matter of program than substance.

It seems likely, nevertheless, that the naming and explicit adoption of external "classic" molds did at a crucial time provide reassurance in some much-desired form for Eliot through their artistic, political, and religious identification with permanence and stability. By this stage, the word _order_ connoted for Eliot a much more comprehensive range of considerations than the somewhat self-enclosed literary-artistic ones conveyed in its earlier employment in

"Tradition and the Individual Talent." So understood, his expanded reference to order accompanies his much discussed shift in emphasis from strictly aesthetic to broader, socio-religious considerations.

We noted in Stravinsky a correlation between his quest for ordering principles and periodic outbursts of highhandedness. If Eliot ever really believed, as he said early in "The Perfect Critic," that "the critic must not coerce, and he must not make judgments of worse and better" (SW, p. 11), his subsequent espousal of authoritarian modes must have greatly compromised his early critical premises. After Strange Gods corroborates this. His lectures at the University of Virginia in 1932-33 were the occasion for an outburst of intolerance he later had cause to regret. In them, place and audience seemed to license his most objectionably magisterial tone and to sponsor a rhetorical excess that came close to discrediting his own "party" in the literary-cultural skirmishes of that uncomfortable and omnious decade. Here, Eliot offends repeatedly against his own dictum: he makes frequent "judgments of worse and better" and seeks diligently to "coerce." He establishes, in fact, a literary standard of orthodoxy. Despite the initial admonition that he is concerned with moral, not literary, issues, the illustration is drawn altogether from literary instances. Dante and James Joyce are elevated, Lawrence and Hardy downgraded in an explicitly stated hierarchy. The criteria, it is true, are mostly ideological, but they cannot be disentangled from the literary judgments and coercions which emerge. The dividing principle is, chiefly, adherence (or lack of it) to the ordering forces which

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prevail with Eliot, in short, the "orthodox" as opposed to the "heterodox." In accord, Eliot's tone is authoritarian and snobbish, as compared to that of his other criticism.

> What is . . . important is unity of religious background; and reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable. . . . A spirit of excessive tolerance is to be deprecated. (ASG, p. 20)
>
> [A]s the majority is capable neither of strong emotion nor of strong resistance, it always inclines to admire passion for its own sake, unless instructed to the contrary. . . . This in itself may go towards accounting for Hardy's popularity. (Ibid., p. 60)
>
> I doubt whether what I am saying can convey very much to anyone for whom the doctrine of Original Sin is not a very real and tremendous thing. (Ibid., pp. 61-62)
>
> I cannot see much development in Lady Chatterley's Lover. Our old acquaintance, the game-keeper, turns up again; the social obsession which makes his well-born--or *almost* well-born--ladies offer themselves to--or make use of--*plebians* springs from the same morbidity which makes other of his female characters bestow their favours upon *savages*. The author of that book seems to me to have been a very sick man indeed. (Ibid., pp. 65-66; italics mine)
>
> The number of people in possession of any criteria for discriminating between good and evil is very small. . . . (Ibid., p. 66)

The real oddity, seldom noted, lies in the divided feeling exhibited in this most unpleasant of Eliot's writings. A broad selection of moderate, sane, and just pronouncements could be gleaned from the same pages, revealing alongside his rancor and intolerance a more characteristic probity and judicious use of experience. It is when the Pope of Russell Street gets the upper hand, posturing before the assembled fugitives and agrarian aristocracy of the Old Dominion, that those extremes of intemperance and distorted value so dominate as to have lent ammunition to his detractors. (He had not behaved so in

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front of his Harvard audience the same winter. The tone of the Norton lectures is inoffensive.) Usually a more wary and subtle fencer than Stravinsky, Eliot in this instance exposes his magisterial side fully. When he tires of invective, the condescension objected to by many is often in evidence: "I imagine that the admirers of Jane Austen are all fascinated by something that may be called her personality" (ibid., pp. 57-58). Nuttall's observation that "urbane deprecation is not argument" comes to mind also in the comments that "Mr. Yeats's 'supernatural world' was the wrong supernatural world" (ibid., p. 50), or that Pound, "[e]xtremely quick-witted and very learned . . . is attracted to the Middle Ages, apparently, by everything except that which gives them significance" (ibid., p. 45).

Perhaps nowhere else does Eliot make so clear the almost intolerably wearying labor he has taken upon himself in opposing his age and at least some of his own strong instincts: "in an age like the present, it could only be poetry of the very greatest rank that could be genuinely what Dr. More would be obliged to call 'classical'; poets of lower ability--that is, all but such as half a dozen perhaps in the world's history--could only be classical by being pseudo-classical; by being unfaithful and dishonest to their experience" (ibid., p. 31). To this there can be little to add, other than to observe that Eliot does not himself seem so much unfaithful and dishonest to his own experience as trying desperately in a manner ultimately debilitating to subdue, contain, or rechannel that experience within forms so unsuitable and anachronistic as to become, increasingly often, self-defeating.

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Of this the more enervated parts of the Four Quartets are the harbinger, and the self-parody which compromises the least successful of his late plays--The Confidential Clerk, The Elder Statesman--is the confirmation.[38]

Eliot's choice of epigraph makes even plainer (if more needed saying) the agitatedly imperative nature and expanded arena of his quest for an ordering framework, a demand toward which his defensive attitude toward the tendency of his time and environment had brought him. Haecker's statement voices a gloom prevalent among those nostalgic for the old order in the Europe of the thirties and is cut from the same ideological cloth as Stravinsky's alarm voiced in 1938, warning that "la crise est bien plus générale que vous ne la voyez. En effet, la condition humaine elle-même est profondement affecté," and citing "la transgression des lois fondamentales de l'équilibre humain."[39] Haecker is uncompromising in his premises, definite in his diagnosis, and unequivocal in declaring literature to be connected and responsible to the life of its time.

Only with difficulty can it be forgotten that Eliot's own early poetry, above all, has been thought of as "imaging" its time.[40] The "disorder" it portrays (this much is agreed upon by almost all the many and divergent readers of the poem) shows many manifestations of the "primacy of sentimentality," of "technical intelligence." Its ambience is the "primacy of pleasure" (one critic counts seven or eight unsavory erotic situations in The Waste Land, he is not sure which). And, when we realize the credit Eliot gives Haecker's diagnosis of literature's "cultural" sin, alongside his own preoccupation with cultural definition and therapy during these years, there remains little mystery as to the nature of his own early "transgression," the burden of his ongoing mea culpa. That the dynamic of the remorse should be projected upon other inhabitants (Hardy, Lawrence, Mansfield, and so on) of the province-become-cloaca maxima (and in such harsh terms) provokes a real question as to just who has met us honestly on this. The climate of the times was not, one might say, either hospitable or reassuring to those who maintained the "primacy of the mind and of the spiritual," and not, above all, in the terms by which Eliot was defining them.

Tradition

Eliot's choice of the Haecker epigraph, in accord with other indications of his critical pragmatism, emphasizes the necessary relationship between literature and its time in such a way as to reveal anew how closely his conception of tradition was tied to his estimate of the immediate poetic situation. Within the hierarchy of value described by Haecker and subscribed to by Eliot, the literary tradition will draw its sanctions and, judging by the lectures which proceed from the epigraph, derive its description on the basis of what is deemed healthy and permissible for the historic moment. In practice, Tradition will then mean "approved tradition." But, as Northrop Frye says perceptively of Eliot's attitude on the matter: "One cannot both accept a tradition and decide what it is to be."[41]

In a celebrated instance, Eliot in 1936 judged Milton to be not only "antipathetic" and "unsatisfactory" as a man, but scored him for his "misdeeds as a poet" "in respect of the deterioration . . . to which he subjected the language" (OPP, p. 156). In 1947, however, Eliot has come to the decision that "poets are sufficiently liberated from Milton's reputation, to approach the study of his work without danger, and with profit to their poetry and to the English language" (ibid., p. 183). That very practical consideration taken care of, the more conventionally pertinent assessment may be made. Milton is then seen to have been "inimitable," "the greatest master in our language of freedom within form," and a poet of "consummate powers" (ibid.). Possibly these terms do not constitute such high marks in Eliot's vocabulary as in some others', but they still denote considerable tribute.

Eliot's renversements on other figures are of similar pattern, if of less moment: "my quarrel with Goethe was . . . primarily a quarrel with his age" (ibid., p. 243). Eliot never found himself at ease with Goethe's "age," but the occasion of the award of the Goethe Prize in May, 1955, in Hamburg was sufficient to elicit a most politic address on "Goethe as the Sage" in which Eliot, if not enthusiastic, yet managed to redeem Goethe's address to his time in as vague terms as possible, eventually lauding him for having been a "great European" and thus achieving "universality" (ibid., pp. 246-51).

Self-reference cuts across the business of placement within the tradition in peculiar ways. Early in Eliot's life, he "cannot remember that [Yeats'] poetry at that stage made any deep impression upon me.

A very young man . . . is looking for masters who will elicit his consciousness of what he wants to say himself, of the kind of poetry that is in him to write" (ibid., p. 295). Later, Yeats' "ability, after becoming unquestionably the master, to remain always a contemporary" sponsors a revaluation as "an unquestionably great living poet" (ibid., p. 296). Reading on, we note with interest how the specific sense in which Yeats' contemporaneity pertains is through his "development in his dramatic poetry" (ibid., p. 303), a line parallel, of course, to Eliot's own at the time of writing. In accord with this fortunate turn of events (possibly abetted by ecumenist politics: the Yeats faction was strong), Yeats can then be welcomed into the pantheon of contemporary tradition and praised as "one of those few whose history is the history of their own time, who are a part of the consciousness of their age which cannot be understood without them. This is a very high position to assign to him; but I believe that it is one which is secure" (ibid., p. 308).

In such instances, as in other turnings of the critical stair, Eliot's practice involves a conflation of his own immediate poetic purpose, an overall cultural strategy, and his own genuinely shifting critical conviction. The blending is often so deft as to obscure the elements involved.[42] It is fair to add that as a critic Eliot is of sufficient scruple that he usually prefers to say nothing if advantageous rapprochement cannot be based on some genuine approval, regardless of how limited that approval might be in the whole picture. In Yeats' case, the poet's "maturation," a subject which had also come to absorb Eliot, had finally enabled other praiseworthy factors to be brought into play. Failing that, Eliot would not likely have seen such merit in a previously "uninteresting" contemporary.

In each case cited, the principle of accommodation turns on a newly discerned integration or reconciliation with what Eliot now posits as the continuing, efficacious Tradition. Milton is no longer, in 1947, an outright menace to the language as he had seemed two decades earlier, the poetry and criticism of the day having, to an extent, moved beyond the dangers formerly posed (there are no Swinburnes left to be liquidated). Yeats, for example, had finally come abreast of what the continuation of the "right" tradition should be doing, though he had been late in taking his proper place among the monuments. Often the necessary attunement, significantly, can be negatively achieved and defined: Goethe becomes assimilable for Eliot, overcoming an early "indifference and antipathy," when Eliot comes to view him as "sometimes in complete opposition to his age," an age, it goes without saying, also repugnant to Eliot. "Certainly Goethe was of his age. . . . But we must remember, for one thing, that we tend to think of an Age in terms of the man whom we take as representative of it, and forget that equally a part of the man's significance may be his battle with his Age" (OPP, p. 255). We are reminded of R. P. Blackmur's comment that the significant irony about Eliot's attempt at fusing poetry with cultural and religious obligation is the way in which he often "finds it necessary to dine with the Opposition."[43] Eliot, a "great wall" to many poets in the sixties, may also have been on occasion a member of the devil's party, but it is hardly likely that he was unaware of it. More in keeping with his character would be the likelihood that he knew it well but did not choose to acknowledge the fact.

Reconciliation with "right tradition" then becomes the criterion for the unspecified but vast undertaking that comprised so much of Eliot's main critical endeavor: he posed nothing less than a redefinition and revaluation of the English poetic tradition. In this respect, his critical effort is a close counterpart and model for Stravinsky's re-creative effort on behalf of what he considers a viable tradition of Western music through the succession of compositions he calls "comments" on a reconstituted tradition.

In pondering major defectors from the approved line, Eliot and Stravinsky define themselves. Milton, Goethe, and Yeats remain stumbling blocks for Eliot and can usually be reconciled only with difficulty, often on vague or previously tangential grounds, and late at that, after the principal battles have been fought. Similarly, Stravinsky warms to a previously belittled Beethoven or an ignored Schumann, as he does at last to the once-scorned Messiaen, when he can finally in one way or another square them with the viable, present extension of select tradition as he sees it. The fact that Stravinsky is usually more peremptory and less concerned with rationalizing his reversals than Eliot, or for that matter in referring his judgments to the framework of traditional sanctions, is a measure of his temperamental distinctions from Eliot (which are marked) and of the considerably less discursive and less closely argued conventions of musical commentary. It is not indicative of any significantly divergent ideological, aesthetic, or strategic ground on which he stands.

Stravinsky's and Eliot's ways of speaking of tradition more nearly coincide than do any other of their preoccupations. "[T]radition results from a conscious and deliberate acceptance. A real tradition is not the relic of a past irretrievably gone; it is a living force that animates and informs the present. In this sense the paradox which banteringly maintains that everything which is not tradition is plagiarism, is true. . . . Tradition thus assures the continuity of creation" (*PM*, pp. 58-59). Such ease with the idea of "plagiarism" is reminiscent of, but goes perhaps one step beyond, Eliot's remark that "dead writers" are "that which we know."

Great masters (individual talents) "appear as powerful signal-fires--~~as~~ beacons, to use Baudelaire's expression--by whose light and warmth is developed a sum of tendencies that most of their successors will share and that contributes to form the parcel of traditions which make up a culture" (*ibid.*, p. 73). For Stravinsky, tradition is the vessel through which culture flows, even as the creative individual is the conduit for tradition's transformations. Further, the way in which he sees one's own contribution to the tradition as being continually modified in the course of time is almost identical to Eliot's better-known formulation: "The chief mental problem in being eighty-five, though intelligent people are afflicted with it already at thirty-five or even twenty-five, is the realization that one may be powerless to change the *quality* of one's work. The quantity can be increased, of course, even at eighty-five, but can one change the whole? I, at any rate, am absolutely convinced that my Variations and Requiem Canticles have altered the picture of my whole life, and I seek the strength now to change that 'completed' picture just one more time."[44] "[S]o the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted," Eliot had said. "[A]nd this is conformity between the old and the new" (SW, p. 50).

That this similarity should be so striking is understandable when it is seen that the single most dynamic and decisive factor, and surely the most persistent, in shaping the two men's neo-classic poetic and polemic is a common reaction against something else and the effort to stem, modify, or refute that something else: the "something else" always emerges in one or another guise as the Beast of Romanticism-Run-Amok.

The short list of the never-forgiven confirms this. Both Eliot and Stravinsky, as is well-known but underemphasized, moderate or withdraw many of their most celebrated strictures in the mellowing and euphoria of old age. But a few arch-offenders never gain absolution, notably Rousseau and Wagner, appropriately the "cause of it all" ("C'est la faute de Voltaire, c'est la faute de Rousseau") and the man whose work more than any other marked without question the apotheosis of errant individualism, that "monster of originality" whose career had come to symbolize everywhere a kind of transcendental love-death in its movement beyond traditional limit and convention.[45] It is in no way coincidental that two such primary figures as Rousseau and Wagner

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at the beginning and end of cultural disintegration and rising disorder within artistic tradition should epitomize the unforgivable for Eliot and Stravinsky respectively. Each carries to a rhetorical extreme the "original sin" of individualistic heresy within his art and example.

Eliot's early dubbing of Stravinsky as "Lucifer of the Season" is then not only acute, but doubly ironic. One does not have to go so far as C. H. Sisson in describing early Eliot as a paragon of that which he later disowns--"What Eliot most wants he says he renounces"[46]--to recognize an element of the poet's own presence in the long threnody on cultural and spiritual breakdwon which permeates his contribution to "the tradition." Eliot's own voice is neither distanced nor detached in Ash Wednesday (1930), where linguistic and creative decline focuses at least one of the planes of attention:

> If the lost word is lost, if the spent word is spent
> . . . .
> O my people, what have I done unto thee.
> Where shall the word be found, where will the word
> Resound?[47]

Given a mutual sternness of view and developing concern with the inevitability of human transgression as an explanation for almost everything, both poet and musician find themselves more deeply implicated than their individual accounts of that seductive abstraction "original sin" would lead us to suppose, once they turn to a consideration of its working in the creative process. Their two descriptions are very close, as has been shown, and it is likely that, as White suggests, it is on the nature and process of Tradition that the two men are in most complete harmony. Increasingly with both, the appeal is to orthodoxy in order to curb and contain initially heterodox creative tendencies already brought to fruition in works of great impact, the cumulative effect of which has been to contribute to an ongoing fragmentation of the very language and form which are yet held to be the primary vehicles of tradition.

Accounts of twentieth-century music and literature abound in testimonials to linguistic, syntactical, and formal paths opened by the innovative and, at once, iconoclastic force of Stravinsky and Eliot, as well as of Joyce, Picasso, Schoenberg, and others in a now familiar pantheon. The fact that Eliot and Stravinsky later construe the "new paths" as proliferating a maze, or, to shift the figure, new structures as erecting a Babel--this is the significant differential to which Stravinsky addresses himself in the contrast he draws between Joyce and Schoenberg in their later course of development and Eliot and himself as "fitters of old ships."[48] The articulated poetic which followed from each man has been conditioned at all points by that unstated recognition of a divergence from earlier aesthetics which has ironically become the necessary lot of great innovators lately grown conservative and dubious of directions indicated in previous, more spontaneous works and days.

The tightrope walk Melchiori describes in his book is all about such a split in purpose and its resultant peril for artists so afflicted in what he calls their "evasion from despair into orthodoxy."[49]

Personality, Expression, and "the Objective"

Nowhere more than in the prolonged effort to solve the stubborn problem of the artist's inescapable subjectivity and the art work's desired degree of objectivity do both Eliot and Stravinsky reveal and enact the drama of their individual balancing acts; for each it was a progress designed to mediate between temperament and time, the creative act and aesthetic construct, inclination and belief.

Eliot's most-quoted dictum on the problem of expression and the poet's personality comes in the context of arguing his "impersonal theory of poetry" in "Tradition and the Individual Talent." "Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality" (SW, p. 58). What initially reads as a complete denial of nineteenth-century expressive theory is, however, immediately countered with the puzzling rejoinder (Eliot to Eliot): "But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things" (ibid.). Leaving the matter in the air, this antiphonal teaser concludes the paragraph and the section of the essay in which it occurs. It is no exaggeration to say that the crux caught here, though permitted to rest almost as passing allusion, in fact adumbrates the heart of a considerable controversy to continue for thirty years, both in the literary world at large and within Eliot himself. And the effort to comprehend Eliot's reasons for thinking of emotion and personality in terms of "escape from" may take one far into the heart of the equivocal darkness of his middle years.[50] In addition to generating a fuller consideration of Eliot's intention to elevate the objective element in the creative process and the created work, the passage illustrates a characteristic mental process and rhythm and lends weight to such analyses as those of Jiří Levý and Fei-Pai Lu which detail Eliot's defining mental process as in essence a dialectical one, continually mediating between irreconciliable oppositions.[51] There is no doubt Eliot was, as critic, capable of holding in perpetually shifting solution opposing ideas and impulses without arriving at terminal resolutions, and he did so especially in the matter of the "personal" question, a central aspect of the perennial Romantic-Classic conundrum.

> Through the first gate,
> Into our first world, shall we follow
> The deception of the thrush?
> . . . .
>
> So we moved, and they, in a formal pattern,
> Along the empty alley, into the box circle,
> To look down into the drained pool.[52]

As late as Burnt Norton, it would appear, the primitive and the instinctual are connected with "deception," even as accession to seductive movement "in a formal pattern" leads toward "the drained pool."

Eliot as a young man enjoyed shock effects, as when he maintained coolly that "the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates" (SW, p. 54), ignoring any natural wish for elaboration on the part of the reader who, only a little later, finds Eliot also complaining of the poets of the "sentimental age" that "they thought and felt by fits, unbalanced; they reflected" (SE, p. 288). Though there is, for Eliot, a perhaps just distinction between the implied objectification of experience which he praises in the first instance and the "rumination" on its disparate elements (of which Tennyson and Browning were guilty) toward which he is disparaging, Eliot does not make the difference very clear, as a voluminous controversy about the "dissociation of sensibility" over the next fifty years testifies. Whether or not Eliot is, as Spender remarks, "not very good at argument or at abstract discussion, and it is the poetry that illuminates and justifies his ideas,"[53] there can be honest disagreement, but in this and other instances, the conclusion is unavoidable. Spender does not do much with the reasons for Eliot's elusiveness, though it would seem, as here, that the contributing factor is quite as often the sprezzatura of his prose style as any failure in expository or argumentative ability.

Eliot also characteristically avoids unequivocal assertions on fundamental matters, or prepares escape clauses even when he does so, as in the matter of "personality." Not so Stravinsky. The composer's "music expresses nothing whatsoever" is not qualified at the point of its utterance and has necessitated considerable expense of words, if not of spirit, in the effort to disengage over the years from its stridently silly hyperbole and the general consternation it engendered at the time. Stravinsky's later explanation is forthright and lucid; in it he puts the case in such a way as to allay remaining doubt that his own view, stripped of pose and polemic, resolves to a near-identity with Eliot's. "That over-publicized bit about expression (or non-expression) was simply a way of saying that music is supra-personal and supra-real and as such beyond verbal meanings and verbal descriptions. It was aimed against the notion that a piece of music is in reality a transcendental idea 'expressed in terms of' music, with the reductio ad absurdum implication that exact sets of correlatives must exist between a composer's feelings and his notation" (ED, p. 101). In character for the retraction, Stravinsky manages at the same time to accept blame for the misunderstanding and to shift it at once.[54] He concludes with a reassertion of what looks like the original principle (to gain the day) but now appends the insight which might have obviated years of puzzle, controversy, and accusations of aesthetic perversity and obfuscation, had it been said at the outset: "It was offhand and annoyingly incomplete, but even the stupider critics could have seen that it did not deny musical expressivity, but only the validity of a type of verbal statement about musical expressivity. I stand by the remark, incidentally, though today I would put it the other way around: music expresses itself" (ibid.). Musical paraphrase is, in other words, no less "heretical" than poetic paraphrase. It may well be more so, for its signs are non-referential in a sense not true of words, with which poetry must work. Even so: "A composer's work is the embodiment of his feelings and, of course, it may be considered as expressing or symbolizing them--though consciousness of this step does not concern the composer. More important is the fact that the composition is something entirely new beyond what can be called the composer's feelings" (ibid.). Eliot's analysis of "what has happened in the case of Valéry" as a change of attitude toward subject matter (experience, personality, emotion) indicates how close the three masters finally come together: "We must be careful to avoid saying that the subject matter becomes 'less important.' It has rather a different kind of importance: it is important as means: the end is the poem. The subject exists for the poem, not the poem for the subject" (CC, p. 39).

Eliot and Stravinsky, despite differences of situation and medium, of temperament and tactic, do exhibit a common pattern in their address to the problem of synthesizing personality and expression in the creative process. Their broad course, reduced, is one of sharp refutation in the twenties of late romanticism and its assumptions, followed by a more fully reasoned and moderate phrasing of originally extreme positions which have since become misleading, untenable, or simply expendable in the atmosphere of ensuing decades. Meanwhile they cling to some of the ground wrested from Expressionist influence through the surprise and incisiveness of their first assault. Under the circumstances, what would be more sweetly conciliatory than Eliot's discussion (1940) of "a second impersonality" in Yeats as "that of the poet who, out of intense and personal experience, is able to express a general truth; retaining all the particularity of his experience, to make of it a general symbol" (OPP, p. 299). Stravinsky too is good at mending fences when there is no longer a need to grind his ax: though Schoenberg's "expressionism is of the naïvest sort," the Viennese master can be seen, within the same paragraph, to stand, by virtue of his "perfect works," "among the great composers. Musicians will take their bearing from [him] for a great while to come. They constitute, together with a few works of not so many other composers, the true tradition" (italics mine).[55] So much for theoretical shortcomings when the art, no matter how ill-conceived, is self-redeeming.

For both Eliot and Stravinsky, emphasis on the objective is the obverse of the escape from personality. With Eliot, this "gentleman with Adam on his mind,"[56] distrust of human fallibility is compounded by a lifelong concern with the limitations of the single perspective,[57] and it is tempting to psychologize and say that the basic energy of his neo-classic quest for adequate objective correlatives derives from the depth and pervasiveness of the double apprehension. There is, however, another, more positive factor, whatever the personal dynamics--immeasurable as they must remain--may be. A classic desideratum of universality assumes a primacy in Eliot's thinking through the years and is evidenced in such essays as the one on Goethe (expressly), in "What is a Classic?" (where the key word, maturity, is synonymous with universality), and in his dramatic efforts. "What, may I ask," says Stravinsky in a late interview, "has become of the idea of universality--of a character of expression not necessarily popular but compelling to the highest imaginations of a decade or so beyond its own time . . . ?" (RC, p. 64). Eliot, as a matter of fact, had never relinquished that idea from the time he announced that the "only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion . . ." (SW, p. 100). Formulas, one recalls, are available to all, offer a universality of application.

So the early expressed urgency of "escape from" is then complemented by the emergent aesthetic premise that, as with Yeats, any poet who would transcend "mere" particularity must cope with the problem in such a way as to achieve in his work "a general symbol." As Allen Austin puts it: "Eliot recognizes that the poem is an integral part of the poet. Eliot's interest in impersonality, is, first of all, a concern with the poet's strategy, with the poet's concentration on his task rather than on his emotions; and secondly, a concern with impersonal art as a representation (a 'general symbol') of universally significant meaning. But Eliot is also consistently interested in the 'depth' of personal emotion and in the poet's personality, which stands behind the poem's objective structure."[58] Apart from scanting this particular poet's reasons for "a concern with . . . strategy," Austin's analysis is sound.

It may be significant that Eliot did not go on to do anything very specific with the idea of the objective correlative after the Hamlet essay. Hugh Kenner points out that, with Eliot, "[d]eliverances of principle occur only as some nexus in the anatomizing of the subject requires them, and, like the famous sentence about the objective correlative, they come with great pregnancy precisely because they are not major premises to an argument but generalizations forced upward into visibility by the pressures of some particular instance."[59] Adding that the Hamlet essay made "perhaps a more general claim than Eliot intended," Kenner recalls, in justice to Eliot the critic (as opposed to Eliot the theoretician, whom he implies never really set up shop), "he could hardly have foreseen its misapplication to the job of the lyric poet. . . . He was not devising a dangling interdependent system of abstractions, like Alexander Calder, but writing ad hoc."[60]

It does appear that at times the invocation of the objective, with Eliot as with others of the time, meant little more than "not writing solely of oneself." Stravinsky's early talk of "musical objects" he has created finds its much-modified latter day refutation in his habit, as an old man, of referring fondly to his compositions paternally. "I love all of my children, of course, and like any father, I am inclined to favor the backward and imperfectly formed ones" (DD, p. 30).

Naturally, such terms as we are discussing of Eliot's, conceived at a given time for a purpose often tactical, would later prove, as Bergonzi calls them, "embarrassing."[61] It is much the same with Stravinsky's extreme and strident dicta at the outset of his neo-classic phase, as with Valéry's prescriptions for la poésie pure, Hindemith's contrasting advocacy of Gebrauchmusik, Webern's "conquest of the tonal field," to say nothing of catchwords and slogans too numerous to mention advanced by Dadists, Futurists, Cubists, etc. The centrifugal force of the impulse to "make it new" was in fact spinning the artistic energies of the time off into a thousand conceptions of what the "new" should be, all contending for attention and credibility. No reading of the criticism of the post-war period is complete if it does not adequately take note of a prevailing climate of individualistic as well as factional advocacy, including that of the most conservative and ostensibly anti-individualistic spokesmen.[62] Ezra Pound provides only the best example of an attitude and compulsive activity nearly universal among major creative artists of the day, a public by-product of the pervasive self-consciousness permeating Western thought.

The inner aspect of this phenomenon is the most interesting. Eliot's comment on Valéry merely epitomizes a condition pertaining as well to himself, to Stravinsky, and to many another serious artist of the time: "The penetration of the poetic by the introspective critical activity is carried to the limit by Valéry, *the limit at which the latter begins to destroy the former*" (*CC*, p. 41; italics mine). Stravinsky, whose comments on the points at which "the latter begins to destroy the former" in the instances of his mutual friends, Valéry and Eliot, would be welcome but are not on record, has this, however, to say of his friend Isherwood: "But Christopher is not now, nor ever could have been, a camera. His reflective processes are too agonizingly acute, and however natural his gifts, writing can only be a torture to an intellectual self-awareness of his kind, though, of course, a commensurate satisfaction, too" (*DD*, p. 40). Here the "of course," so often no more than a mannerism of Stravinsky's prose style, is, I think, not perfunctory. It indicates a fundamental difference in his nature and attitude which explains in part why he, unlike Valéry and Eliot, with whom he had otherwise so much in common, never lapsed into extended periods of creative silence, and perhaps was never even in danger of doing so. In his writings, he often reverts to the almost physical joy of composing.

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Once more, Kermode's assessment is apt. Referring to Eliot's theory of Tradition, surely one of the most famous, provocative, and influential of the doctrines of the day, as "in a sense . . . Cubist historiography, unlearning the trick of perspective and ordering history as a system of perpetually varying spatial alignments,"[63] he notes, quite accurately, that the "objective correlative . . . is an attempt to depersonalize what remains essentially the image of romantic poetry, and to purge it of any taint of simple expressiveness or rational communication. . . . The 'dissociation of sensibility' is an historical theory to explain the dearth of objective correlatives in a time when the artist, alienated from his environment, _l'immonde cité_, is working at the beginning of a dark age 'under conditions that seem unpropitious', in an ever-worsening climate of the imagination."[64] "Such theories," Kermode concludes, "we now see, are highly personal versions of stock themes in the history of ideas of the period."[65]

Eliot's early insistence on anti-romantic, anti-expressive theories is, for him, according to Mowbray Allan, "largely the expression of hostility to the kind of subjective idealism that we find in Pater."[66] Allowing this, and recalling how one of Eliot's most obsessive fears, on another level, is that of drowning, it is tempting to attribute the occasional extremity of his anti-romantic rhetoric to the fear of going down in one last great wash of Paterian impressionism at floodtide. Reminded that Eliot was to some extent always haunted by the Bradleyan problem that "my mind . . . is a point of view from which I cannot possibly escape,"[67] Allan believes that Eliot's aversion to Pater and to critical "impressionism" generally is closely tied to his realization that he and Pater had a "common heritage in the idealist tradition," and that the related "cult of personality . . . might cause in a disciple excessive self-consciousness."[68] To this it may be added that the theme of "excessive self-consciousness," endemic to so much twentieth-century European art, has a specific resonance throughout Eliot's most significant work, from Prufrock through Four Quartets. The record of its shifting ramifications from poem to poem could comprise as coherent a history of Eliot's art as any other.

Eliot's reactive relation toward predecessors like Arnold and Pater has been described by various commentators in terms ranging from the filial to the Oedipal. Whatever psychological interpretation we place on these matters, it would be hard to dispute the relevance to his case of the generalized construction which Stravinsky, in a moment of self-awareness, offered: "It is in the nature of things--and it is this which determines the uninterrupted march of evolution in art quite as much as in other branches of human activity--that epochs which immediately precede us are temporarily farther away from us than others which are more remote in time."[69] One emendation, however, suggests itself in the comparison between Eliot and Stravinsky and their relation to the epoch immediately preceding them: that is, that the children of such epochs, as of some all-embracing parents with whom one has too close natural affinities, find it necessary to put as much distance between themselves and their immediate matrices as possible in order to avoid what indeed becomes a form of drowning. Humankind cannot indeed bear very much of that particular reality. In such instances, recourse "to others which are more remote in time" is a frequent pattern. We are all familiar with the flight to grandparents which derives principally from the fact that parents are, after all, parents from whom we cannot altogether escape. Though modernism in its initial phase drew important inspiration from its immediate ancestry (Robert Langbaum's Poetry of Experience details the indebtedness of Eliot, for example, to Browning and Tennyson; Lawrence Morton establishes beyond question the intricate and intimate connections between neo-classic modernist and late-romantic master in his essay, "Stravinsky and Tchaikovsky: Le Baiser de la Fée"),[70] Eliot and Stravinsky were among the most precocious in insisting that their real sustenance came from forebears more remote. The more mature Eliot would have scarcely quarreled with Kermode's description of his literary theories as "highly personal versions of stock themes in the history of ideas of the period." He himself says nearly the same thing in retrospect. "They have served their turn as stimuli to the critical thinking of others. . . . But I prophesy that if my phrases are given consideration, a century hence, it will be only in their historical context, by scholars interested in the mind of my generation" (CC, p. 19).

In "To Criticize the Critic," Eliot reflects on "dissociation of sensibility" and "objective correlative" and acknowledges that he is not sure, "at this distance of time, how valid are the two phrases. . . . They have been useful in their time." He further owns the propagandistic nature of the writings in which they appeared: "The

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term 'objective correlative' occurs in an essay on Hamlet and His Problems in which I was perhaps not altogether guiltless of trailing my coat: I was at that time hand-in-glove with that gallant controversialist, J. M. Robertson, in his critical studies of Tudor and Stuart drama." He candidly admits again his predilection for rationalizing taste. "What I wish to suggest . . . is that these phrases may be accounted for as being conceptual symbols for emotional preferences. Thus, the emphasis on tradition came about, I believe, as a result of my reaction against the poetry, in the English language, of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and my passion for the poetry . . . of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries" (ibid.).

Two considerations important to this study emerge from this disclosure. The first is that Eliot is, in a strict sense, a true reactionary, as he specifies, though not necessarily in the more generalized socio-political sense of which he is often accused. In that regard, there is room for the charge, but it must be put with reservations and much more sharply defined: Eliot was both too gentle and too genteel for that term to apply so neatly to him as it could to Wyndham Lewis, Pound, or others whose anti-liberal stances on public matters earned them the label and brought suspicion and discredit on modernism in some quarters.[71] Eliot escapes the most culpable implication also, as does Stravinsky, through a sort of accustomed disengagement and disinterest, though that disengagement took quite different turns in the two men. Both are, in view of their psychologically reactive natures, lucky in the history of their political non-alignments.

Another consideration is that, while the candor of Eliot's admission does little to depreciate the validity of his own critical theory or poetics _within the terms in which he was usually careful to express it_, such disclosure is disastrous to others' efforts to derive self-sufficient system, absolute poetic precepts, or canonical classical aesthetic from what remain "conceptual symbols for emotional preferences." Of these efforts there have been too many for the best advancement of his understanding; it may someday appear that Eliot's most fatal proclivity, his most original "sin," has been to spawn a satellite corps of literary sycophants whose activity has succeeded in confusing unnecessarily for years the most intelligent literary discussion he, as much as any other, set in motion.[72]

A. D. Nuttall says that Eliot's polemic "tended of itself to lapse into sanity and platitude in later years."[73] To this it may be answered that there is nothing necessarily wrong with platitude when it brings considerations back to a plane of sanity. In retrospect, Eliot's, along with other doctrines of impersonality, can be seen to have served a chiefly dialectic function, culturally therapeutic in aim. It brought a needed antithesis to a "cult of personality" unhealthily taken with what Stravinsky foresaw to be leading through a proliferation of artistic styles and dialects toward unintelligibility and the artist's isolation: this he called the "monster of originality," and it is this tendency of their artistic age against which both men reacted and waged unremitting war for nearly twenty years in the midst of a distinguished, yet troubled, journey.

Safely beyond the most topical demands for polemic and "cultural politics," past what John Chalker calls "the need for psychological reassurance and a defence against the unrestrained personality"[74] (Stravinsky, no less than Eliot, was one of those who had such personality and emotions as to "know what it means to want to escape from these things"), both men could later afford to acknowledge the simpler truth behind their elaborate facade of "impersonality" and the "objective."

For all the talk about "objective correlatives" and "composition based on objective elements which are sufficient in themselves," the notion of "musical object," like its poetic analog, refers back eventually to the quite unexceptionable creative principle that the work itself, though inescapably and properly expressive in its primary dimension, does manage, especially in classically conceived art, to become indirect, to refract its very expression. It is no accident that one of the principal legacies of Eliot's theory of impersonality should have been the long New Critical debate over the ontological status of poetry, a discussion which took several forms and initiated ingenious terminologies in centering the critical inquiry for some years.[75] What Eliot and Stravinsky are eventually agreed upon, and say outright, in their later years, is that poetry (the art work) becomes a thing in its own right after its creation, and that it continues to exist, in one of its dimensions, independent of, apart from, and beyond its origins. It is the finished product, in Eliot's phrasing of the ideal process, of that "continual surrender of [the artist] as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable" (SW, p. 52). While acknowledging that a "composer's work is the embodiment of his feelings and, of course, it may be considered as expressing or symbolizing them," Stravinsky significantly adds that "consciousness of this step does not concern the composer" (ED, p. 101). He is in total agreement with early Eliot that the artist has "a particular medium" to express, rather than a "personality," and he stresses the creative aspect when he cites Cassirer to the effect that "art is not an imitation, but a discovery, of reality. . . . A new piece of music is a new reality" (ibid., pp. 101-02). All this, it seems, we should have known all along, and probably did in our more lucid moments.

The "neo-classic" poetics of Eliot and Stravinsky, to the extent they merited that designation, among other similar though perhaps less prestigious statements, had at least the effect of forcing us back toward such sanities, even when their ring was abrasively pretentious, their initial logic sketchy. In this sense their distinctive blending of inquiry, authority, and polemic forced basic dis- and re-coveries, even where the resonant echoes sometimes came later to seem platitudinous. One is entitled to ask if the platitudes with which we are left could only be arrived at through the often misleading and alienating dialectic generated by the earlier, more polemical and sharply-edged versions of essentially the same artistic precepts.

Eliot's reconciliation of the place of "personality" in poetry is perhaps best put in his observation on Valéry's poetry, one more analytical and, perhaps, more open than he was inclined, certainly in 1924, to turn on his own: "It is impersonal in the sense that personal emotion, personal experience, is extended and completed in something impersonal--not in the sense of something divorced from personal experience and passion. No good poetry is the latter."[76] He is even moved to complain, a few years later, that "Browning . . . is too objective . . . too often, one thinks with Browning, here is a world with no particular interesting man inside it, no consistent point of view."[77] Just what distinguishes "particular interesting man" from the despised "personality" in Eliot's mind we shall probably not know, but one thing is clear: such a comment is a far cry from the brittle, depersonalizing talk of twenty years previous. The point is that eventual sanity is once more possible, the main critical battle having been fought, and that Eliot may have won through as well to the capacity for a more genuine, less querulous and mannered expression. The "enemy" has more or less yielded the field, or has become temporarily amorphous, pending the return of a climate more conducive to the individualistic, the openly expressive, even the confessional.

Eliot can, at this point, now safely assert what was once too obvious, yet too intimidating, for him to admit, what romantics from Coleridge to Wallace Stevens have been insisting upon: the essential shaping force of the imagination, as opposed, one must assume, to the more passive, catalyzing agent of the "mind of the poet" cast in what John Crowe Ransom might have called the not-quite-meant metaphor of the "shred of platinum." Past the strategies of evasion, dictated by motives of the moment still not thoroughly open, Eliot tended more and more to acknowledge the presence of the poet in the poem, in much the same way as he more unequivocally came to acknowledge the essential continuities between life and art.

Here again he meets his musical peer. Stravinsky, in effect, makes *rapprochement* with both the imitative and expressive ideas of art (so often belittled) when he says (1963): ". . . I am always aware of *my being* in music. This *mirroring* is the main point, I think . . ." (italics mine).[78]

"The search for the objective correlative is the remedy for the dissociation of sensibility,"[79] says Allan, "a compensation for the extreme 'subjectivity' of the point of view as impenetrable."[80] Here one wishes he might interpose the word "proposed." Whether or not the search *was* a remedy for either Eliot or Stravinsky depends upon the ultimate success or failure of the major works of their maturity, of the poems Eliot called *Four Quartets*, of *Oedipus* and *Symphonie des Psalms* and whatever else may emerge as the main achievements of Stravinsky's final period. One tenet which meets no dispute at any point with the two men is that the true measure of the critical tree is the artistic fruit it bears.

Eliot studies today deal most profitably with the interrelation between his philosophic ground and his poetry, the enduring wrestle with the extended implications of the idealism he inherited from Bradley,[81] his battle against solipsism, and the struggle he was condemned always to be making in order to transcend his own recognized tendency to become imprisoned within his own 'finite center.' Given his temperament and training, the complicating elements of his own early work, his personal situation, and his emergent ideological response to those factors, Eliot's lifelong progress which Genesius Jones calls "approach to the purpose" can equally be seen in Giorgio Melchiori's metaphor of the tightrope walk. The abyss below would have appeared to Eliot, at nearly every stage, as a deep one, but the destination discerned at the other end could scarcely have been less than an imperative at any point during the approach. That he was a less ebullient figure than Stravinsky does not alter the essential similarity in their persistent pursuit of an art which could, as they saw it, move beyond what they had already achieved in early triumphs. "There was, however," as Louis Simpson says, "the question of how to continue."[82] For what had been created, in the instances of *Le Sacre du Printemps*, of *Prufrock* and *The Waste Land*, was an art their audience could already recognize to be powerful, compelling and, even when little else was yet certain, an expression which was, to say the very least, inimitably personal. Nowhere else in the productions of the day are the words *originality* and *individuality* more distinctly applicable.

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NOTES

[1] "Eliot's Critical Method," in *T. S. Eliot: A Study of His Writings by Several Hands*, ed. B. Rajan (London, 1947), p. 123.

[2] *A Common Sky* (Berkeley, 1974), p. 209.

[3] *The Invisible Poet: T. S. Eliot* (New York, 1959), p. 96.

[4] Quoted in Donald Gallup, *T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound: Collaborators in Letters* (New Haven, 1970), p. 28.

[5] *Ibid*.

[6] Gallup says that, though Pound "attempted to give the 'movement' more of a focus, perhaps, than it ever actually had . . . he effected a revolution which still, a half-century later, seems miraculous" (*ibid*., p. 12). Eliot enabled Pound's "miracle."

[7] "The Criticism of T. S. Eliot," *Sewanee Review*, 64 (1956), pp. 398-443.

[8] "The Triumph of T. S. Eliot," *Critical Quarterly*, 7, No. 4 (Winter 1965), p. 337.

[9] *Ibid*.

[10] "Authority and Personality in Eliot's Criticism," in *Eliot in Perspective*, ed. Graham Martin (London, 1970), p. 195.

[11] "T. S. Eliot as a Critic," in *T. S. Eliot: The Man and His Work*, ed. Allen Tate (New York, 1965), pp. 263-64.

[12] See Kenner's chapter on Eliot's criticism, esp. p. 118.

[13] Kenner, p. 96.

[14] "The Perfect Critic," the first essay in *SW*, states the case for what was later to prove one of Eliot's most consistently held beliefs. "The two directions of sensibility are complementary, and as

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sensibility is rare, unpopular, and desirable, it is to be expected that the critic and the creative artist should frequently be the same person" (p. 16). UPUC proceeds from the same assumption.

[15] In UPUC, virtually no attention is given to critics who did not write poetry, from Sidney to Eliot himself.

[16] Preface to 1928 edition of SW, p. viii.

[17] SW, p. 102. Typically, Eliot wants to know what Shakespeare had been reading. But, as Miss Bradbrook says, a "poet's deepest experiences may come in reading other poets--this is not aestheticism, it is merely to take poetry seriously" (T. S. Eliot: The Making of The Waste Land [London, 1972], p. 24).

[18] SE. Eliot is here warmly advocating the metaphysicals, and his language shows it.

[19] W. K. Wimsatt's book, The Verbal Icon (New York, 1954), expounds the "official line" and defines the major critical "fallacies" or heresies against the autonomy of the art work. Early Eliot, with his insistence on "the integrity of poetry" and the effort "to see the object as it really is" is the authority, rather than the later Eliot who accords increased attention to the connections between "belief" and poetry.

[20] T. S. Eliot's Impersonal Theory of Poetry (Lewisburg, Pa., 1974), p. 165.

[21] T. S. Eliot, "East Coker," Complete Poems and Plays (London, 1969), p. 182.

[22] Allan, p. 165.

[23] Kenner studies him through his poetic personae and voices; Auden reminisces on three characterological humors. Edmund Wilson is another who has a hand at the game, mentioning six Eliot roles. Eliot enjoyed a bit of the same, as shown in his relish of the role of Old Possum and of the playing of practical jokes.

[24] Epigraph to ASG. Translated by John H. E. Paine.

[25] New Bearings in English Poetry (London, 1932), p. 75.

[26] Allan, p. 172.

[27] Ibid., p. 173.

[28] Frank Kermode, "A Babylonish Dialect," in T. S. Eliot: The Man and His Work, p. 237.

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

[30] *T. S. Eliot's Dramatic Theory and Practice* (Princeton, 1963), p. viii.

[31] "T. S. Eliot," in *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Bernard Bergonzi (London, 1970), p. 171.

[32] Even Stravinsky's advocates observe the period of difficulty and change. Others, like Rosenfeld and even *La Nouvelle Revue Littéraire* critics, were more severe and particular.

[33] Robert Craft, "Stravinsky's *Mass*: A Notebook," in *Stravinsky*, ed. Merle Armitage (New York, 1949), p. 201.

[34] "The trick, of course, is to choose one's commission, to compose what one wants to compose and to get it commissioned afterwards," was Stravinsky's comment on his own practice of the time. The remark (quoted in *S*, p. 94) is indicative of the degree to which he had fastened on the stylistic essay.

[35] "Ash Wednesday," in *Complete Poems*, p. 99.

[36] *DD*, p. 78.
Perhaps Stravinsky's addendum is even more significant. He continues: "*Never before had I written anything quite so literal* as the triplets for horns and piano to suggest the horses and chariot. The final hymn of praise must be thought of as issuing from the skies, and agitation is followed by 'the calm of praise,' *but such statements embarrass me*" (italics mine).

[37] "Retreat," *Dial*, 86 (July 1929), p. 630.

[38] "His plays, the characters of which are remembered with difficulty, have, above all, an experimental value." Jorge Luis Borges, *An Introduction to English Literature* (Lexington, Ky., 1974), p. 72.

[39] Quoted in *S*, p. 540. The occasion was a prepared radio interview in Paris, 1938.

[40] "Waste land" has become a near-universal tag for cultural desolation; few will miss the sense of "failure of nerve" at the mention of Prufrock. Eliot's early poems are a remarkable part of "that which we know."

[41] *T. S. Eliot* (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 99.

[42] Eliot's adroit way of shifting categories and mixing meanings recalls Quiller Couch's outrage after an Eliot attack on liberalism:

"What he means by 'liberalism', except that it is something he dislikes, one must use patience to discern, so dexterously he shuffles religion into politics, politics into literature, tradition into dogma, to and fro, until the reader--let alone a listener--can scarcely tell out of what category the card (so to speak) is being dealt. Still, if one keeps gripping, as Menelaus and his comrades did upon the Old Man of the Sea, this may be squeezed out--that 'Liberalism' is anything which questions dogma: which dogma, to be right dogma, is the priestly utterance of a peculiar offset of a particular branch of a historically fissiparous Church" (quoted from _Q Anthology_ by F. Brittain, 1948).

[43] _The Lion and the Honeycomb_ (New York, 1955), p. 175.

[44] Igor Stravinsky, _Themes and Conclusions_ (London, 1972), p. 126.

[45] Both interesting and ironically self-revealing are Stravinsky's latter day observations on his lifelong _bête-noir_, permeated as they are with Eliotic perspective and problems. Of Wagner he notes that: "He is the first great composer to have begun with an analysis of music history from the outside, and from that perspective to have determined his own place in its future progress. . . . With spectacular simplicity, his reading of history pointed straight home to the Fatherland and unfalteringly to the Wagner front door" (_TE_, pp. 138-39). Stravinsky's aperçu concerning schizophrenic influence implicit in Wagner's composer-theorist dualism reveals an abundance of insight gained from Stravinsky's own experience, as well as the borrowing of an Eliot idea: "The only answer I can find is that the writings are effective evidence of the _split_ [italics mine] between a man's genius and the accessory parts of his mental _mise-en-scene_" (_ibid._). What one would give for a fuller disclosure on this point about dissociation as it might pertain to Stravinsky or to Eliot himself!

[46] _English Poetry, 1900-1950_ (London, 1971), p. 142.

[47] "Ash Wednesday," _Complete Poems_, p. 96

[48] _DD_, p. 30. This is from the passage quoted in full in Chapter I of the present study.

[49] See Georgio Melchiori, _The Tightrope Walkers_ (New York, 1956). Melchiori's book, subtitled "Studies of Mannerism in Modern English Literature," treats "funambulists" from James and Hopkins through Dylan Thomas and notes in the Introduction that a "common link among most of the essays may be seen perhaps in the mention, in nearly all of them, of T. S. Eliot" (p. 1).

[50] "But an escape from personality, which is an escape from emotion, _is_ an expression of personality," says Stephen Spender in _The Destructive Element_ (New York, 1936), p. 159. John Chalker notes in his article, "Authority and Personality in Eliot's Criticism," how,

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with Eliot, in "each area of discussion personality is left behind defeated, only to reappear at a later stage and in a different form" (p. 207 in *Eliot in Perspective*).

[51] Jiří Levý, "Synthesis of Antitheses in the Poetry of T. S. Eliot," *Essays in Criticism*, 2, No. 4 (October 1952), and Fei-Pai Lu, *T. S. Eliot: The Dialectic Structure of his Theory of Poetry* (Chicago, 1966). Numerous commentators now take for granted as fundamental the principles here described.

[52] *Burnt Norton*, in *Complete Poems*, pp. 171-72.

[53] *The Destructive Element*, p. 156.

[54] Stravinsky was invariably severe with critics and often held them to account for his own ills.

[55] Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Conversations with Stravinsky* (Garden City, 1959), pp. 78-79.

[56] George Barker, "To T. S. Eliot," quoted in C. H. Sisson, *English Poetry, 1900-1950*, p. 243.

[57] See especially "T. S. Eliot" in Nuttall's *A Common Sky*.

[58] "T. S. Eliot's Theory of Personal Expression," *PMLA*, 81 (1966), pp. 306-07.

[59] *The Invisible Poet*, p. 101.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[61] See Bernard Bergonzi, *T. S. Eliot* (New York, 1972), pp. 82-83. Suggesting that Eliot's long association with *The Criterion* "did him personally more harm than good" through his becoming too thoroughly institutionalized, Bergonzi adds: "By the mid-twenties Eliot's literary attachment to tradition was becoming modified by his need to see it in more extensively ideological terms. The influence of Charles Maurras . . . led him to adopt for a while the absurd intellectual red herring of 'classicism,' which did him no good as poet or critic."

[62] "But if we look carefully, we see that these recalls to order and returns to tradition come more from the desire to consolidate the modern revolution in art than from the desire to organize a coup d'état or restore the *ancien régime*. Even in the case of T. S. Eliot, the most symptomatic and significant case, we have in fact only the theoretical reinvocation of an historical classicism now irrevocably lost. Just so, whereas that reinvocation has exercised a valid function in the critical field, it has not in the least worked for the creation of art or even for the mere practice of art: a judgment that

holds also in the particular case of Eliot himself as an artist" (Renato Poggioli, The Theory of the Avant-Garde, tr. Gerald Fitzgerald [New York, 1968], p. 221).

[63] "A Babylonish Dialect," pp. 236-37.

[64] Ibid., p. 236.

[65] Ibid.

[66] T. S. Eliot's Impersonal Theory of Poetry, p. 27.

[67] T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience (London, 1964), p. 145.

[68] Allan, p. 28.

[69] Igor Stravinsky, An Autobiography (New York, 1936), p. 91.

[70] The Poetry of Experience (New York, 1957); Lawrence Morton's article appeared in Stravinsky: A New Appraisal of His Work, ed. P. H. Lang (New York, 1963), pp. 47-60.

[71] John Harrison, in his book The Reactionaries (London, 1967), recounts the history of several figures' public involvement (Eliot's among them) and draws some of the main distinctions, but he is both reticent and dull.

[72] Helen Gardner, F. O. Matthiessen, and Cleanth Brooks are among the many commentators who seem to take Eliot much more canonically than he does himself.

[73] A Common Sky, pp. 204-05.

[74] "Authority and Personality," p. 202.

[75] See Richard Foster, The New Romantics (Bloomington, 1962).

[76] T. S. Eliot, "A Brief Introduction to the Method of Paul Valéry," in Paul Valéry, Le Serpent, tr. Mark Wardle (London, 1924), p. 16.

[77] T. S. Eliot, "Donne in Our Time," in A Garland for John Donne, ed. Theodore Spencer (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931), pp. 15-16.

[78] DD, p. 31. It would appear, the state of Stravinsky studies being what it now is, a thoroughgoing psychoanalytic study could illuminate more than any other approach to the question of his development. Support for this is lent by the reflection which precedes the foregoing quotation: "the word mirror frightens me. Seventy-five years ago as a child alone in my room, I once saw my father instead of

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myself in the looking glass, and my already strong case of father-fears became mirror-fears as well. I expect Purgatory to be full of many-dimensional mirrors" (ibid., p. 28). To this it may be added that Stravinsky's music, particularly that of the problematic middle-period, has often been likened by advocates and detractors alike to "many-dimensional mirrors." The application to Eliot is perhaps less direct, but highly suggestive.

It is only fair to add that Stravinsky, no less than Eliot, whose feeling about psychoanalyzing artists was well-known, would object strenuously to such a proposal. Speaking of his own ironic displacement, both cultural and temporal, Stravinsky says: "I was born to causality and determinism, and I have survived to probability theory and chance. I was born to a world that explained itself largely in dogmatic terms and I have lived, through several changes of management, to a world that rationalizes itself almost entirely in psychoanalytic terms" (ibid.). In the same collection (within a page) he adds, giving some indication of the combination of urgency and tension involved in the retrospective question to which he is seemingly condemned for life: ". . . I tug at my memory as a mountain-climber tugs at his rope: to see how and where it is tied; I do not go back, in the threat of time, because of a wish to return. And even though my subconscious may be trying to close the circle, I want to go on rectilinearly as always: the dualism again. The archaeologist's dream--Renan's--of the past recaptured, is another of my visions of Purgatory, and the poet's dream--Coleridge's--of restoring the collective experience of a mind's whole past existence is, to me, an insanity threat" (ibid.). It is difficult to speculate where such an unguarded meditation might have led Eliot.

[79] T. S. Eliot's Impersonal Theory of Poetry, p. 80.

[80] Ibid., p. 84.

[81] I have in mind particularly Allan's closely knit analysis and such other studies as A. D. Nuttall's chapter on Eliot in his A Common Sky, Richard Wollheim's "Eliot and F. H. Bradley: An Account," in Eliot in Perspective.

[82] Three on the Tower (New York, 1975), p. viii.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

For those who retain a degree of faith in and reliance on History (including histories of the arts and their relation to cultural history), Frank Kermode's call a few years back for "a discrimination of modernisms" is timely. *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* (1907), *Le Sacre du Printemps* (1913), *Pierrot Lunaire* (1914), *Ulysses* (1921), and *The Waste Land* (1922) all appeared over fifty years ago. No great perception is required to see that whatever today's equivalent works may be, they no longer answer so directly to the paradigmatic molds of those and other monuments of the *anni mirabiles*. Plainly, though it would be hard to say just when, we have passed from one "period" to another and, just as clearly, have more or less consented to call the displaced one *modernism* despite certain obvious disparities marking its distinguishing figures, factions, and accomplishments.

The work of discriminating is going on, in one way or another, if in occasionally surprising contexts and shapes. Meditations on what it has meant to be modern (and post-modern) as sustained as Stephen Spender's by-now four volume sequence,[1] as formally and syntactically experimental and impressionistic as Ihab Hassan's Paracriticisms[2] indicate the range of current approaches. There begins to be an accepted bibliography. Ellmann and Feidelson's The Modern Tradition[3] illustrates one perspective in its very title. Renato Poggioli's The Theory of the Avant-Garde[4] carries to scholarly fullness the kind of formulations adumbrated much earlier by Ortega y Gasset and others.[5] Harold Rosenberg discerns The Tradition of the New[6] and celebrates as cultural transformations a succession of events treated rather more conventionally as to historical sequence and causal connections by, say, Irving Howe in his essay, "The Idea of the Modern."[7] Langbaum and Kermode emphasize continuities, while others--Barzun and John Cage, to cite dramatically contrasted figures of similar persuasion--are struck by radical discontinuities, indications of historic mutation.[8] Karl Shapiro can credibly entitle his most recent collection The Poetry Wreck,[9] but Geoffrey Thurley, despite viewing the influence of the early "greats"--Pound, Eliot, Joyce--as pernicious and, over the long term, debilitating (his title is The Ironic Harvest),[10] delineates a tenacious thread of vitality in English poetry today "winning through." Measurements of modernist achievement abound; reputations are revalued; cultural assessments of great moment impend; George Steiner declares us to be in all essentials "post-cultural."[11] We stand, it seems, faced with overwhelming questions, trying vainly to handle them with shabby equipment (despite bravely proliferating panacean methods, which we prefer to call, just now, methodologies). All the while, the common pursuit of the armed vision is intensified even as it finds itself beset

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by the continuous cry from an expanding chorus of cultural apocalyptists, "HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME / HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME." Presently the endeavor can only be described as a beginning in which the end, although perhaps already present, is not readily discernible; the search for appropriate touchstones, the Alexandrian refinement and proliferation of approaches, and the painstaking vectoral analysis applied to the calibration of contending dynamics--all these pose continued challenge to critical and historical ingenuity. We have not yet adequately read ourselves in the works of the significant "moderns" any more than we have plumbed the deep structures that are said to yield the secrets of their synchronic distinctions. We have begun, but only begun, a myth of the modern.

The present study, concerned with the character, pertinence, and validity of two strikingly similar theoretical responses from two admitted "masters of the epoch" toward what they found to be pressing questions in the middle of their own creative lives, is designed to play a modest part in an expanding examination of vast proportions, one preliminary to a long diagnostic. What began, for myself, as the enjoyment of privileged table talk in high quarters (the Stravinsky retrospectives) led step by step to an exercise in syndromy, the evolution of an opinion about the relations between criticism and the artist's workshop in an Age of Criticism and about the distinguishing marks of a predominant style in two of its prime representatives, ultimately to the effort to delineate an important facet of cultural character.

In his unpublished dissertation, "Neo-Classicism in the Twentieth Century: A Study of the Idea" (Syracuse University, 1972), William John Mahar makes by far the most detailed study to date of an important phase of modernism, one closely related to my own subject. After his examination of the eminent parts played by Stravinsky and Picasso and their works (there is also a chapter on Eliot) in the constitution of a "new" classicism, Mahar concludes that through their impact as artists, as contrasted to their (and in the case of Picasso, others') professions concerning their art, they proved in fact to have become "participants in final dissolution of the 'classical' tradition, not the modern prophets of its resurrection."[12] "Final dissolution" is, of course, a comprehensive phrase; it points to a premise about where we stand historically, culturally, which can, as I see it, neither be substantiated nor refuted at this moment or perhaps at any time. But within the existing evidence there is much to corroborate his conclusion that there was no effective resurrection of any pervasive or authentically classical mode.

One finds the constituents of the case put in several ways: Jacques Barzun announced in 1960 that Art, always in his phrasing an essentially "classic" conception even in its romantic phases, was dead, that anti-Art, multifarious and ubiquitous, was the ascendant order of the day. In one respect, he confirms the darkest predictions of such earlier reconstructionists as I have been discussing when he notes that the "total repudiation of Art by our leading men coincides with the frittering away of high art through vulgarization." Vulgarization had been, of course, a spectre of the "modern" to both Eliot and Stravinsky upon second sight. "What," asks Barzun, "can this convergence mean except that the act of abolition will not be nullified by the persistence of old objects in the common memory?"[13] To be sure, dominant trends in form and technique in the last two decades have served to confirm the premonitions of observers like Eliot and Stravinsky, if the co-existence of a profusion of modes and languages, the deliberate abrogation of choice and the enthronement of "chance" factors, and the effort to cut off, short-circuit, or negate traditional structures are signs of the artistic times. Whether or not aleatoric music, contingency painting, street theatre, poèsie concrete, happenings Op and Pop achieve the immediacy of confrontation and impact to which they aspire or the spontaneity they proclaim, their direct challenge to Tradition and Order as primary principles in Art is indisputable as a cultural phenomenon, no matter how we assess the value of their premises and contributions. The anti-cultural, anti-traditional lineage includes the early transcendences, abrogations, and extensions of classic order reflected in the experimental phase of modernist art just as certainly as it does its more obvious forebears in Dada and Futurism, though the precedents of syntactical disjuncture, experimental form, linguistic collage, and primitive evocation are more subtilized as they appear in *Ulysses*, *The Waste Land*, or *Le Sacre* than in the crudest manifestations in Zürich or Paris of Tzara and Breton, in the zanier and now almost forgotten antics of the Italian futurists like Marinetti. Approved and later institutionalized artists (Stravinsky and Eliot are not alone; Schoenberg, for one, could be fiercely defensive about his "traditionalism")[14] have never liked to talk much about the revolutionary implications of their early experimental phases, but that fact does little to dissipate their actual long-term effects. In light of the overwhelming results of more than sixty years of continued experimentation, after which contemporary culture seems at times almost buried underneath its Babel of "styles," the "neo-classic" effort to close Pandora's box during the early twenties must now be seen as a gallant but largely ineffectual rear-guard action on the part of certain repentant, erstwhile members of the avant-garde.

To whatever degree we regard the condition of the arts as culturally symptomatic, it can hardly be ignored that they exert today a strong schismatic, disintegrative tendency which continues its relentless work of "fracturing the language" and results in daily observable fissures in the once-vaunted (though perhaps nostalgically fictionalized) unity of Art's "universal language." In this respect, more may be said for the dark prognosis of a Stravinsky or Eliot as each came to lament the "monster of originality" in its post-romantic excrescence (not so incidentally an inescapable element in their own heritage and mode of expression) than for their ensuing prescriptions as to how to evade or surmount its, to them, potentially disastrous artistic and cultural consequences. What they proposed came to be called, for lack of a better, less multivalent term, a new or neo-classicism, though neither of its most luminous proponents could be held principally responsible for the misnomer, and neither would accord more than a generalized allegiance to its banner. That remained for lesser, more categorically occupied diagnosticians to enlarge upon.[15]

The years have served to diminish the force of the most strongly voiced declarations as to how music, how poetry should be done, what made up "right" tradition. The updated versions of symbolist aesthetic evident in appeals to objectivism and depersonalization; the elevation of "tradition" to the status of shibboleth; the effort to reinstate decrepit and anachronistic "orders"; the talk of "separation of belief and poetry"; and the consequent deflation of the principles of imitation and of expression: all these were given prestigious articulation and wide currency through the doctrines aired by spokesmen like Eliot and, to a lesser degree, like Stravinsky. Taken together these statements became, or almost became, the aesthetic orthodoxy of a post-war generation shaken by apprehensions of disorder, fashionable talk of "nothingness," and radically insecure in its own heritage of late or post-romantic intuitions and means of expression.

Eliot had said of the philosopher Leibniz: "His orthodoxy is more alarming than others' revolution,"[16] and, because of the eminent sources from which the pieties of 1920's "classicism" proceeded and their relative inapplicability to the most urgent and powerful creative impulses of the time, the same observation might appropriately be turned upon him and those who thought like him. The perception of Zeitgeist is unmatched by any commensurately strong courage of what had been initially brilliant creative convictions both attuned to and prefiguring the temper of the era they reflected and to which, indeed, they had contributed the defining images and sounds.

Mahar's thesis is supported in two ways, each susceptible of considerably more amplification than one such study can furnish: in terms of the application and influence of program upon practice in the works of its exponents; and in terms of subsequent impact upon artistic development generally.

The first has received little attention that will bear scrutiny; its further examination would comprise the ground for one continuation of my own dissertation. There are a limited number of admirably detailed studies of the relationship between Stravinsky's poetic and individual pieces of his music,[17] but no convincing assessment has built upon the analysis of theory in its bearing upon the overall pattern of his full oeuvre. The most persuasive current generalities remain unsubstantiated, more for a lack of thoroughgoing analytic of his poetic itself than for any deficiency in the musicological analysis of the individual pieces which have appeared thus far.

With Eliot, the generalizing of connections is far advanced and oft repeated in varying perspectives, but it seems unsupported by commensurate technical analysis. Thomas R. Rees's recently published study, The Technique of T. S. Eliot,[18] may bridge the gap, though it does not address itself directly to the enactment of critical formulations in Eliot's middle and later poetry. Recent Eliot collections such as Eliot in Perspective[19] and Eliot in His Time[20] indicate some turning of interest toward such a focus, as in essays like Donald Davie's "Anglican Eliot" and Gabriel Pearson's "Eliot: An American Use of Symbolism." In T. S. Eliot: Between Two Worlds, David Ward has recently written that "Eliot's 'classicism' was perhaps always a flimsy and uncertain reaction to the failure of Romanticism; more a matter of keeping the stubborn Romantic impulse, the deceptions of memory and desire, bridled and curbed. But the repressed fantasies chafe, gathering power yet remaining fundamentally unchanged."[21]

One index of what a more extended cross-relation of theory and practice might yield may be seen by noting more adequately the demonstrable relaxation in both men of their most rigorous stances as they grew older. As Joseph Chiari says: "The purely aesthetic emotion aimed at by Poe is unattainable through words; it can only be attained, and not always, in music or in pure mathematics; Stravinski has tried and succeeded in writing music which does not tell a story or express feelings but he did not keep up the effort for long."[22] Such evidence, considered alongside Eliot's own transfer of poetic energies (the word is possibly ill-chosen) to the writing of his late plays, then the lapse into silence, corroborates for many a conspicuous decline of the symbolist aesthetic in its neo-classic formulation and does so along the lines of its most cogent testing. The failure of the advocacy is to be seen in the defective practice and suggests the debilitating effects of an implicitly missapplied set of ideas to the salient artistic and cultural subject matter of the day.

Such a judgment tends to be confirmed in the weak performance of other artists subscribing to the main precepts. No one argues any longer that, given the perspective of half a century, the poetic of "shoring up" did in fact have great progenitive issue or that it gave decisive direction for major poetry and music to follow, though the works of a Poulenc or a later Auden (in whom the ideas, if not the method, of Eliot are apparently influential) often achieve a nostalgic polish and elegance of contour and expression which are ingratiating. At the same time, they bespeak most eloquently a suspect disengagement from generative conflicts, a disinclination toward the most vital involvement with a swiftly changing cultural matrix which, though turbulent and hectic in its development and vulgarizing in its effects, would have seemed the most plausible ground for productive mid-century engagement.

All this is to say nothing of more sinister aspects to be observed in what is commonly held to have developed from deceptively innocuous, anachronistic precepts into a more culpable elitism, the "belief" which may now be seen to tarnish the "poetry" in a variety of ways and degrees of participation. Of course, the word elitism has become one of our most threadbare clichés, as Susan Sontag has recently suggested,[23] and is presently a prime candidate for retirement from the critic's vocabulary before it gets to be the discredited categorical instrument for too many easy dichotomies of "good" and "bad." Ms. Sontag is, in the main, correct and her complaint timely. But George Steiner's repudiation of Eliot's special mode of adopted conservatism carries nevertheless a convincing ring when he relates the critical position of the 1930's to the civil holocaust in process by the time and to the publication of such detached statements as Notes on a

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Definition of Culture: the assertion that there "is something histrionic and psychologically suspect even in the bare exercise of stating an elitist canon"[24] gains credibility in the wake of World War II atrocities and subsequent exposures of authoritarian constructs which lent their perpetration tacit support. Steiner's charge exemplifies a general line of indictment which our own decade levies often and effectively against the more vulnerable, motive-exposed, and factional side of such positions as Eliot and Stravinsky, for their own combination of reasons, saw fit to expound in their middle, formulary years.[25] This is not the place to enumerate the pros and cons, to estimate the relevance or damaging *extent* of such incriminations, but only to indicate something of their nature and frequency and, in some aspects, of their appearance of irrefutability in the present perspective. Doubtless they have much to do with the presently devaluated status of both men as reliable guides, if rather less so as creative artists.

Such arguments as Steiner's, along with other, more favorable ones, do of course serve to reinforce the growing conviction which has been strengthened as a by-product of this study--that the connections between the psychological sets of the two men, combined with similar biographical stresses and practical strategies of the moment, have had a considerably more far-reaching influence on the precise articulation of theoretical stances and legislation of taste on their part than has been commonly recognized, or, at least, acknowledged. Two results of my study have been to place greater importance on both the personal and

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culturally "political" ingredients in the curious amalgam of voiced experience emerging from the artists' workshop, poetic, and polemic as one of the distinguishing features of a whole cultural confrontation. With Eliot especially, the acknowledgement of these mixed determinants is frequent and explicit. With Stravinsky it comes later, and is expressed with characteristic point: "The greatest crisis in my life as a composer was the loss of Russia, and its language not only of music but of words."[26]

One aftereffect is to relieve their somewhat suspect poetics of the severest obligations to theoretical rigor and to cast them much more in the light of pragmatic considerations of topical artistic concerns operating within an intensely "lived" and vicissitudinous context.

Recognition of this complex basis not only underlies the point-for-point description of nuclear poetic theory which has comprised the main matter of the dissertation (a position which may well seem, when described at length, merely hackneyed and wrongheaded today if one does not give due reference to the human, temporal contingencies), but it also illustrates how the easy intimacy of the late-developing friendship could trade upon such a wealth of mutual understanding and affinity. It reinforces our perception of the close experiential congruity the two men could enjoy so much. The account adds dimension, a measure of enhanced understanding, and ultimately a much-needed corrective to our view of what Spender called "revolutionary traditionalism" as it took shape and found focus in two of its most notable, and occasionally notorious, expressions; it comprises, moreover, a necessary element in that account Stravinsky and Craft have left of how the acquaintance came to be rounded-off in the moderating euphoria to which the truly eminent are finally entitled at a stage when each had by now recognized through mutual personal and practical struggles that aspect of endeavor in which "all artists know that they are part of the same thing."

Robert Musil took a dim view of his contemporaries who lamented artistic disorder and prophesied the collapse of a despiritualized Europe: "It is significant that these people were all bad at mathematics at school."[27] But that fact has not been ascertained of Stravinsky, who graduated in law before becoming a composer and who maintained throughout his life a zealous interest in matters of finance and taxes, or of Eliot, who for years found his work with the Bank of England more compatible to his effort to write poetry than other available literary occupations. Musil's mot has nevertheless its symbolic truth. Much in the twenties' quest for restored orders and reinvigorated absolutes had its roots in reaction against the encroachment of science and an increasingly quantified and technologized world. R. P. Blackmur's observation on contemporary apostles of a revived Order (too often based on somewhat nebulous restorations of nostalgically idealized traditions and irretrievable orthodoxies) is apt. "There is," he wrote, "an inner violence of this sort connected with every formidable assertion of order."[28]

Stravinsky's contrast between himself and Eliot on the one hand

and Schoenberg and Joyce on the other refers specifically to two allegedly divergent lines of development, not to sets of originally opposed premises or to distinctions between the nature and impact of initial accomplishments. While rejecting the oversimplification which casts the one artist-type as "stayers of the course" and the other as apostates from the early modernist faith, he makes clear that one of the valid "discriminations of modernisms" has centrally to do with roads not taken, with the differences between the search for "new forms of travel" and the business of "trying to refit old ships." The rest of the passage corroborates this interpretation in its tendency to self-vindication, a process urged by the continued recurrence of the question. It holds conspicuously true that neither Stravinsky nor Eliot in the wake of their first, explosive works, did in fact manage to take any relish in that most quintessential proclamation of early modernist credo, Klee's celebrated assertion, "I want to be as though newborn, knowing nothing, absolutely nothing of Europe."[29] Rather they are now noted for the advocacy of a directly opposed belief, faced with the question, and their strenuous attempts to refurbish and reintegrate Tradition are the evidence thereof.

Europe, "the mind of Europe," was for Eliot a synthesized evocation of Virgil, Dante, Baudelaire, the hybrid and civilized cumulation of centuries of classic and Christian accretions, extending through its achievements and, in recent centuries, its corruptions (to which the Pelagian heresy seems to have been the foremost contributor). For a young, estranged American poet without, as Gabriel Pearson says, a viable native tradition upon which to build the sort of poetry he thought it necessary to the time to write,[30] the model of English poetry lay at hand. Eliot adopted it, in the idiosyncratic phrasing of The Sacred Wood and later critical essays, as "that which we know." Fragmented the whole might seem, but its remnants could still be shored against what otherwise must be regarded as portents of ruin, cultural and individual. Stravinsky, cut adrift by a maelstrom of his own, that most specific and cataclysmic upheaval in his native land, found the concept of the revolutionary to be progressively repellent, and was less and less able to square the revolutionary element in his own genius with its outer and newly-derived historical connotations. Though he continued to give every sign of wanting to be, with Rimbaud before him, "absolument moderne" (and in a modish, Parisian sense like that of his friends--Cocteau, Chanel, Claudel--he managed to be so), Stravinsky was in fact bereft of the most direct links to a live, native tradition in the event of his renunciation of Russia after its revolution, and his consequent, self-imposed deracination. He found that, like Eliot, he needed "Europe," as his whole invocation of musical tradition (albeit a peculiarly chosen one) continued to declare. For decades the central Stravinskyan crux has dealt with the success/failure he experienced in his search for that artistic sustenance.

Faced with a shared deprivation, confronted with a highly personal Blick ins Chaos, both men found themselves increasingly separated from cohorts of previous years by their refusal to turn their backs on Europe, tradition, its old orders, "form." The unthinkability of such a break as is indicated in Klee's dictum is everywhere echoed in the pages of The Criterion, as it is in the manifestoes that began to preface Stravinsky's neo-classic "restorations."

Stravinsky lived to witness in full flower a post-war resurgence of anti-cultural expression in the anti-Art phenomena of the sixties, heirs in hip trappings to Klee's early call. His quips on the passing parade of Sunset Boulevard (near which he resided), the happenings and aleatoric quirks of a post-Webernian musical life, and assorted freaks of the contemporary scene are not only perceptive and pungent, but also reflect a capacity for reconciliation which would have been plainly impossible for the taut, doctrinaire Stravinsky of forty years previous, caught up in the "inner violence" and rhetoric of his polemic years. Eliot died in 1965, and did not see the thing through to quite such Frankensteinian emergence, or if so did not make his updated observations a matter of public record. One can only guess how he would have regarded Stravinsky's reaction to the "scene" in 1969 as efforts to co-opt borrowings from probability and indeterminacy theories made aesthetic "news" among young composers: "The answers of the computer-Sphinx will be 'insignificant variables.' But what are the invariables? A natural traction attached to a mind divided by the attempt to hold up a shattered wall of beliefs on one side while holding back an encroaching scientific analysis wall on the other?"[31]

Throughout his later writings Stravinsky displayed the "natural traction" of such a uniquely "divided mind." Intensely interested in the "new"--new means, new methods--he yet asks "whether they are related to art, for they seem to kill even the possibility of it: parvo in multum, to reverse the slogan."[32] He warns the young musician who looks to "historical imperatives" for guidance that "music is made out of musical imperatives only"[33] and notes, with Eliot of fifty years before, that "musical languages seem to develop by new infusions of emotion, or new emphases and combinations of emotion, in correspondence with shifts and changes--losses as well as additions--in vocabulary."[34] But even remarks of such tenor are offset by a responsiveness to the nowness of his situation (even if it is an ironic one) and a brisk reference to the very current notion that it "is still generally thought of as art if it is shown in a gallery, and as music if it takes place in premises traditionally associated with concerts. Another way of knowing is by way of the dealers who are obliged to keep the racket going. Their formula, and it seems to be working very well, is 'Buy now on the likelihood that it may later turn out to be Art.'"[35]

Roman Vlad has written that "the main problem, on the solution of which the very survival of music as a coherent form of aesthetic expression would seem to depend, is to restore to music the unity of language it had lost as a result of the post-Romantic dilemma,"[36] and his is an authoritative voice for what has appeared to many as not only a musical but a general crisis. Certainly Stravinsky and Eliot, in their criticism as well as their art, are prime exemplars of that very dilemma. Their responses are by now a matter of more extensive public record than is the case with any other major creative men of their privileged, burdened generation, though their thoughts are stated in different formats. They spoke to the problems of their maturity in the only authenticity worth discussing, one which subsumes a man's full range of concerns--emotional, political, aesthetic, rational, religious; the effort to limn that response in dimension, balance, and perspective has been the broad aim of this study. The corresponding accounts of Schoenberg, of Joyce, and of whichever other figures best represent the other sides of the watershed posed in Klee's edict would be, of course, another part of the story which others will be telling in the development of an aesthetic topography adequate to the desired "discrimination of modernisms."

Eliot had written in his doctoral dissertation of the philosopher Leibniz that his "orthodoxy [was] more alarming than others' revolution."[37] He also wrote thirty years later in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism that "those who speak of Wordsworth as the original Lost Leader . . . should make pause and consider that when a man takes politics and social affairs seriously the difference between revolution and reaction may be by the breadth of a hair" (p. 73). Taken together the two reflect and testify to the intricacy of Eliot's own pivotal shift as he moved beyond The Sacred Wood and continued to sift the myriad aspects of his own "post-Romantic dilemma." That his topical writings proved so universally resonant is one measure of his great intelligence and capacity for memorable phrasing, even as it makes alarming to some the orthodoxy which they see as eventually compromising his energies and image-making talent.

But the two statements also point up a strong continuity within change which remains one of the hallmarks of Eliot's integrity, as it helps resolve some of the questions of his development. The road from Prufrock to The Elder Statesman is a long, winding, and sometimes disappointing one, even as is the one connecting Petrouchka with The Rake's Progress (to say nothing of Stravinsky's whole final period); to admirers of the freshest, most powerful manifestations of an earlier, emergent era, it is often a sobering passage to contemplate. For many it has seemed one long decline. But there is also the heartening reflection that the Symphony of Psalms and Four Quartets also lie along that way, and they too survive as milestones along the approaches to what became a most complex and sometimes mystifying lifelong purpose.

Irving Kolodin offered, on the occasion of the composer's death, an encomium which might well have pertained as well to Eliot, for its description holds intriguingly true for both men: "The miracle of Stravinsky is how much he created with a vocabulary that was constantly changing as he mastered his craft and applied it to the varied priorities of his long lifetime."[38]

Stravinsky, indulging both his penchant for the apt borrowing and the self-defining comment, had said it another way shortly before in concluding an interview given at age 85: "'Myself I must remake,' Yeats's poem says. And so must we all" (RC, p. 50).

At their last meeting, poet and composer went out for dinner in New York with Mrs. Stravinsky and the new Mrs. Eliot. Observing that Eliot's marriage, from appearances, was "undoubtedly the happiest event of his life," Stravinsky recalls how his friend mentioned a special

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fondness for East Fifty-Second Street because "it is a dead-end, which makes it so convenient" (TE, p. 128). Later, despite this melancholic beginning, Eliot, who was becoming noticeably feeble, seemed to "leap a little in spirit"[39] as, warmed by the wines, he decided to shed his pullover, exposing flamboyant braces in the process, as a ringside of Le Pavillon patrons (luxe, calme, and fat bank accounts) gazed on aghast."[40] Stravinsky does not conceal his enjoyment of the ambiguity of solemnity and showmanship in the poet's performance, a blending for which he himself had long exhibited his own distinct flair. His continuing version of the evening's denouement provides the best possible coda for the partial rendering of their shared world I have tried to give.

Stravinsky remembers that "Eliot was a touching figure that night" and, in closing, tells how "stopping for our coats on our way out of the restaurant, we could not help overhearing the maitre d'hotel say to the vestiare that 'there you see the greatest living poet and the greatest living composer together.'"[41] Then, in the last words he writes of their times together, Stravinsky quotes his wife Vera, whose sense of tact, as it must often have done, proved once more equal to a possibly embarrassing situation when she "saved the day by saying in just the right tone, 'Well, they do their best.'"[42]

NOTES

[1] *The Destructive Element* (New York, 1936); *The Creative Element* (New York, 1954); *The Struggle of the Modern* (London, 1963); and *Love-Hate Relations* (New York, 1974).

[2] *Paracriticisms: Seven Speculations of the Times* (Urbana, Ill., 1975).

[3] Richard Ellmann and Charles Feidelson, eds., *The Modern Tradition* (New York, 1965).

[4] Renato Poggioli, *The Theory of the Avant-Garde* (New York, 1968).

[5] Ortega's essay, "The Dehumanization of Art" (Madrid, 1925), is the classic early statement and has not been substantially improved upon for its basic insight and articulation of modernist mainsprings. Other more tentative attempts were, and continued to be, frequent. For another excellent formulation see Edwin Muir, *Transitions* (New York, 1926).

[6] *The Tradition of the New* (New York, 1959).

[7] Irving Howe, "The Idea of the Modern," in *The Idea of the Modern* (New York, 1967). Also see *Decline of the New* (New York, 1970).

[8] Robert Langbaum, *The Poetry of Experience* (New York, 1957) and *The Modern Spirit* (New York, 1970); Frank Kermode, *Romantic Image* (London, 1968), *The Sense of an Ending* (New York, 1967), *Continuities* (London, 1968), and *The Classic* (New York, 1975); Jacques Barzun, *Classic, Romantic, and Modern* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961); and John Cage, *Silence* (Middletown, Conn., 1961), *Notations* (New York, 1969), *Liberation* (Middletown, Conn., 1971), *M: Writings* (Middletown, Conn., 1973), and also *A Year from Monday* (Middletown, Conn., 1967).

[9] *The Poetry Wreck* (New York, 1975). Mr. Shapiro has long carried on a running battle with what he has called "official" or "criticism poetry," inveighing against what he calls the domination of poetry via "the establishment of a culture orthodoxy," the canon of which is centered in the work and thought of Pound, Eliot, Richards, Hulme, Stevens, Valéry, Joyce, among others. Shapiro's opening shots were

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fired in two essays, "What's the Matter with Poetry" and "The Death of Literary Judgment," both published in the early 1960's. Kathleen Nott had earlier made a cogent attack on the more flagrant pretenses of the new orthodoxy in The Emperor's Clothes (Bloomington, 1954).

[10] The Ironic Harvest (London, 1974).

[11] George Steiner, In Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes towards the Redefinition of Culture (New Haven, 1971).

[12] "Neo-Classicism in the Twentieth Century: A Study of the Idea and its Relationship to Selected Works of Stravinsky and Picasso," Dissertation Abstracts International, 33 (1972), 677A (Syracuse University).

[13] Barzun, p. 154.

[14] See Michael Steinberg, "Tradition and Responsibility," Perspectives of New Music, 1, No. 1 (Fall 1962) for a resume of Schoenberg's attitudes on the subject. Style and Idea (New York, 1950) reflects the composer's somewhat oddly rationalized "traditionalization" of his work throughout several essays.

[15] Though Eliot still thought in 1947 that the "proper end of the romantic is to achieve the classic" ("Lecon de Valéry," The Listener, 37 [January 9, 1974], p. 72), he had long before noted that it "must not be forgotten that a poet in a romantic age cannot be a 'classical' poet except in tendency" (SE, p. 424). To this should be added his perception that it is much easier to be a classicist in criticism than it is in poetry. Eliot probably harbored few illusions about the likelihood of a classical renascence in a time when romantic feeling (as he defined it) remained predominant. That he ceased to write poetry is one indication that he recognized the futility of his "quarrel with the age."

[16] T. S. Eliot, "Leibniz' Monads and Bradley's Finite Centers," Appendix II, Knowledge and Experience (London, 1964), p. 198.

[17] These include Edward T. Cone, "Stravinsky: The Progress of a Method," in Perspectives on Schoenberg and Stravinsky (Princeton, 1968); and Laurence Morton, "Stravinsky and Tchaikovsky: Le Baiser de la Fée," in P. H. Lang, Stravinsky: A Reappraisal (New York, 1963).

[18] The Technique of T. S. Eliot (The Hague, 1974).

[19] Graham Martin, ed., Eliot in Perspective (London, 1970).

[20] A. Walton Litz, ed., Eliot in His Time (Princeton, 1973).

[21] T. S. Eliot: Between Two Worlds (London, 1973), pp. 248-49.

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[22] Joseph Chiari, *Symbolism from Poe to Mallarmé* (London, 1956), p. 106.

[23] Susan Sontag, "Notes on Art, Sex and Politics," *New York Times*, Section 2, 8 February, 1976, pp. 1 and 36.

[24] Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, p. 88.

[25] Sontag says of New Left orthodoxies: "Diagnoses of cultural sickness made in such general and self-congratulatory terms become a symptom of the problem, not part of the answer" ("Notes," p. 36). The knife cuts both ways. Elitism is characteristically smug.

[26] Stravinsky and Craft, *Themes and Conclusions* (London, 1972), p. 33. V. S. Pritchett said of Nabokov that the "country that replaces his lost native land is language" ("Nabokov's Touch," *New York Review of Books*, 2 November, 1974, p. 3.

[27] Quoted in Francis Hope, Review of Stephen Spender's *The Struggle of the Modern*, *The Review*, No. 8 (April 1963), p. 47.

[28] R. P. Blackmur, *The Lion and the Honeycomb* (New York, 1955), p. 166. "Eliot," he says, "is a substance besieged by orders."

[29] Quoted in Barzun, p. 145.

[30] See Gabriel Pearson, *Eliot in Perspective*, pp. 94-95. "One--that of Whitman--is prophetic celebration of the very forces that had disinherited him (Eliot). The other . . . Poe--is too unauthoritative to offer much in its American version." Stravinsky, trying to go forward, stood in much the same relation to his Russian antecedents.

[31] Stravinsky and Craft, *Themes and Conclusions*, p. 35.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Roman Vlad, *Stravinsky*, tr. Frederick and Ann Fuller (London, 1960), p. 176.

[37] T. S. Eliot, *Knowledge and Experience*, Appendix II, p. 195.

[38] In Saturday Review of Literature, 55, 8 July, 1972, p. 73.

[39] The phrase occurs in a description by Stravinsky of his own composing habits (RC, p. 111).

[40] Stravinsky and Craft, Themes and Conclusions, p. 72.

[41] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[42] Ibid., p. 72.

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